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PP-Module for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access Systems

NIAP Logo
Version: 2.0
2025-03-31
National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

VersionDateComment
2.02025-03-31Incorporate NIAP Technical Decisions, Update to CC:2022
1.02022-03-31Initial Release
0.52022-01-20Conversion to PP-Module;
Updated to include WPA 3 and Wi-Fi 6.
WPA 3 is required. WPA 2 can additionally be included in the ST.
256 bit keys are required. 128 and 192 bit keys can additionally be included in the ST.
Mandated Distributed TOE

Contents

1Introduction1.1Overview1.2Terms1.2.1Common Criteria Terms1.2.2Technical Terms1.3Compliant Targets of Evaluation1.3.1TOE Boundary1.4Use Cases2Conformance Claims3Security Problem Definition3.1Threats3.2Assumptions3.3Organizational Security Policies4Security Objectives4.1Security Objectives for the Operational Environment4.2Security Objectives Rationale5Security Requirements5.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device Security Functional Requirements Direction 5.1.1 Modified SFRs 5.1.1.1Cryptographic Support (FCS)5.1.1.2Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.1.1.3Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)5.2TOE Security Functional Requirements5.2.1Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs5.2.2Security Audit (FAU)5.2.3Cryptographic Support (FCS)5.2.4Identification and Authentication (FIA)5.2.5Security Management (FMT)5.2.6Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.2.7TOE Access (FTA)5.2.8Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)5.3TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale6Consistency Rationale6.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition 6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements Appendix A - Optional SFRsA.1Strictly Optional Requirements A.1.1Auditable Events for Optional SFRsA.1.2Cryptographic Support (FCS)A.2Objective Requirements A.3Implementation-dependent Requirements Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements B.1Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRsB.2Cryptographic Support (FCS)B.3Identification and Authentication (FIA)Appendix C - Extended Component DefinitionsC.1Extended Components TableC.2Extended Component DefinitionsC.2.1Cryptographic Support (FCS)C.2.1.1FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSecC.2.2Identification and Authentication (FIA)C.2.2.1FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) AuthenticationC.2.2.2FIA_PSK_EXT Pre-Shared Key CompositionC.2.3Security Management (FMT)C.2.3.1FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management RestrictionsAppendix D - Implicitly Satisfied RequirementsAppendix E - Allocation of Requirements in Distributed TOEsAppendix F - Entropy Documentation and AssessmentAppendix G - AcronymsAppendix H - Bibliography

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The scope of this PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access System (AS) in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP:

This Base-PP is valid because a WLAN AS is a device at the edge of a private network that establishes an encrypted IEEE 802.11 link that protects wireless data in transit from disclosure and modification. A network device typically implements this functionality.

Access Point (AP)

A TOE that conforms to a Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) containing this PP-Module can either be a standalone or distributed TOE as defined in the NDcPP. For distributed TOEs, the expectation for this PP-Module is that a WLAN AS is composed of a single controller and one or more access points (APs).

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance
Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)
Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)
A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
 Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE
A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)
Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)
A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)
An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)
A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

1.2.2 Technical Terms

Access Point (AP)
 A device that provides the network interface that enables wireless client hosts to access a wired network.
Service Set Identifier (SSID)
 The primary name associated with an 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN).
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
 A wireless computer network that links two or more devices using wireless communication to form a local area network within a limited area such as a home, school, computer laboratory, campus, office building, etc.

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

This PP-Module specifically addresses WLAN (IEEE 802.11) ASes. A compliant WLAN AS is a system composed of hardware and software that is connected to a network and has an infrastructure role in the overall enterprise network. In particular, a WLAN AS establishes a secure wireless (IEEE 802.11) link that provides an authenticated and encrypted path to an enterprise network and thereby decreases the risk of exposure of information transiting “over-the-air”.

Since this PP-Module extends the NDcPP, conformant TOEs are obligated to implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in response to the threat environment discussed subsequently herein.

1.4 Use Cases

[USE CASE 1] Standalone Device
The TOE is a standalone network device that serves as a single network endpoint that provides connectivity to wireless clients.
[USE CASE 2] Distributed System
The TOE is a distributed system consisting of multiple network devices that collectively serve as the wireless network endpoint. In addition to claiming the relevant "Distributed TOE" requirement in the NDcPP, this use case also requires the TOE to claim the optional SFR FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB to describe the key distribution method between distributed TOE components.

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.
CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.
PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:
Package Claim

The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SFRs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSF and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made.

3 Security Problem Definition

This PP-Module is written to address the situation when network packets cross the boundary between a wired private network and a wireless client via a WLAN AS. The WLAN Access System provides secure communication between a user (wireless client) and a wired (trusted) network by supporting security functions such as administration, authentication, encryption, and the protection and handling of data in transit. To protect the data in transit from disclosure and modification, a WLAN AS is used to establish secure communications. The WLAN AS provides one end of the secure cryptographic tunnel and performs encryption and decryption of network packets in accordance with a WLAN AS security policy negotiated with its authenticated wireless client. It supports multiple simultaneous wireless connections and is capable of establishing and terminating multiple cryptographic tunnels to and from those peers.

The proper installation, configuration, and administration of the WLAN AS are critical to its correct operation.

Note that this PP-Module does not repeat the threats identified in the NDcPP, though they all apply given the conformance and hence dependence of this PP-Module on the NDcPP. Note also that while the NDcPP contains only threats to the ability of the TOE to provide its security functions, this PP-Module addresses only threats to resources in the Operational Environment (OE). Together the threats of the NDcPP and those defined in this PP-Module define the comprehensive set of security threats addressed by a WLAN AS TOE.

3.1 Threats

T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to conduct unauthorized activities. If malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network, or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices (e.g., as a result of nonexistent or insufficient WLAN data encryption that exposes the WLAN data in transit to rogue elements), then those internal devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
Devices located outside the protected network may seek to exercise services located on the protected network that are intended to be only accessed from inside the protected network or only accessed by entities using an authenticated path into the protected network.
T.TSF_FAILURE
Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management, privileged modes of process execution) to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms could lead to a compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in a compromise of the TSF.
T.DATA_INTEGRITY
Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to modify the data without authorization. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.
T.REPLAY_ATTACK
If an unauthorized individual successfully gains access to the system, the adversary may have the opportunity to conduct a “replay” attack. This method of attack allows the individual to capture packets traversing throughout the wireless network and send the packets at a later time, possibly unknown by the intended receiver.

3.2 Assumptions

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (OE) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an OE that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality. All assumptions for the OE of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module.
A.CONNECTIONS
It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE's security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

All objectives for the OE of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module.
OE.CONNECTIONS
TOE administrators will ensure that the TOE is installed in a manner that will allow the TOE to effectively enforce its policies on the network traffic of monitored networks.

4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions and organizational security policies map to operational environment security objectives.
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale
Assumption or OSPSecurity ObjectivesRationale
A.CONNECTIONSOE.CONNECTIONS The OE objective OE.CONNECTIONS is realized through A.CONNECTIONS.

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

5.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the Network Device as a whole and evaluated against the NDcPP. The following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the NDcPP in addition to what is mandated by Section 5.2.

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the NDcPP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

5.1.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

This SFR has been modified from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate the inclusion of certain selections, and add additional AES modes utilized in WLAN technology.

The text of the requirement is replaced with:

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, CCM mode Protocol (CCMP), and [selection: CTR, GCM, GCMP, no other] modes and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits and [selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, no other key sizes] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2020,[selection: CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772, GCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38D and IEEE 802.11ax-2021, no other standards].

Application Note: This requirement is modified from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating the selection of CBC mode and 256 bit key sizes while also defining additional AES mode and key size selections not present in the original definition.

This requirement mandates two modes for AES with a key size of 256 bits being implemented. It is not expected that these modes will both be used for all encryption and decryption functionality. Rather, the mandates serve particular purposes: to comply with the FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 requirements, CBC mode is mandated, and to comply with IEEE 802.11-2020, AES-CCMP (which uses AES in Counter Mode with CBC-Message Authentication Code (CCM) as specified in SP 800-38C) must be implemented.

For the first selection of FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption, the ST author should choose the additional mode or modes in which AES operates. For the second selection, the ST author should choose the key sizes that are supported by this functionality. 256-bit CCMP is required in order to comply with FCS_CKM.1/WPA. Note that optionally AES-CCMP-192, AES-CCMP-128, AES-GCMP-192, and AES-GCMP-128 with cryptographic key size of 256 bits, may be implemented for IEEE 802.11ax-2021 connections. In the future, one of these modes may be required.

CTR mode is not used for WLAN AS capabilities but remains selectable since it may be required by another part of the TSF.



Evaluation Activities:
TSS
There are no additional TSS evaluation activities for this component beyond what the NDcPP requires.

Guidance
There are no additional guidance evaluation activities for this component beyond what the NDcPP requires.

Tests
In addition to the tests required by the NDcPP, the evaluator will perform the following testing:

AES-CCM Tests

The evaluator will test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

Two payload lengths. One payload length will be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. The other payload length will be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits).

Two or three associated data lengths. One associated data length will be 0, if supported. One associated data length will be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. One associated data length will be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits). If the implementation supports an associated data length of 216 bytes, an associated data length of 216 bytes will be tested.

Nonce lengths. All supported nonce lengths between 7 and 13 bytes, inclusive, will be tested.

Tag lengths. All supported tag lengths of 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 bytes will be tested.

Due to the restrictions that IEEE 802.11 specifies for this mode (nonce length of 13 and tag length of 8), it is acceptable to test a subset of the supported lengths as long as the selections fall into the ranges specified above. In this case, the evaluator will ensure that these are the only supported lengths. To test the generation-encryption functionality of AES-CCM, the evaluator will perform the following four tests:

To determine correctness in each of the above tests, the evaluator will compare the ciphertext with the result of generation-encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for each combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator will supply a key value and 15 nonce, associated data and ciphertext 3-tuples, and obtain either a fail result or a pass result with the decrypted payload. The evaluator will supply 10 tuples that should fail and 5 that should pass per set of 15.

Additionally, the evaluator will use tests from the IEEE 802.11-02/362r6 document “Proposed Test vectors for IEEE 802.11 TGi”, dated September 10, 2002, Section 2.1 AES-CCMP Encapsulation Example and Section 2.2 Additional AES-CCMP Test Vectors to verify further the IEEE 802.11-2020 implementation of AES-CCMP.

5.1.1.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

This SFR is functionally identical to what is defined in the NDcPP except that the specific self-test of verifying the integrity of TSF executable code has been mandated as a minimum baseline for the requirement. Other self-tests may still be claimed at the ST author's discretion.

Any element that is not specified in this section is unchanged from its definition in the Base-PP. The text of the requirement is replaced with:

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests: [ ] to verify the correct operation of the TSF: [integrity verification of stored TSF executable code through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen] and if failure detected [take action as specified in FPT_TST_EXT.1.2.]. Application Note: This SFR is modified from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating that self-testing occur at power on and that the self-testing must include, at minimum, an integrity test using a digital signature. FCS_COP.1/SigGen is defined in the NDcPP.

Evaluation Activities
TSS

The evaluator will examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution, which includes the generation and protection of the “check value” used to ensure integrity as well as the verification step. This description will also cover the digital signature service used in performing these functions. The evaluator also checks the operational guidance to ensure that any actions required by the administrator to initialize or operate this functionality are present.

The evaluator will also ensure that the TSS or operational guidance describes the actions that take place for successful and unsuccessful execution of the integrity test.

Guidance

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS or operational guidance describes the actions that take place for successful and unsuccessful execution of the integrity test.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

5.1.1.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

This SFR has been modified from its definition in the Base-PP to mandate communications protocols that are necessary for a WLAN AS. Any element that is not mentioned in this section is unchanged from its definition in the Base-PP.

The text of the requirement is replaced with:

FTP_ITC.1.1: The TSF shall be capable of using IEEE 802.1X, [selection: IPsec, RADIUS over TLS] and [selection: SSH, TLS, DTLS, HTTPS, no other protocols] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: 802.1X authentication server, audit server, [selection: authentication server, [assignment: other capabilities], no other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

Application Note: This requirement has been modified from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate the communications protocols and environmental components that a WLAN AS must use for infrastructure communications (802.11 support is also required for wireless client communications, but this is covered by the FTP_ITC.1/Client SFR in this PP-Module). IPsec or RADIUS over TLS (commonly known as "RadSec") is required at least for communications with the 802.1X authentication server. Other selections may be made if needed by other parts of the TSF. The requirement implies that not only are communications protected when they are initially established, but also on resumption after an outage.

The IT entity of "802.1X authentication server" is distinct from "authentication server" because the latter may be used for administrator authentication rather than authorization of WLAN clients.

If "IPsec" is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 from the NDcPP must be claimed. If "RADIUS over TLS" is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed, as well as FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the Functional Package for TLS, version 2.0. SSH is defined in the Functional Package for SSH, version 2.0.

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

Table 2: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1/WLAN
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
No events specifiedN/A
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
Attempts to access the 802.1X controlled port prior to successful completion of the authentication exchange.Provided client identity (e.g. Media Access Control [Media Access Control (MAC)] address).
Failed authentication attempt.Provided client identity (e.g. MAC address).
FIA_UAU.6
Attempts to re-authenticate.Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FMT_SMF.1/AccessSystem
No events specifiedN/A
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FPT_FLS.1/AS
Failure of the TSF.Indication that the TSF has failed with the type of failure that occurred.
FTA_TSE.1
Denial of a session establishment due to the session establishment mechanism.Reason for denial, origin of establishment attempt.
FTP_ITC.1/Client
No events specifiedN/A

5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1/WLAN Audit Data Generation

The TSF shall be able to generate audit data of the following auditable events:
  1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
  2. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
  3. [Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs table (Table 2)
    The modified audit events for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FTP_ITC.1 and FPT_TST_EXT.1 have been omitted from the respective audit tables due to a change in the syntax making it impossible to add an audit entry for an SFR that is not defined within the PP-Module itself. The modifications made to these SFRs' audit events can likely be covered through application of the original audit events or modification to the NDcPP itself. If this is insufficient, these SFRs may need to be converted to iterations instead of modified SFRs.
  4. Failure of wireless sensor communication
    5. ]
.
Application Note:

The auditable events defined in Table 2 and Table 8 are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module and are intended to extend FAU_GEN.1 in the Base-PP. The events in the Auditable Events table should be combined with those of the NDcPP in the context of a conforming Security Target.

If the ST includes any selection-based SFRs, the selection for "Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs table" must be selected. If no selection-based SFRs are included, "no other events" should be selected. The Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs (Table 8) include audit records for selection-based SFRs. The auditing of selection-based SFRs is only required if that SFR is included in the ST.

Per FAU_STG.1 in the Base-PP, the TOE must support transfer of the audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel.

The TSF shall record within the audit data at least the following information:
  1. Date and time of the auditable event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
  2. For each auditable event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP, PP-Module, functional package or ST, [ information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table in which the auditable event was defined].

5.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)

It's not clear how CNSA 1.0 requirements are applied (if at all) to 802.11 crypto. This comment also applies to FCS_CKM.2/GTK and FCS_CKM.2/PMK. No substantive changes have been made to these SFRs yet. The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF-384 and [selection: PRF-512, PRF-704, no other algorithm]] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits and [selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, no other key sizes]] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1 that meet the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020 and [selection: IEEE 802.11ax-2021, no other standards]].
Application Note:

The cryptographic key derivation algorithm required by IEEE 802.11-2020 (Section 12.7.1.2) and verified in WPA2 certification is PRF-384, which uses the HMAC-SHA-1 function and outputs 384 bits. The use of GCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11ax-2021 (Section 12.5.5) and requires a Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on HMAC-SHA-256 (for 128-bit symmetric keys) or HMAC-SHA-384 (for 256-bit symmetric keys). This KDF outputs 704 bits.

This requirement applies only to the keys that are generated or derived for the communications between the AP and the client once the client has been authenticated. It refers to the derivation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK), through the Random Bit Generator (RBG) specified in this PP-Module, as well as the derivation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) from the Pairwise Master Key (PMK), which is done using a random value generated by the RBG specified in this PP-Module, the HMAC function as specified in this PP-Module, as well as other information. This is specified in IEEE 802.11-2020, primarily in chapter 12. FCS_RBG.1 is defined in the NDcPP.

FCS_CKM.2/GTK Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK)

The TSF shall distribute Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [selection: AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame, AES Key Wrap with Padding in an EAPOL-Key frame] that meets the following: [NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE 802.11-2020 for the packet format and timing considerations] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note: This requirement applies to the Group Temporal Key (GTK) that is generated by the TOE for use in broadcast and multicast messages to clients to which it is connected. 802.11-2020 specifies the format for the transfer as well as the fact that it must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.

FCS_CKM.2/PMK Cryptographic Key Distribution (PMK)

The TSF shall receive the 802.11 Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [from 802.1X Authorization Server] that meets the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note: This requirement applies to the Pairwise Master Key that is received from the RADIUS server by the TOE. The intent of this requirement is to ensure conformant TOEs implement 802.1X authentication prior to establishing secure communications with the client. The intent is that any WLAN AS evaluated against this PP-Module will support both WPA2-Enterprise and WPA3-Enterprise at a minimum and certificate-based authentication mechanisms and therefore disallows implementations that support only pre-shared keys. Because communications with the RADIUS server are required to be performed over a protected connection, the transfer of the PMK will be protected.

5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.
The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865 and 3579.
The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.
Application Note:

This requirement covers the TOE's role as the authenticator in an 802.1X authentication exchange. If the exchange is completed successfully, the TOE will obtain the PMK from the RADIUS server and perform the four-way handshake with the wireless client (supplicant) to begin 802.11 communications.

As indicated previously, there are at least three communication paths present during the exchange; two with the TOE as an endpoint and one with the TOE acting as a transfer point only. The TOE establishes an EAP over Local Area Network (EAPOL) connection with the wireless client as specified in 802.1X-2007. The TOE also establishes (or has established) a RADIUS protocol connection protected either by IPsec or RadSec (TLS) with the RADIUS server. The wireless client and RADIUS server establish an EAP-TLS session (RFC 5216); in this transaction the TOE merely takes the EAP-TLS packets from its EAPOL/RADIUS endpoint and transfers them to the other endpoint. Because the specific authentication method (TLS in this case) is opaque to the TOE, there are no requirements with respect to RFC 5126 in this PP-Module. However, the base RADIUS protocol (2865) has an update (3579) that will need to be addressed in the implementation and evaluation activities. Additionally, RFC 5080 contains implementation issues that will need to be addressed by developers but which levy no new requirements.

The point of performing 802.1X authentication is to provide access to the network (assuming the authentication was successful and that all 802.11 negotiations are performed successfully); in the terminology of 802.1X, this means the wireless client has access to the "controlled port" maintained by the TOE.

TLS is defined in the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 2.0.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating

The TSF shall re-authenticate the administrative user under the conditions [when the user changes their password, [selection: following TSF-initiated session locking, [assignment: other conditions], no other conditions]].

5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/AccessSystem Specification of Management Functions (WLAN Access Systems)

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
  • Configure the security policy for each wireless network, including:
    • Security type
    • Authentication protocol
    • Client credentials to be used for authentication
    • SSID
    • If the SSID is broadcasted
    • Frequency band set to [selection: 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, 6 GHz]
    • Transmit power level
]

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_FLS.1/AS Failure with Preservation of Secure State

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [failure of the self-tests].
Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to express the fail secure capabilities that the TOE possesses. This means that the TOE must be able to attain a secure, safe state (shutdown) when any of the identified failures occur.

5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)

FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment

The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment of a wireless client session based on [TOE interface, time, day, [selection: [assignment: other attributes], no other attributes]].
Application Note:

The “TOE interface” can be specified in terms of the device in the TOE that the WLAN client is connecting to (e.g. specific WLAN APs). “Time” and “day” refer to time-of-day and day-of-week, respectively.

The assignment is to be used by the ST author to specify additional attributes on which denial of session establishment can be based. In the case of standalone TOEs with a single interface, the "based on TOE interface" restriction is inherently met.

5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1/Client Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (WLAN Client Communications)

This SFR will need to be revisted when the CC:2022 version of the NDcPP's definition of FTP_ITC.1 is available. For now, slight language updates have been made to bring it closer to the CC:2022 definition of this SFR while still maintaining the overall spirit of this requirement. The TSF shall provide a communication channel using WPA3-Enterprise, WPA2-Enterprise and [selection: WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, WPA2-PSK, no other modes] as defined by IEEE 802.11-2020 between itself and WLAN clients that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
The TSF shall permit [the authorized IT entities] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [no services].

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:

Table 3: SFR Rationale
ThreatAddressed byRationale
T.NETWORK_​DISCLOSUREFCS_COP.1/DataEncryption (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by utilizing secure encryption and decryption algorithms to protect data.
FTP_ITC.1 (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure channel for administrative traffic (e.g., 802.1X traffic, audit server).
FCS_CKM.1/WPAMitigates the threat by utilizing a secure key generation function for WPA functionality.
FCS_CKM.2/GTKMitigates the threat by securely distributing GTK keys to clients.
FCS_CKM.2/PMKMitigates the threat by securely receiving a key from an authentication server.
FIA_8021X_EXT.1Mitigates the threat by authenticating clients before allowing access to the controlled network.
FIA_UAU.6Mitigates the threat by re-authenticating users when specified criteria are met.
FTA_TSE.1Mitigates the threat by denying sessions based on undesirable characteristics.
FTP_ITC.1/ClientMitigates the threat by providing a secure channel for WLAN client traffic.
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB (optional)Mitigates the threat by securely distributing 802.11 keys to clients.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure RADIUS implementation to authenticate clients.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure TLS configuration for RADIUS over TLS.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by verifying server identifiers when utilizing RADIUS over TLS.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by generating and/or accepting secure pre-shared keys.
T.NETWORK_​ACCESSFIA_8021X_EXT.1Mitigates the threat by authenticating clients before allowing access to the controlled network.
FIA_UAU.6Mitigates the threat by re-authenticating users when specified criteria are met.
FMT_SMF.1/AccessSystemMitigates the threat by defining management functions that must be protected.
FMT_SMR_EXT.1Mitigates the threat by preventing remote administration functions from being exercised from a wireless client.
FTA_TSE.1Mitigates the threat by denying sessions based on undesirable characteristics.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure RADIUS implementation to authenticate clients.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure TLS configuration for RADIUS over TLS.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by verifying server identifiers when utilizing RADIUS over TLS.
T.TSF_​FAILUREFPT_TST_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by testing the TSF for correct operation and entering a failure state if the tests fail.
FAU_GEN.1/WLANMitigates the threat by notifying administrators of irregular operation that could indicate a failure.
FPT_FLS.1/ASMitigates the threat by attaining a secure state upon any self-test failures.
T.DATA_​INTEGRITYFCS_COP.1/DataEncryption (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by encrypting data in transit to protect its confidentiality and integrity.
FTP_ITC.1 (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure channel for administrative traffic (e.g., 802.1X traffic, audit server) that maintains data confidentiality and integrity.
FCS_CKM.1/WPAMitigates the threat by generating a secure key used to encrypt and protect wireless traffic using WPA.
FCS_CKM.2/GTKMitigates the threat by securely distributing GTK keys to clients so that they are not disclosed, maintaining the integrity of the data the key is used to protect.
FCS_CKM.2/PMKMitigates the threat by securely receiving a key from an authentication server so that it is not disclosed, maintaining the integrity of the data the key is used to protect.
FTP_ITC.1/ClientMitigates the threat by providing a secure channel for WLAN client traffic that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the data.
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB (optional)Mitigates the threat by securely distributing 802.11 keys to clients so that they are not disclosed, maintaining the integrity of the data the key is used to protect.
T.REPLAY_​ATTACKFCS_COP.1/DataEncryption (modified from Base-PP)Mitigates the threat by utilizing secure encryption and decryption algorithms to protect data from disclosure, modification, or replay.
FCS_CKM.1/WPAMitigates the threat by utilizing a secure key generation function for WPA functionality that is not subject to replay or guessing.
FCS_CKM.2/GTKMitigates the threat by securely distributing GTK keys to clients so that they are not disclosed, maintaining confidentiality and preventing replay.
FCS_CKM.2/PMKMitigates the threat by securely receiving a key from an authentication server so that it is not disclosed, maintaining confidentiality and preventing replay.
FIA_8021X_EXT.1Mitigates the threat by authenticating clients before allowing access to the controlled network and preventing replay of previous authentication sessions.
FIA_UAU.6Mitigates the threat by re-authenticating users when specified criteria are met, which can include if a specified time has passed or other indicators of stale authentication data.
FTA_TSE.1Mitigates the threat by denying sessions based on undesirable characteristics, which can include a detection of replay or other indicators of stale authentication data.
FTP_ITC.1/ClientMitigates the threat by providing a secure channel for WLAN client traffic that prevents the use of replayed data.
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB (optional)Mitigates the threat by securely distributing 802.11 keys to clients so that they are not disclosed, maintaining confidentiality and preventing replay.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure RADIUS implementation to authenticate clients, which protects authentication data from replay attacks.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by utilizing a secure TLS configuration for RADIUS over TLS, which provides protection against replay and data modification.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 (selection-based)Mitigates the threat by verifying server identifiers when utilizing RADIUS over TLS, preventing impersonation attacks that could lead to replay.

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module extends the NDcPP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a network device. This PP-Module just defines the TOE as a specific type of network device with functional capabilities distinct to that type.

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 4: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (NDcPP base)
PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSPConsistency Rationale
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSUREThis threat extends the security problem defined by the Base-PP to include the threat of a malicious entity in an untrusted network interacting with a protected entity in a trusted network. This is not addressed in the Base-PP because not all network devices are responsible for facilitating communications between separate networks. This threat is also consistent with the T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS threat defined by the Base-PP because compromise of data in transit is one potential way this threat may be exploited.
T.NETWORK_ACCESSThis threat extends the security problem defined by the Base-PP to include the threat of a malicious entity in an untrusted network interacting with a protected entity in a trusted network. This is not addressed in the Base-PP because not all network devices are responsible for facilitating communications between separate networks.
T.TSF_FAILUREThis threat is an extension of the T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE threat defined by the Base-PP.
T.DATA_INTEGRITYThis threat is a specific type of failure that may result from successful exploitation of the T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY threat defined by the Base-PP. It is an extension of the Base-PP threat for communications that are specific to this PP-Module.
T.REPLAY_ATTACKThis threat is a specific type of failure that may result from successful exploitation of the T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS and T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATIONS_CHANNELS threats defined by the Base-PP. It is an extension of the Base-PP threat for communications that are specific to this PP-Module.
A.CONNECTIONSThe Base-PP does not define where in a particular network architecture a network device must be deployed since it is designed to be generic to various types of network devices. This PP-Module defines the expected architectural deployment specifically for WLAN AS network devices.

6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

Table 5: Consistency of OE Objectives (NDcPP base)
PP-Module OE ObjectiveConsistency Rationale
OE.CONNECTIONSThe Base-PP does not define where in a particular network architecture a network device must be deployed since it is designed to be generic to various types of network devices. This PP-Module defines the expected architectural deployment specifically for WLAN AS network devices.

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the NDcPP that are needed to support Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access System functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the NDcPP is being used for its intended purpose. The PP-Module also identifies a number of modified SFRs from the NDcPP that are used entirely to provide functionality for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access Systems. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the NDcPP are as follows:
Table 6: Consistency of Requirements (NDcPP base)
PP-Module RequirementConsistency Rationale
Modified SFRs
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryptionThis PP-Module modifies the Base-PP's definition of the SFR by adding additional AES modes consistent with the standards referenced in the Base-PP and by mandating specific selections that are relevant to the technology type of the PP-Module.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 For CC:2022 Part 2 conformance this SFR may be replaced in the next NDcPP release with FPT_TST.1. If so, then corresponding changes will need to be made here as well. Additionally, the modified audit event associated with this modified SFR has been removed due to an incompatibility with the schema. The audit event modifications do not materially change the requirements laid out in the Base-PP. This PP-Module modifies the Base-PP's definition of the SFR by defining a minimum baseline for what self-tests must be run. Additional self-tests may still be specified by the ST author.
FTP_ITC.1 For CC:2022 updates, the modified audit events associated with this SFR have been removed. The modified audit events are not fundamentally different from those already defined in the Base-PP for the SFR (both events would already fall into the category of 'Failure of the trusted channel functions', as detection of modification would cause an integrity error and failure of a trusted channel) and new PP syntax is incompatible with modified audit events. This PP-Module modifies the Base-PP's definition of the SFR by specifying a minimum baseline of required communications protocols and also includes additional protocols not originally defined by the Base-PP. The original protocols specified in the Base-PP may still be selected by the ST author.
Additional SFRs
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the NDcPP is the base.
Mandatory SFRs
FAU_GEN.1/WLANThis SFR iterates the FAU_GEN.1 SFR defined in the Base-PP to define auditable events for the functionality that is specific to this PP-Module.
FCS_CKM.1/WPAThis SFR defines additional cryptographic functionality not defined in the Base-PP, but it implements this using the DRBG mechanism already defined in the Base-PP.
FCS_CKM.2/GTKThis SFR defines additional cryptographic functionality not defined in the Base-PP that is used for functionality outside the original scope of the Base-PP.
FCS_CKM.2/PMKThis SFR defines additional cryptographic functionality not defined in the Base-PP that is used for functionality outside the original scope of the Base-PP.
FIA_8021X_EXT.1This SFR defines support for 802.1X communications, which is a logical interface that extends the scope of what the Base-PP originally defined.
FIA_UAU.6This SFR defines support for re-authentication of wireless users, which are a type of subject beyond the scope of what the Base-PP originally defined.
FMT_SMF.1/AccessSystemThis SFR defines additional management functionality that is specific to the Module’s product type and would therefore not be expected to be present in the Base-PP.
FMT_SMR_EXT.1This SFR applies restrictions on when the execution of management functions is authorized. It does not prevent proper administration of the TSF.
FPT_FLS.1/ASThis SFR extends the functionality described by FPT_TST_EXT.1 in the Base-PP by defining the specific TSF reaction in the event of a failed self-test.
FTA_TSE.1This SFR applies restrictions on establishment of wireless communications, which is a logical interface that extends the scope of what the Base-PP originally defined.
FTP_ITC.1/Client This SFR iterates the FTP_ITC.1 SFR defined in the Base-PP to define trusted communication channels for the functionality that is specific to this PP-Module.
Optional SFRs
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIBThis SFR defines an additional use for the cryptographic and self-protection mechanisms defined in the Base-PP.
Objective SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.
Implementation-dependent SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent requirements.
Selection-based SFRs
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1This SFR defines the implementation of RadSec and the peer authentication method that it uses. This relies on the TLS requirements defined by the Base-PP and may also use the X.509v3 certificate validation methods specified in the Base-PP, depending on the selected peer authentication method.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2This SFR defines the implementation of RadSec when pre-shared key authentication is used. This functionality is outside the original scope of the Base-PP, but it relies on the TLS client protocol implementation, cryptographic algorithms, and random bit generation functions defined by the Base-PP.
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3This SFR defines the implementation of RadSec when pre-shared key authentication with RSA is used. This functionality is outside the original scope of the Base-PP, but it relies on the TLS client protocol implementation, cryptographic algorithms, and random bit generation functions defined by the Base-PP.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1This SFR defines parameters for pre-shared key generation. The Base-PP supports pre-shared keys as a potential authentication method for IPsec. This PP-Module does not prevent this from being used but does define restrictions on how pre-shared keys may be generated and what constitutes an acceptable key. This may also be used for RadSec, which is outside the original scope of the Base-PP.

Appendix A - Optional SFRs

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

A.1.1 Auditable Events for Optional SFRs

Table 7: Auditable Events for Strictly Optional Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
No events specifiedN/A

A.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB Cryptographic Key Distribution (802.11 Keys)

The TSF shall distribute the IEEE 802.11 keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [trusted channel protocol specified in FPT_ITT.1 (Base-PP)] that meets the following: [standards specified in the various iterations of FCS_COP.1] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note:

This requirement applies to any key necessary for successful IEEE 802.11 connections not covered by FCS_CKM.2/GTK. In cases where a key must be distributed to other APs, this communication must be performed via a mechanism of commensurate cryptographic strength. Because communications with any component of a distributed TOE are required to be performed over a trusted connection, the transfer of these keys will be protected.

FCS_COP.1 and FPT_ITT.1 are defined in the NDcPP.

A.2 Objective Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent SFRs.

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs

Table 8: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3
No events specifiedN/A
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A

B.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FTP_ITC.1.1.
The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.
The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [selection: X.509v3 certificates, pre-shared keys].
Application Note:

This SFR is applicable if "RADIUS over TLS" is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1.

If X.509v3 certificates is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 from the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 2.0 must be claimed. If pre-shared keys is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 and FIA_PSK_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2.
This SFR is a recreation of FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 as present in the NDcPP v2.2e with refinements and an additional element. It's unclear how this requirement should be handled moving forward as we move these types of requirements into the TLS FP. The TLS FP v2.0 contains some of the PSK ciphersuites listed here but not all of them. The TSF shall implement [selection: TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and no earlier TLS and SSL versions when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client that supports the following ciphersuites: [selection:
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
].
Application Note:

If any of the TLS_RSA_PSK ciphersuites are selected by the ST author, it is necessary to claim the selection-based requirement FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.

The above ciphersuites are only for use when the TSF is acting as a RADIUS over TLS client, not for other uses of the TLS protocol. The ciphersuites to be tested in the evaluated configuration are limited by this requirement. The ST author should select the ciphersuites that are supported. If "X.509v3 certificates" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, the ciphersuites selected in (and tested by) FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 are also supported for RADIUS over TLS client use.

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.
When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.
Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.

The rules for verification of identity are described in Section 6 of RFC 6125. The reference identifier is typically established by configuration (e.g. configuring the name of the authentication server). Based on a singular reference identifier’s source domain and application service type (e.g. HTTP, SIP, LDAP), the client establishes all reference identifiers which are acceptable, such as a Common Name for the Subject Name field of the certificate and a (case-insensitive) DNS name for the Subject Alternative Name field. The client then compares this list of all acceptable reference identifiers to the presented identifiers in the TLS server’s certificate.

The preferred method for verification is the Subject Alternative Name using DNS names, URI names, or Service Names. Verification using the Common Name is required for the purposes of backwards compatibility. Additionally, support for use of IP addresses in the Subject Name or Subject Alternative name is discouraged as against best practices but may be implemented. Finally, support for wildcards is discouraged but may be implemented. If the client supports wildcards, the client must follow the best practices regarding matching; these best practices are captured in the evaluation activity.

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall [selection: not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]] if the presented server certificate is deemed invalid.
Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.

Validity is determined by the identifier verification, certificate path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280. Certificate validity is tested in accordance with testing performed for FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev in the NDcPP.

B.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2.
The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for [selection: RADIUS over TLS (RadSec), IPsec, WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, IEEE 802.11 WPA2-PSK, [assignment: other protocols that use pre-shared keys]].
The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
  • are 22 characters and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
  • are composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).
The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.
Application Note:

This requirement must be included if IPsec or another protocol that uses pre-shared keys is claimed, and pre-shared key authentication is selected (e.g., "Pre-shared Keys" is selected in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 or "pre-shared keys" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2). The intent of this requirement is that all protocols will support both text-based and bit-based pre-shared keys.

For the length of the text-based pre-shared keys, a common length (22 characters) is required to help promote interoperability. If other lengths are supported, they should be listed in the assignment; this assignment can also specify a range of values (e.g., "lengths from 5 to 55 characters") as well.

For FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3, the ST author specifies whether the TSF merely accepts bit-based pre-shared keys or is capable of generating them. If it generates them, the requirement specifies that they must be generated using the RBG provided by the TOE.

Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:
Table 9: Extended Component Definitions
Functional ClassFunctional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec
Identification and Authentication (FIA)FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication
FIA_PSK_EXT Pre-Shared Key Composition
Security Management (FMT)FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

C.2 Extended Component Definitions

C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.1.1 FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of the RadSec (RADIUS over TLS) protocol.

Component Leveling

FCS_RADSEC_EXT123

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1, RadSec, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using a specified peer authentication method.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using pre-shared key authentication in a manner that conforms to relevant TLS specifications.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA, requires the TSF to validate the external entity used for trusted communications.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol and
[FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition
or FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation]

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [assignment: some authentication method].

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall implement [assignment: list of allowed TLS versions] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation shall support the following ciphersuites for use when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client: [assignment: list of supported ciphersuites].

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.1

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.2

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall [selection: not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]] if the presented server certificate is deemed invalid.

C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.2.1 FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of 802.1X port-based network access control.

Component Leveling

FIA_8021X_EXT1

FIA_8021X_EXT.1, 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication, requires the TSF to securely implement IEEE 802.1X as an authenticator.

Management: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the ST:

  • Attempts to access the 802.1X controlled port prior to successful completion of the authentication exchange

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:No dependencies

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865 and 3579.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.

C.2.2.2 FIA_PSK_EXT Pre-Shared Key Composition

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for the creation and composition of pre-shared keys used to establish trusted communications channels.

Component Leveling

FIA_PSK_EXT1

FIA_PSK_EXT.1, Pre-Shared Key Composition, requires the TSF to support pre-shared keys that meet various characteristics for specific communications usage.

Management: FIA_PSK_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_PSK_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for [selection: RADIUS over TLS (RadSec), IPsec, WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, IEEE 802.11 WPA2-PSK, [assignment: other protocols that use pre-shared keys]].

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
  • are 22 characters and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
  • are composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

C.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.3.1 FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe architectural restrictions on security administration that are not defined in CC Part 2.

Component Leveling

FMT_SMR_EXT1

FMT_SMR_EXT.1, No Administration from Client, requires the TSF to reject remote administration from a wireless client by default.

Management: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.3 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

This PP-Module has no implicitly satisfied requirements. All SFR dependencies are explicitly met either through SFRs defined by the PP-Module or inherited from the Base-PP.

Appendix E - Allocation of Requirements in Distributed TOEs

For a distributed TOE, the security functional requirements in this PP-Module need to be met by the TOE as a whole, but not all SFRs will necessarily be implemented by all components. The following categories are defined in order to specify when each SFR must be implemented by a component: The table below specifies how each of the SFRs in this PP-Module must be met, using the categories above.
Requirement Description Distributed TOE SFR Allocation
FAU_GEN.1/WLAN Audit Data Generation All
FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections) One
FCS_CKM.2/GTK Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK) Feature Dependent
FCS_CKM.2/PMK Cryptographic Key Distribution (PMK) Feature Dependent
FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication One
FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating Feature Dependent
FMT_SMF.1/AccessSystem Specification of Management Functions Feature Dependent
FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client All
FPT_FLS.1/AS Failure with Preservation of Secure State All
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment All
FTP_ITC.1/Client Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (WLAN Client Communications) All
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB Cryptographic Key Distribution (802.11 Keys) Feature Dependent
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec Feature Dependent
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys Feature Dependent
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA Feature Dependent
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition Feature Dependent

Appendix F - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

The TOE does not require any additional supplementary information to describe its entropy sources beyond the requirements outlined in the Base-PP.

Appendix G - Acronyms

Table 10: Acronyms
AcronymMeaning
AESAdvanced Encryption Standard
APAccess Point
ASAccess System
Base-PPBase Protection Profile
CBCCipher Block Chaining
CCCommon Criteria
CCMCounter Mode with CBC-Message Authentication Code
CCMPCCM mode Protocol
CEMCommon Evaluation Methodology
cPPCollaborative Protection Profile
CTRCounter (encryption mode)
EAPExtensible Authentication Protocol
GCMGalois-Counter Mode
GTKGroup Temporal Key
IPsecInternet Protocol Security
MACMedia Access Control
NDcPPNetwork Device collaborative Protection Profile
OEOperational Environment
PAEPort Access Entity
PMKPairwise Master Key
PPProtection Profile
PP-ConfigurationProtection Profile Configuration
PP-ModuleProtection Profile Module
PTKPairwise Transient Key
RADIUSRemote Authentication Dial In User Service
RBGRandom Bit Generator
SARSecurity Assurance Requirement
SFRSecurity Functional Requirement
SSIDService Set Identifier
STSecurity Target
TLSTransport Layer Security
TOETarget of Evaluation
TSFTOE Security Functionality
TSFITSF Interface
TSSTOE Summary Specification
WLANWireless Local Area Network
WPAWi-Fi Protected Access

Appendix H - Bibliography

Table 11: Bibliography
IdentifierTitle
[CC]Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
[CEM]Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
[NDcPP] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 4.0, 6 December 2023
[NDcPP SD] Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023