

# PP-Module for Session Border Controllers



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**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

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| Version | Date       | Comment   |
|---------|------------|---|
| 1.0     | 2022-12-05 | Initial Release                                   |
| 2.0     | 2026-03-17 | Apply NIAP Technical Decisions, Update to CC:2022 |

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

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The scope of this Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) is to describe the security functionality of a Session Border Controller (SBC) in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- Network Device collaborative Protection Profile Version 4.0

This Base-PP is valid because a device that implements an SBC is a specific type of network device, and there is nothing about the implementation of an SBC that would prevent any of the security capabilities defined by the Base-PP from being satisfied.

Note that the NDcPP defines an optional architecture for a “distributed TOE” that allows for security functionality to be spread across multiple distinct components. This PP-Module does not require or prohibit the TOE from being a distributed system when the TOE conforms to the NDcPP; the TOE may be standalone or distributed in this case.

## 1.2 Terms

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The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Assurance                              | Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].  |
| Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)      | Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.   |
| Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) | A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.   |
| Common Criteria (CC)                   | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).  |
| Common Criteria Testing Laboratory     | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
| Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)    | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.   |
| Direct Rationale                       | A type of Protection Profile, PP-Module, or Security Target in which the security problem definition (SPD) elements are mapped directly to the SFRs and possibly to the security objectives for the operational environment. There are no security objectives for the TOE.                  |

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Distributed TOE                                     | A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.   |
| Operational Environment (OE)                        | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.                   |
| Protection Profile (PP)                             | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.  |
| Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module. |
| Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)               | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.                   |
| Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)                | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.  |
| Security Functional Requirement (SFR)               | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.  |
| Security Target (ST)                                | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.   |
| Target of Evaluation (TOE)                          | The product under evaluation.   |
| TOE Security Functionality (TSF)                    | The security functionality of the product under evaluation.   |
| TOE Summary Specification (TSS)                     | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.   |

## 1.2.2 Technical Terms

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Enterprise Session Controller (ESC)        | A voice/video over IP (VVoIP) infrastructure device that is used to set up and tear down calls between VVoIP endpoints.  |
| H.323                                      | A communications protocol defined by the ITU Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T) that is used for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions with multiple participants. |
| Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP)      | A means of communication between a media gateway and a media gateway controller.   |
| Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) | A protocol that is used to provide multimedia (voice/video) streaming services with added security of encryption, message authentication and integrity, and replay protection.                       |
| Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)          | A communications protocol defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that is used for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions with multiple participants.                |

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

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This ~~PP-Module~~ specifically addresses SBCs that provide firewalling, interoperability, and security functions for ~~VVoIP~~ networks. The SBC also provides protected communication between trusted components of the network infrastructure.

The physical boundary of the SBC is defined by the operating system components storing or providing security functions and all software supplied by the vendor, including vendor modified components to the operating system. All the security functionality is contained and executed within the physical boundary of the device.


While the functionality that the ~~TOE~~ is obligated to implement in response to the described threat environment is detailed in later sections, a brief description is provided here. A compliant ~~TOE~~ will provide security functionality that addresses threats to itself. It must also protect communications between itself and an Internet Protocol Public Branch Exchange (~~IP-PBX~~) or another SBC by using a trusted channel. Some protocols required by this ~~PP-Module~~ make use of certificates; therefore, the SBC must securely store certificates and private keys.

Since this ~~PP-Module~~ builds on the NDcPP, conformant ~~TOEs~~ must implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this ~~PP-Module~~ in response to the threat environment discussed later in this document.

### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

An SBC is a security device composed of hardware and software connected to two or more distinct voice networks that provides security and interoperability functions. SBCs are deployed between peering service provider networks, service provider networks and enterprise networks, service provider networks and residential customers, or in some cases as a back-to-back user agent (~~B2BUA~~) that allows mobile users the ability to connect to their internal ~~VVoIP~~ network.

The following diagram represents a typical deployment of the ~~TOE~~ and its operational environment (~~OE~~). Note that the ~~TOE~~ boundary is limited to the physical boundary of the SBC device itself, and the trusted channels/paths that are established by the SBC.



**Figure 1: SBC Deployment Model**

## 1.4 Use Cases

This PP-Module defines a single potential use case for the SBC TOE:

### [USE CASE 1] Border Protection

The TOE is a specialized network device that provides firewall services for VoIP networks. The TOE is intended to provide protection against well-known threats that target these networks. The SBC examines headers and data values of packets and compares them to an Access Control List (ACL) to either permit or deny them to or through the SBC. The SBC is typically deployed between service providers for security, interoperability, translation, and transcoding purposes; between service providers and residential customers for security and interoperability purposes; or between service providers and enterprise networks for translation, transcoding, and security purposes. The SBC, as a border element, should also be able to establish a secure communication channel with external devices it communicates with.

## 1.5 Package Usage

This section contains selections and assignments that are required when the listed Functional Packages are claimed by this PP-Module.

Package Usage guidance defined in the TOE's relevant Base-PP applies to the usage of the packages for this module, unless explicitly stated otherwise in this section.

### Functional Package for X.509, Version 1.0

#### Certificate Verification and Assertion Required in FIA\_XCU\_EXT.1.1

Because this PP-Module mandates support for mutual authentication for ESC communications, the ST author shall select the options to both verify and assert certificate identities in FIA\_XCU\_EXT.1.1.

### **Limitations on Signature Algorithms in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1**

The **T.O.E.** must utilize appropriate cryptographic algorithms that conform to CNSA standards. Thus, the **T.O.E.** shall utilize no other algorithms outside of those specified in RFC 8603 for certificate or CRL signatures. Additionally, the **T.O.E.** shall not use ECDSA with SHA-512 signatures for OCSP responses, and shall utilize no other algorithms for OCSP responses.

### **Required Extension Processing for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2**

The **S.T.** author shall select the options to process the basicConstraints and extendedKeyUsage extensions. Other extensions may be selected as appropriate without restriction.

### **CRL or OCSP-based Revocation Required for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.3**

The **T.O.E.** must support revocation that only involves CRL or OCSP. Accordingly, the **T.O.E.** shall select only from options involving CRL or OCSP in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.3 (e.g., the selection to treat all certificates older than a given short timeframe is not an acceptable substitute or alternative for supporting CRL or OCSP).

### **Connections to CRL or OCSP Servers Required for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.4**

Because the **T.O.E.** is required to support CRL or OCSP, the **T.S.F.** shall support an appropriate mechanism for obtaining revocation status information. In the case of CRL, the **S.T.** author shall claim that revocation status information is obtained via network connection to a CRL distribution point. In the case of OCSP, the **S.T.** author shall claim that revocation status information is obtained via network connection to an OCSP responder, via OCSP stapling, or via OCSP multi-stapling.

### **Restrictions on Acceptable Key Usage Values for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.5**

The **T.O.E.** will always support the use of extendedKeyUsage values to verify that X.509 certificates are used in accordance with their intended purpose. Accordingly, the **S.T.** author shall claim that the **T.O.E.** supports the processing of extendedKeyUsage fields in the leaf certificate (as opposed to application of trust store context rules or passing the certification path or other supported context information to an external function) and shall select all values that are relevant to the claimed uses of X.509 in the **S.T.** In particular, since the **P.P.** does not define any functions that require the use of S/MIME, the **S.T.** author shall not select this as an extendedKeyUsage value to be validated.

### **Requirements on Functions for FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1**

The **S.T.** author shall ensure that the selections and assignments in this requirement reflect the **T.O.E.**'s usage of X.509 certificate validation for TLS. Other assignments and selections may be made as applicable for other **T.O.E.** functions.

## **Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 2.1**

### **DTLS or TLS Server and Client Functionality Required**

The **S.T.** author shall select the option to utilize TLS as both a server and client. The **S.T.** author shall additionally select the option to utilize DTLS as a server and client if support for DTLS is claimed in [FTP\\_ITC.1/ESC](#).

### **DTLS or TLS Mutual Authentication Required**

The **S.T.** shall select the option to support mutual authentication in FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1, or FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.1, according with the protocol support claimed in [FTP\\_ITC.1/ESC](#).

# 2 Conformance Claims

## Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [\[CEM\]](#) as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE\_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.

## CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.

## PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

- Network Device collaborative Protection Profile Version 4.0

## Package Claim

- This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS, version 2.1 conformant.
- This PP-Module is Functional Package for X.509, version 1.0 conformant.
- This PP-Module does not conform to any assurance packages.

The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SFRs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSE and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made.

# 3 Security Problem Definition

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the `T.OE` is expected to address, assumptions about its Operational Environment, and any organizational security policies that the `T.OE` is expected to enforce.

## 3.1 Threats

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The following threats that are defined in this `PP:Module` extend the threats that are defined by the `Base-PP`.

### **T.MALICIOUS\_TRAFFIC**

An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to the SBC to cause the network stack or services listening on TCP/UDP ports on the SBC or protected network to crash.

### **T.NETWORK\_ACCESS**

An attacker may send traffic through the `T.OE` that enables them to access devices in the `T.OE`'s `OE` without authorization.

### **T.RESOURCE\_EXHAUSTION**

An attacker may transmit network traffic to the `T.OE` that causes it to be unable to perform its functions on legitimate network traffic.

### **T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS**

An attacker may acquire sensitive `T.OE` or user data that is transmitted to or from the `T.OE` because an untrusted communication channel causes a disclosure of data in transit.

### **T.USER\_DATA\_REUSE**

User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the original sender, causing an unauthorized disclosure of the data.

## 3.2 Assumptions

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This `PP` defines no Assumptions beyond those defined in the claimed `Base-PP(s)`.

All assumptions for the `OE` of the `Base-PP` also apply to this `PP:Module`.

`A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION` is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the `T.OE` that are defined by the `Base-PP` and not the `PP:Module`.

## 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

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This `PP` defines no Organizational Security Policies beyond those defined in the claimed `Base-PP(s)`.

# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

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All objectives for the OE of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction

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In a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the Network Device as a whole and evaluated against the NDcPP. The following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the NDcPP in addition to what is mandated by [Section 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements](#).

### 5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the NDcPP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

#### 5.1.1.1 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

##### FTP\_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

This SFR has been modified to mandate the use of TLS for inter-TSF trusted channels in the TOE. Any element not mentioned in this section is unchanged from its original definition.

The text of FTP\_ITC.1.1 is replaced with:

**FTP\_ITC.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of using **TLS as defined in the Functional Package for TLS and [selection: IPsec, SSH as defined in the Functional Package for SSH, DTLS as defined in the Functional Package for TLS, HTTPS, no other protocol ]** to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, **[selection: authentication server, [assignment: other capabilities], no other capabilities]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2:** The TSF shall permit [*the TSF, the authorized IT entities*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**Application Note:** TLS is mandated for SIP trunking as required by [FIA\\_SIPT\\_EXT.1](#).

## 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

### 5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

**Table 1: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements**

| Requirement    | Auditable Events                             | Additional Audit Record Contents  |
|----------------|--|---|
| FAU_ARP_EXT.1  | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FAU_GEN.1/SBC  | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FAU_SAA.1      | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FAU_SEL.1      | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FDP_IFC.1      | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FDP_IFF.1      | Any modifications to the B2BUA policy.       | No additional information.  |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1  | Application of traffic filtering rules.      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Source and destination of observed traffic.</li> <li>• Rule relevant to observed traffic.</li> <li>• Result of rule evaluation.</li> </ul> |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2  | Application of traffic filtering rules.      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Source and destination of observed traffic.</li> <li>• Rule relevant to observed traffic.</li> <li>• Result of rule evaluation.</li> </ul> |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1  | Application of deep packet inspection rules. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Source and destination of observed traffic.</li> <li>• Rule relevant to observed traffic.</li> <li>• Result of rule evaluation.</li> </ul> |
| FFW_NAT_EXT.1  | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FIA_SIPT_EXT.1 | All SIP trunk authentication attempts.       | Username and IP address of the service provider.  |
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC  | All management actions.                      | Identifier of initiator.  |
| FRU_PRS_EXT.1  | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FRU_RSA.1      | No events specified                          | N/A   |
| FTP_ITC.1/ARP  | Initiation of the trusted channel.           | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel.  |

|                 |   |  |
|-----------------|---|--|
|                 | Termination of the trusted channel.       | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                 | Failure of the trusted channel functions. | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
| FTP_ITC.1/ESC   | Initiation of the trusted channel.        | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                 | Termination of the trusted channel.       | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                 | Failure of the trusted channel functions. | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
| FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP | Initiation of the trusted channel.        | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                 | Termination of the trusted channel.       | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                 | Failure of the trusted channel functions. | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |

## 5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1 Security Audit Automatic Response

#### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall be capable of using [**selection:** *TLS, IPsec, SSH, HTTPS, SNMPv3*] to transmit potential security violations to an external IT entity in the OE upon detection.

**Application Note:** The selected protocols must be reflected in FTP\_ITC.1.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.1](#)

##### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to transmit potential security violations to an alert receiver in the operational environment.*

##### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the TOE so that it is able to communicate potential security violations to an alert receiver in the operational environment using the selected protocols.*

##### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall deploy the TOE in an environment that contains an alert receiver in the operational environment. The evaluator shall configure the TOE to communicate with an alert receiver in the manner that is specified by the operational guidance. The evaluator shall deploy a*

packet capture tool that is capable of sniffing the traffic between the TOE and the alert receiver. For each type of potential security violation that is defined by the ST, the evaluator shall cause that potential security violation to occur on the TOE, including configuring the TOE to detect the behavior as a potential security violation if it is necessary to do so.

Depending on what the TSF considers to be potential security violations, it may be necessary for the evaluator to set up traffic generators, heat guns, or other equipment that is used to simulate potential security violations.

After this is done, the evaluator shall observe via use of the packet capture tool and direct interaction with the alert receiver that the TSF transmitted the potential security violation and that it correctly used the selected protocols.

## FAU\_GEN.1/SBC Audit Data Generation (Session Border Controller)

### FAU\_GEN.1.1/SBC

The TSF shall be able to generate audit data of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit;
- c. [All administrative actions;
- d. Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs table (Table 1)
- e. [**selection:** Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs table ( Table 5), Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs table ( Table 6), no other events]

].

**Application Note:** The auditable events defined in the Auditable Events table are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module. For any SFRs that are included as part of the TOE based on the claimed Base-PP, it is expected that any applicable auditable events defined for those SFRs in the Base-PP are also claimed as part of the TSF.

The Base-PP iteration of the SFR also requires “all administrative actions” to be audited. When the TOE includes this PP-Module, it is expected that this will also include the administrative actions that support the PP-Module defined in [FMT\\_SMF.1/SBC](#).

If the ST includes any implementation-dependent or selection-based SFRs, the selection for "Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs table" or "Auditable events listed in the Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs table" must be made, respectively. If no implementation-dependent or selection-based SFRs are included, "no other events" should be selected. The auditing of each implementation-dependent or selection-based SFR is only required if that SFR is included in the ST.

A CDR is expected to be generated at the start of a session, at the end of a session, and during a session at an interval or time period specified by the ST author.

### FAU\_GEN.1.2/SBC

The TSF shall record within the audit data at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the auditable event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
- b. For each auditable event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the **PP**, **PP-Module**, functional package, or **ST**, [information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table in which the auditable event was defined].

## Evaluation Activities

### **FAU\_GEN.1/SBC**

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to determine that it identifies the **TOE**'s auditable events. If the **TOE** is distributed across multiple components, the evaluator shall also ensure that the **TSS** identifies the component that is responsible for each type of auditable event.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events and provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the **PP-Module** and claimed in the **ST** is described, and that the description of the fields contains the information required in **FAU\_GEN.1.2/SBC** and the additional information specified in the Auditable Events table of the **PP-Module**.

If the **TOE**'s default configuration does not include all required auditable events, the evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure that it includes instructions on how to place the **TOE** into its evaluated configuration by ensuring that all required auditable events are generated.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall test the **TOE**'s ability to correctly generate audit records by having the **TOE** generate audit records in accordance with the **EAs** associated with the functional requirements in the **PP-Module**. Additionally, the evaluator shall test that each administrative action applicable in the context of the **PP-Module** is auditable. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the operational guidance, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, the testing that is performed to ensure that the operational guidance provided is correct will verify that **AGD\_OPE.1** is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

## **FAU\_SAA.1 Potential Violation Analysis**

### **FAU\_SAA.1.1**

The **TSE** shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the **SFRs**.

### **FAU\_SAA.1.2**

The **TSE** shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:

- a. Accumulation or combination of [**assignment:** *subset of defined auditable events*] known to indicate a potential security violation;
- b. [**assignment:** *any other rules*].

**Application Note:** Examples of monitored audited events include authentication failures, self-test failures, or environmental failures (e.g., temperature violation).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FAU\\_SAA.1](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the **TSS** describes the conditions that will be flagged by the **TSE** as a potential security violation and whether these conditions are administratively configurable.

#### **Guidance**

If the conditions that are flagged by the **TSE** as a potential security violation are configurable, the evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine that it describes how an administrator can configure potential security violations.

#### **Tests**

Testing for this **SER** is completed in conjunction with [FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.1](#). This **SER** is tested by causing each type of potential security violation defined by the **TSE** and observing that they are correctly treated as such.

## FAU\_SEL.1 Selective Audit

### FAU\_SEL.1.1

The **TSE** shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all auditable events based on the following attributes:

- a. [event type]
- b. [**assignment:** *list of additional attributes that audit selectivity is based upon*]

**Application Note:** The auditable events associated with traffic filtering rules (see the [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2](#) and [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1](#) rows in [Table 1](#) above) may generate a significant volume of traffic that make them impractical to generate on a persistent basis. The **TOE** must have the ability to generate these records when necessary but this **SER** exists to allow for the generation of those events to be suppressed when the **TOE** is in its evaluated configuration.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FAU\\_SEL.1](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to verify that it identifies the auditable events that can be suppressed and the filters that can be applied to suppress them. For example, if **TOE** has the ability to suppress the generation of events related to the application of rules, the evaluator shall examine the **TSS** to determine whether this suppression is done globally, on a per-rule basis, etc.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it identifies the auditable events that can be suppressed and instructions for enabling and disabling the generation of these events.

### **Tests**

For each auditable event that can be disabled, the evaluator shall configure the TOE to enable all auditable events, perform actions against the TOE that cause these events to be generated, and verify that the corresponding events are generated. The evaluator shall then disable the generation of a specific type of event, repeat the activity, and verify that a corresponding event is not generated.

For cases where multiple event types can be suppressed in this manner, or multiple mechanisms exist to selectively suppress events, the evaluator shall repeat this test as many times as necessary to ensure that each mechanism is validated. For example, if the suppression of audit records for application of traffic filtering rules can be configured globally, on a per-rule basis, and on a per-subject basis, the evaluator shall ensure that all three mechanisms of suppression are tested individually.

## **5.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)**

### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1 Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol**

#### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSS shall implement the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that complies with RFC 3711, and use Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) in compliance with RFC 4568 to provide key information for the SRTP connection.

#### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.2**

The TSS shall implement SDES-SRTP supporting the following ciphersuites: [AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, in accordance with RFC 7714].

**Application Note:** This requirement specifies that the SRTP session that will be used to carry the VoIP traffic will be keyed according to an SDES dialog using one of the identified ciphersuites. The ST author should select all ciphersuites that are supported.

#### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.3**

The TSS shall ensure the SRTP NULL algorithm [**selection:** is disabled, can be disabled by a [security administrator]].

#### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.4**

The TSS shall allow the SRTP ports to be used for SRTP communications to be specified by a [security administrator].

### **Evaluation Activities** ▼

#### **FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1**

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to do the following:

- Support the use of SRTP and the ciphersuites that are supported by the SRTP implementation.

- Disable the *SRTP* NULL algorithm automatically or provide the ability for it to be disabled by a security administrator.
- Provide the ability for a security administrator to specify the *SRTP* ports used for *SRTP* communications.

### Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the *TSS* describes the ability of the *TOE* to do the following:

- How to configure the ciphersuites used by *SRTP*.
- [conditional, if “can be disabled by a [security administrator]” is selected in [FCS\\_SRTP\\_EXT.1.3](#)] How to disable use of the *SRTP* NULL algorithm.
- How to specify the ports used for *SRTP* communications.

### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test *FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1:1*:
  1. If necessary, configure the *TOE* to use *SRTP*.
  2. Deploy a packet capture tool that is capable of sniffing traffic on the network interface where *SRTP* traffic will be transmitted.
  3. Establish an *SRTP* connection with the *TOE* and verify using packet captures and audit logs that *SRTP* communications are established and that encrypted traffic is transmitted over the *SRTP* channel.
  4. Repeat this test for each ciphersuite supported for the *SRTP* implementation.
- Test *FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1:2*:
  1. Deploy a packet capture tool that is capable of sniffing traffic on the network interface where *SRTP* traffic will be transmitted.
  2. [conditional, if “can be disabled by a [security administrator]” is selected in [FCS\\_SRTP\\_EXT.1.3](#)] Configure the *TOE* to disable use of the *SRTP* NULL algorithm.
  3. Transmit *SRTP* NULL message to the *TOE* and observe that it is rejected.
- Test *FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1:3*:
  1. Configure the *TOE* to use a specified port for *SRTP* traffic.
  2. Deploy a packet capture tool that is capable of sniffing traffic on the network interface where *SRTP* traffic will be transmitted.
  3. Transmit *SRTP* traffic to the *TOE* and observe that the traffic is transmitted over the specified port.
  4. Configure the *TOE* to use a different port for *SRTP* traffic.
  5. Transmit *SRTP* traffic to the *TOE* and observe that the traffic is transmitted over the newly-specified port.

## 5.2.4 User Data Protection (FDP)

### FDP\_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control

#### FDP\_IFC.1.1

The *TSE* shall enforce the [B2BUA policy] on [caller-callee pairs attempting to communicate through the *TOE*].

### Evaluation Activities

## *FDP\_IFC.1*

*The evaluation of this ~~SSR~~ is performed as part of FDP\_IFF.1.*

### **FDP\_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes**

#### FDP\_IFF.1.1

The ~~TSSF~~ shall enforce the [~~B2BUA~~ policy] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [**assignment**: *method by which the ~~TSSF~~ identifies each endpoint for a call*].

#### FDP\_IFF.1.2

The ~~TSSF~~ shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [*when valid communication through the ~~TOE~~ is attempted, the ~~TSSF~~ will establish a connection between itself and the caller; the ~~TSSF~~ will establish a second connection between itself and the callee; and the ~~TSSF~~ will redirect all communications that it receives between the two endpoints out through the proper connection*].

#### FDP\_IFF.1.3

The ~~TSSF~~ shall enforce the [*following configurable behavioral rules*: [**selection**:

- *Default-deny (allowlist) posture*: If configured, the ~~TSSF~~ will implicitly deny all information flows except for those explicitly authorized by the ~~TSSF~~.
- *Default-allow (denylist) posture*: If configured, the ~~TSSF~~ will implicitly allow all information flows except for those explicitly denied by the ~~TSSF~~.

]].

#### FDP\_IFF.1.4

The ~~TSSF~~ shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [*if the ~~TSSF~~ is operating in an allowlist posture, any calling parties that are present on the allowlist (identifiable by calling number, source IP address, or communications protocols) are explicitly authorized*].

#### FDP\_IFF.1.5

The ~~TSSF~~ shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [*if the ~~TSSF~~ is operating in a denylist posture, any calling parties that are present on the denylist (identifiable by calling number or source IP address, or communications protocols) are explicitly denied*].

### **Evaluation Activities** ▼

#### *FDP\_IFF.1*

##### **~~TSS~~**

*The evaluator shall review the ~~TSS~~ to verify that it describes the ability of the ~~TOE~~ to function as a ~~B2BUA~~ and that it provides the ability to operate in either an allowlist or a denylist posture.*

##### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to verify that it provides instructions for setting the ~~TOE~~ into either an allowlist or a denylist posture and for how to add or remove entries from the allowlist or denylist.*

## Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FDP\_IFF.1:1: Configure a custom ACL to deny a call originating from an IP address or subnet. Make a call from that IP address or subnet and verify the call cannot be completed. Verify calls from any other IP address or subnet will complete a call.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:2: Configure a custom ACL to only permit a call originating from an IP address or subnet. Make a call from that IP address or subnet and verify the call can be completed. Verify calls from another IP address or subnet cannot be completed.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:3: Configure a custom ACL to deny a call destined for an IP address or subnet. Make a call to that IP address or subnet and verify the call cannot be completed. Verify calls to any other IP address or subnet will complete a call.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:4: Configure a custom ACL to only permit a call destined to an IP address or subnet. Make a call to that IP address or subnet and verify the call can be completed. Verify calls to any other IP address or subnet will not complete a call.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:5: Configure a custom ACL to deny a call using a certain signaling (e.g. SIP) or media (e.g. RTP) protocol. Make a call using that protocol and verify the call cannot be completed. If other signaling (e.g. H.323) or media (e.g. SRTP) protocols are supported, verify that they can be used to complete a call while this ACL is in effect.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:6: Configure a custom ACL to only permit a call using a certain signaling (e.g., SIP) or media (e.g., RTP) protocol. Make a call using that protocol and verify the call can be completed. If other signaling (e.g. H.323) or media (e.g. SRTP) protocols are supported, verify that they cannot be used to complete a call while this ACL is in effect.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:7: On the TOE, configure an allowlist of allowed callers by calling number and all other numbers to be blocked. Verify the configuration through the audit log. Call through the TOE from each one of the allowlisted numbers. Verify that each number can complete. Attempt a call through the TOE from other non-allowlisted numbers. Verify that the calls cannot complete.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:8: On the TOE, configure an allowlist of allowed callers by IP address and all other IP addresses to be blocked. Verify the configuration through the audit log. Call through the TOE from each one of the allowlisted IP addresses. Verify that each IP address can complete. Change the IP address of the endpoints; however, keep the calling number the same. Attempt a call through the TOE from new IP addresses. Verify that the calls cannot complete.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:9: On the TOE, configure a denylist of disallowed callers by calling number and all other numbers to be allowed. Verify the configuration through the audit log. Attempt to call through the TOE from each one of the denylisted numbers. Verify that each number cannot complete. Call through the TOE from other non-denylisted numbers. Verify that the calls can complete.
- Test FDP\_IFF.1:10: On the TOE, configure a denylist of disallowed callers by IP address and all other IP addresses to be allowed. Verify the configuration through the audit log. Attempt to call through the TOE from each one of the denylisted IP addresses. Verify that each IP address cannot complete. Change the IP address of the endpoints; however, keep the calling number the same. Attempt a call through the TOE from new IP addresses. Verify that the calls can complete.

## 5.2.5 Firewall (FFW)

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1 Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering

#### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall perform traffic filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

#### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall allow the definition of traffic filtering for real-time communications traffic using the following network protocol fields:

- IPv4
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- IPv6
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- TCP (**for signaling channel**)
  - source port
  - destination port
- UDP (**for signaling channel**)
  - source port
  - destination port
- Distinct Interface (**physical versus virtual or trust zone, e.g., trusted versus untrusted**)
- [Application (Real-Time Communications Protocol)
  - signaling protocols: [**selection: SIP, H.323**]]

**Application Note:** Real-time communications traffic can use multiple transport protocols and ports. Therefore, traffic filtering rules should be defined using the network protocol fields above, and one type of traffic may require multiple rules to be applied.

If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SER [FTP\\_ITC.1/H323](#).

#### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.3

The TSSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with traffic filtering rules: permit or drop with the capability to log the operation **for each specific rule defined**.

**Application Note:** Whether or not logging is performed may be applied to individual rules or groups of rules on an independent basis. For example, if there are six rules defined, the TOE should allow for any subset of these rules to be logged, independent of one another.

#### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.4

The TSSF shall allow the traffic filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

#### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5

The TSSF shall:

- Accept a network packet without further processing of traffic filtering rules if it matches an allowed established session for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, based on the following network packet attributes:
  - TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, flags
  - UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports
- Remove existing traffic flows from the set of established traffic flows based on the following: [**selection:** *session inactivity timeout, completion of the expected information flow*].

FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.6

The TSS shall process the applicable traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order.

FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.7

The TSS shall deny packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.

## Evaluation Activities

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.1](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS provides a description of the TOE's initialization or startup process, which clearly indicates where processing of network packets begins to take place, and provides a discussion that supports the assertion that packets cannot flow during this process.*

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS also includes a narrative that identifies the components (e.g., an active entity such as a process or task) involved in processing the network packets and describes the safeguards that would prevent packets flowing through the TOE without applying the ruleset in the event of a component failure. This could include the failure of a component, such as a process being terminated, or a failure within a component, such as memory buffers being full to the point where they cannot process packets.*

#### **Guidance**

*The guidance documentation associated with this element is assessed in the subsequent test EAs.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following test:*

*The evaluator shall attempt to get network traffic to flow through the TOE while the TOE is being initialized. A steady flow of network packets that would otherwise be denied by the ruleset should be sourced and directed to a host. The evaluator shall verify, using a packet sniffer, that none of the generated network traffic is permitted through the firewall during initialization.*

*The evaluator shall attempt to get network traffic to flow through the TOE while the TOE is being initialized. A steady flow of network packets that would be permitted by the ruleset should be sourced and directed at a host. The evaluator shall verify, using a packet sniffer, that none of the generated network traffic is permitted through the TOE during initialization and is only permitted once initialization is complete.*

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes a packet filtering policy and the following attributes are identified as being configurable within traffic filtering rules for the associated protocols:*

- IPv4/IPv6
  - Source address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
  - Destination Address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
  - Transport Layer Protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, TCP+UDP)
- TCP/UDP (for signaling channel)
  - Source Port
  - Destination Port
- Distinct interface (physical or virtual or trust zone, e.g., trusted or untrusted)
- Application (Real-Time Communications Protocol)
  - Signaling (whatever is claimed by the TSE; SIP, H.323, or both)

The evaluator shall verify that each rule can identify the following actions: permit or drop with the option to log the operation. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies all interface types subject to the packet filtering policy and explains how rules are associated with distinct network interfaces.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation identifies the following attributes as being configurable within traffic filtering rules for the associated protocols:

- IPv4/IPv6
  - Source address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
  - Destination Address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
  - Transport Layer Protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, TCP+UDP)
- TCP/UDP (for signaling channel)
  - Source Port
  - Destination Port
- Distinct interface (physical/virtual or trust zone, e.g., trusted/untrusted)
- Application (Real-Time Communications Protocol)
  - Signaling (whatever is claimed by the TSE; SIP, H.323, or both)

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation indicates that each rule can identify the following actions: permit, drop, and log.

### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.2:1: The evaluator shall use the instructions in the guidance documentation to test that stateful packet filter firewall rules can be created that permit, drop, and log packets for each of the following attributes:
  - IPv4/IPv6
    - Source address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
    - Destination Address (e.g., 10.0.0.1/16, 10.0.0.1, any)
    - Transport Layer Protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, TCP+UDP)
  - TCP/UDP (for signaling channel)
    - Source Port
    - Destination Port
  - Distinct interface (physical/virtual or trust zone, e.g., trusted/untrusted)
  - Application (Real-Time Communications Protocol)
    - Signaling (whatever is claimed by the TSE; SIP, H.323, or both)

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.2:2: Repeat [Test FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2:1](#) above as needed to ensure that traffic filtering rules can be defined for each distinct network interface type supported by the [TOE](#).

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.3](#)

This element is evaluated through the evaluation activities for [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2](#).

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.4](#)

This element is evaluated through the evaluation activities for [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2](#).

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.5](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) identifies the protocols that support session handling to include both TCP and UDP.

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) describes how sessions are established (including handshake processing) and maintained.

The evaluator shall verify that for TCP, the [TSS](#) identifies and describes the use of the following attributes in determining the validity of a session: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, and individual flags.

The evaluator shall verify that for UDP, the [TSS](#) identifies and describes the following attributes in determining the validity of a session: source and destination addresses and source and destination ports.

The evaluator shall verify that the [TSS](#) describes how established sessions are removed. The [TSS](#) shall describe how connections are removed for each protocol based on normal completion or timeout conditions. The [TSS](#) shall also indicate when session removal becomes effective (e.g., before the next packet that might match the session is processed).

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes session behaviors. For example, a [TOE](#) might not log packets that are permitted as part of an existing session.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5:1: The evaluator shall configure the [TOE](#) to permit and log TCP traffic. The evaluator shall initiate a TCP session. While the TCP session is being established, the evaluator shall introduce session establishment packets with incorrect flags to determine that the altered traffic is not accepted as part of the session (i.e., a log event is generated to show the ruleset was applied). After a TCP session is successfully established, the evaluator shall alter each of the attributes for determining the validity of a session (source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, flags) one at a time in order to verify that the altered packets are not accepted as part of the established session.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5:2: The evaluator shall terminate the TCP session established per [Test FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.5:1](#) as described in the [TSS](#). The evaluator shall then immediately send a packet matching the former session definition in order to ensure it is not forwarded through the [TOE](#) without being subject to the ruleset.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5:3: The evaluator shall expire (i.e., reach timeout) the TCP session established per [Test FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.5:1](#) as described in the [TSS](#). The evaluator shall then send a packet matching the former session in order to ensure it is not forwarded through the [TOE](#) without being subject to the ruleset.

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5:4: The evaluator shall configure the TQE to permit and log UDP traffic. The evaluator shall establish a UDP session. Once a UDP session is established, the evaluator shall alter each of the attributes for determining the validity of a session (source and destination addresses, source and destination ports) one at a time in order to verify that the altered packets are not accepted as part of the established session.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5:5: The evaluator shall expire (i.e., reach timeout) the UDP session established per [Test FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.5:4](#) as described in the TSS. The evaluator shall then send a packet matching the former session in order to ensure it is not forwarded through the TQE without being subject to the ruleset.

## [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.6](#)

### TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the algorithm applied to incoming packets, including the processing of default rules, determination of whether a packet is part of an established session, and application of administrator-defined and ordered ruleset.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes how the order of traffic filtering rules is determined and provides the necessary instructions so that an administrator can configure the order of rule processing.

### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.6:1: The evaluator shall devise two equal stateful traffic filtering rules with alternate operations – permit and drop. The rules should then be deployed in two distinct orders and in each case the evaluator shall ensure that the first rule is enforced in both cases by generating applicable packets and using packet capture and logs for confirmation.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.6:2: The evaluator shall repeat the procedure above, except that the two rules should be devised where one is a subset of the other (e.g., a specific address versus a network segment). Again, the evaluator should test both orders to ensure that the first is enforced regardless of the specificity of the rule.

## [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.7](#)

### TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the process for applying traffic filtering rules and also that the behavior (either by default, or as configured by the administrator) is to deny packets when there is no rule match unless another required condition allows the network traffic (i.e., [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.5](#)).

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes the behavior if no rules or special conditions apply to the network traffic. If the behavior is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation provides the appropriate instructions to configure the behavior to deny packets with no matching rules.

### **Tests**

For each attribute in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2](#), the evaluator shall construct a test to demonstrate that the TQE can correctly compare the attribute from the packet header to the ruleset, and shall demonstrate both the permit and deny for each case. The evaluator shall check the log in each case to confirm that the relevant rule was applied. The evaluator shall record a packet capture for each test to demonstrate the correct TQE behavior.

## FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2 Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1

The TSSF shall perform stateful traffic filtering on the following VVoIP protocols: [selection: SIP, H.323 (H.225, H.245), MGCP].

**Application Note:** If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC.1/H323](#).

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2

The TSSF shall enforce the following default stateful traffic filtering rules on all network traffic matching protocol types identified in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.1](#):

[selection:

- SIP traffic where a BYE message precedes an INVITE message
- H.225 traffic where an RCF reply precedes any other traffic
- H.245 traffic where a ResponseMessage precedes a RequestMessage
- MGCP traffic where a DLCX message precedes a CRCX message

].

**Application Note:** The stateful traffic filtering rules selected in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.2](#) must match the selections made for VVoIP protocols in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.1](#).

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.3

The TSSF shall terminate any connection found to be in violation of the default stateful traffic filtering rules and provide the ability to generate an audit record of the event.

**Application Note:** Due to the potential for an SBC to receive large amounts of traffic that gets filtered by the default stateful traffic filtering rules, this PP-Module only requires that the TSSF have the ability to generate audit records for all events. “Configure traffic filtering rules” in [FMT\\_SMF.1/SBC](#) provides an expectation that the administrator can determine which rules cause audit records to be generated so that the environment is not producing an excessively large volume of audit data.

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.4

The TSSF shall dynamically open media ports to VVoIP protocol traffic upon negotiation of a session and close these ports upon termination of a session.

### FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.5

The TSSF shall not define a static range of ports to remain open indefinitely for the purpose of allowing VVoIP protocol traffic.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to perform stateful traffic filtering of all VVoIP protocols specified in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.1](#). The evaluator shall also verify that the TSS identifies the default stateful traffic filtering rules that are enforced by the TSSF and what actions are taken when traffic is found to be in violation of one more of these rules.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to dynamically open and close ports to handle VVoIP traffic such that the ports used to carry VVoIP traffic are not predictable and ports are not open and listening for VVoIP traffic.

## Guidance

If the TOE provides the ability to configure its stateful traffic filtering rules, the evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to verify that it provides instructions on how to do so.

## Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:1: [conditional, if “SIP” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1 and “SIP traffic where a BYE message precedes an INVITE message” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2] The evaluator shall connect a remote endpoint to the TOE and use it to transmit an out of sequence SIP request where a BYE message is sent before an INVITE request. The evaluator shall use packet captures and audit logs to verify that the out of sequence traffic was sent and that the call attempt was dropped and logged by the TOE.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:2: [conditional, if “H.323 (H.225, H.245)” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1 and “H.225 traffic where an RFC reply precedes any other traffic” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2] The evaluator shall connect a remote endpoint to the TOE and use it to transmit an out of sequence H.225 request where an RCF reply is sent before any other traffic. The evaluator shall use packet captures and audit logs to verify that the out of sequence traffic was sent and that the call attempt was dropped and logged by the TOE.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:3: [conditional, if “H.323 (H.225, H.245)” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1 and “H.245 traffic where a ResponseMessage precedes a RequestMessage” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2] The evaluator shall connect a remote endpoint to the TOE and use it to transmit an out of sequence H.245 request where a ResponseMessage is sent prior to a corresponding RequestMessage. The evaluator shall use packet captures and audit logs to verify that the out of sequence traffic was sent and that the call attempt was dropped and logged by the TOE.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:4: [conditional, if “MGCP” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1 and “MGCP traffic where DLCX message precedes a CRCX message” is selected in FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2] The evaluator shall connect a remote endpoint to the TOE and use it to transmit an out of sequence MGCP request where a DLCX message is sent prior to a corresponding CRCX message. The evaluator shall use packet captures and audit logs to verify that the out of sequence traffic was sent and that the call attempt was dropped and logged by the TOE.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:5: The evaluator shall configure a custom ACL to deny a call originating from an IP address or subnet. The evaluator shall then make a call from that IP address or subnet and verify the call cannot be completed. The evaluator shall also verify that calls from any other IP address or subnet will complete a call.
- Test FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2:6: The evaluator shall complete a call and capture the packets. The evaluator shall examine the packet capture and take note of the ports the media channel (RTP, SRTP) is communicating over. The evaluator shall then terminate the call. Using a packet generator, the evaluator shall attempt to send traffic over the media ports that were active when the call was active. Using packet captures, the evaluator shall then verify that the traffic does not traverse the TOE on these ports.

## FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1 Deep Packet Inspection

### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall implement DPI for the following protocols: [selection: H.323 (H.225, H.245), SIP, RTP, RTCP].

**Application Note:** If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC.1/H323](#).

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall enforce the following rules for DPI: [assignment: for each protocol listed in [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1.1](#), list elements of the packet data that are examined for potentially malicious content or compatibility with the protocol definition].

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.3

When traffic is found to be in violation of a DPI rule, the TSSF shall take the following action: [selection: drop the traffic, generate an audit record, generate an alarm].

### Evaluation Activities

#### [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1](#)

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the ability of the TOE to perform deep packet inspection for any or all of H.323, SIP, RTP, and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) traffic (consistent with the ST's SFR claim) and the rules that the TSSF enforces to determine whether the received traffic is well-formed. The evaluator shall also verify that the TSS describes what actions the TOE performs when malformed traffic is detected.

##### **Guidance**

If the deep packet inspection function of the TSSF is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation provides instructions on how to configure this function.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall repeat the following test for each protocol that the TOE is capable of performing deep packet inspection for: If the deep packet function is configurable, the evaluator shall configure this function to flag, log, or drop malformed traffic, depending on the selections chosen in [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1.3](#). The evaluator shall then transmit malformed traffic to the TOE. Using packet captures and audit logs, the evaluator shall verify that the malformed traffic was sent to the TOE, logged, and not transmitted any further. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each type of malformed traffic that can be detected by the TOE as described in [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1.2](#).

### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1 Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal

#### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall support NAT of signaling and media channel traffic through the TOE that is mediated by the [B2BUA policy] defined by [FDP\\_IFC.1](#).

#### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall support NAT for the following protocols: [selection: SIP, SIP-TLS, H.225, H.245].

#### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.3

The **TSSF** shall use **NAT** to replace the IP address header value of traffic originating from the internal network with [**selection**: the IP address of the **TOE**, a [security administrator]-defined value].

#### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.4

The **TSSF** shall maintain a **NAT** table to ensure that traffic bound for the internal network is directed to only the intended recipient.

### Evaluation Activities

#### [FFW\\_NAT\\_EXT.1](#)

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall review the **TSS** to verify that it describes the ability of the **TOE** to support **NAT** for the protocols specified in [FFW\\_NAT\\_EXT.1.2](#). The evaluator shall also verify that the **TSS** describes how the **TSSF** uses **NAT** to replace the IP address header value of outbound traffic and how the **TOE** keeps track of the original identities of calling parties.

##### **Guidance**

If the **ST** author selected “a security administrator-defined value” in [FFW\\_NAT\\_EXT.1.3](#), the evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation provides instructions on how to define the IP address header value

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall place a call originating from the internal network to the external network. The evaluator shall use packet captures on the external network to verify that the data in the packets do not disclose the internal network’s addressing or naming structure.

If the **ST** author selected “a security administrator-defined value” in [FFW\\_NAT\\_EXT.1.3](#), the evaluator shall specify a given IP header value and verify that the traffic replaces the original header value with the administrator-defined value. If the **ST** author instead selected “the IP address of the **TOE**,” the evaluator shall verify that this header value is the IP address of the **TOE**’s interface to the “external” network.

## 5.2.6 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### **FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Trunking**

#### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.1

The **TSSF** shall provide support for **SIP** trunking.

#### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.2

The **TSSF** shall require a service provider to provide valid identification in the form of a [**selection**: username and password, X.509 certificate] and IP address in order to establish a **SIP** trunk.

#### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.3

The **TSSF** shall require a service provider to provide a valid authentication credential in order to establish a **SIP** trunk.

#### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.4

The TSS shall require a service provider to encrypt traffic using TLS in order to establish a SIP trunk.

## Evaluation Activities

### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1

#### TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to support authenticated and encrypted SIP trunking along with the method by which the trunk peer will authenticate to the TOE.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation provides instructions on how to configure SIP trunking to require encryption and authentication if this function is configurable.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1:1: Configure the TOE to support an encrypted SIP trunk. Configure a trunk peer to communicate with the TOE using the SIP trunk. Present a correct username and password combination or valid X.509 certificate on the trunk peer with a SIP trunk request that originates from an expected IP address. Verify via packet capture and audit log that the session was established.
- Test FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1:2: Repeat [Test FIA\\_SIPT\\_EXT.1:1](#) but provide incorrect username and password information or invalid X.509 certificate with the trunk peer and verify via packet capture and audit log that the session was not established.
- Test FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1:3: Repeat [Test FIA\\_SIPT\\_EXT.1:1](#) but change the IP address of the trunk peer and verify via packet capture and audit log that the session was not established.

## 5.2.7 Security Management (FMT)

### **FMT\_SMF.1/SBC Specification of Management Functions (SBC)**

#### FMT\_SMF.1.1/SBC

The TSS shall be capable of performing the following management functions **related to SBC functionality**: [*Ability of a security administrator to:*

- Change a user's password
- Require a user's password to be changed upon next login
- Configure the auditable events that will result in the generation of an alarm
- Configure the B2BUA policy
- Configure traffic filtering rules
- Configure auditable events
- Configure NAT
- Configure ports and cryptography for signaling and media communications
- Configure SIP communications

].

**Application Note:** This SFR defines additional management functions for the TOE beyond what is defined in the Base-PP as FMT\_SMF.1. The TOE may have all

management functionality implemented in the same logical interface; it is not necessary for “network device management” and “SBC management” to be implemented in separate interfaces.

This PP-Module may rely on management functionality defined in the Base-PP to support the implementation of its functions. For example, the SBC portion of the TOE relies on the reliable time function that must be implemented by the Base-PP portion of the TOE. If the Base-PP implements this using NTP, the “Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps” or “Ability to configure NTP” management function defined in FMT\_SMF.1 in the Base-PP can be used to address this PP-Module’s dependency on reliable system time. Note that support for NTP is recommended but not required.

The 'configurable auditable events' function relates to [FAU\\_SEL.1](#), specifically with respect to allowing a security administrator to determine whether a given event is auditable. As this refers to the events for the triggering of various filtering rules, it may be implicitly addressed through the ‘configure traffic filtering rules’ function, for example by explicitly defining a rule with a type that automatically requires it to be logged or a parameter that causes it to be logged if triggered.

## Evaluation Activities

### [FMT\\_SMF.1/SBC](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for each administrative function listed in the SER, the ability to execute the function and the logical interfaces used to perform the function is claimed. For each of these functions, the evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS details how the ability to manipulate the TSF data through these interfaces is disallowed for non-administrative users.*

#### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to determine that each of the functions detailed in the TSS are identified, and that configuration information is provided to ensure that only administrators have access to the functions.*

#### **Tests**

*For each management function specified in [FMT\\_SMF.1.1/SBC](#), the evaluator shall access the TOE with appropriate authorizations, perform the required function, and demonstrate that configuration of the function results in the proper expected behavior. For behavior related to SBC functionality (as opposed to manipulation of user accounts), this may be tested in conjunction with other SERs.*

*The evaluator shall also ensure that all relevant management functionality from FMT\_SMF.1 in the Base-PP that relates to the SBC PP-Module are tested in conjunction with SBC functionality. For example, for SBC functions that rely on time services, the evaluator shall ensure that a security administrator can either manually configure the time or specify NTP server connectivity and ensure that the SBC functions will make use of the configured time data.*

*The evaluator shall also demonstrate that a user who lacks privileges to execute these functions (as described in the operational guidance) are unable to execute them.*

## 5.2.8 Resource Utilization (FRU)

## FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1 Limited Priority of Service

### FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall assign a priority to each type of communications packet that traverses the TSSF.

### FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall ensure that each access to network bandwidth shall be mediated on the basis of the subject's assigned priority.

## Evaluation Activities

### [FRU\\_PRS\\_EXT.1](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to prioritize traffic flows as well as the mechanism by which access to network bandwidth is granted by the TSSF.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation for a description of how to configure Quality of Service (QoS) for the TOE, including how to set tags for given traffic flows.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1:1: Configure the TOE to support QoS. Set QoS tags for media and signaling traffic flows. Complete a call between calling parties that are connected to the TOE via two different external interfaces. Verify, using packet captures, that traffic between the TOE and the callee is tagged with appropriate QoS markings.
- Test FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1:2: Configure the TOE to support QoS. Set QoS tags for media and signaling traffic flows. Configure one remote endpoint to act as a calling party that sends a continuous stream of VVoIP traffic (media and signaling) to another endpoint that is connected to the TOE via a different external interface. Using a tool of choice, create a data stream of non-VVoIP (no media and no signaling) traffic that ingresses one interface, passes through the TOE, and egresses on the TOE. These shall be the same interfaces used by the VVoIP traffic. Verify using packet captures that traffic between the TOE and the callee is tagged with appropriate QoS markings, and that VVoIP and non-VVoIP traffic packets are passed through the TOE. Change the TOE QoS configuration to rate-limit, or police, non-VVoIP traffic. Verify either using packet captures that VVoIP traffic passes through the TOE while non-VVoIP traffic is rate-limited (egress packets are less than ingress traffic) OR that Rating Factor (R-Factor) or Mean Opinion Score (MOS) values signal mediation.

## FRU\_RSA.1 Maximum Quotas

### FRU\_RSA.1.1

The TSSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources: [CPU, memory, **assignment:** other resources]], that [subjects] can use [**selection:** simultaneously, over a specified period of time].

**Application Note:** The intent of this SFR is for the TOE to be resistant to DoS attacks.

### *FRU\_RSA.1*

#### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify that the ***TSS*** describes the internal resources that the ***TSE*** can protect from ***DoS*** attacks as well as the types of behavior that would constitute a ***DoS*** attack against each of these resources.

#### **Guidance**

If the ability to protect against ***DoS*** attacks is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure this function.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test *FRU\_RSA.1:1*: Using a tool of choice, attempt a ***DoS*** attack that creates excess CPU cycles. Place a call while this attack occurs. Verify through packet capture and audio file or screenshot that the call was successful.
- Test *FRU\_RSA.1:2*: Using a tool of choice, attempt a ***DoS*** attack that attempts to exhaust the ***TQE***'s memory. Place a call while this attack occurs. Verify through packet capture and audio file or screenshot that the call was successful.
- Test *FRU\_RSA.1:3*: Using a tool of choice, perform protocol fuzzing for each communications protocol supported by the ***TQE***. Verify that fuzzing does not cause the ***TQE*** to be compromised or to experience degraded functionality. For each tool of choice used to perform these tests, the evaluator shall provide justification for the appropriateness of the chosen tool.

## 5.2.9 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### **FTP\_ITC.1/ARP Inter-TSE Trusted Channel (Automatic Response)**

#### **FTP\_ITC.1.1/ARP**

The ***TSE*** shall **be capable of using [selection: *TLS*, *IPsec*, *SSH*, *DTLS*, *HTTPS*, *SNMPv3*] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: security audit automatic response** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

#### **FTP\_ITC.1.2/ARP**

The ***TSE*** shall permit [*the TSE*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

#### **FTP\_ITC.1.3/ARP**

The ***TSE*** shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*transmission of potential security violations*].

**Application Note:** This ***SFR*** is used to specify any trusted protocols that are implemented in support of [FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.1](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FTP\\_ITC.1/ARP](#)

The evaluator shall evaluate this SFR in the manner specified for FTP\_ITC.1 in the NDcPP except that SNMPv3 communications shall be tested (if claimed) in addition to any other selected protocols. Testing for SNMPv3 is performed through evaluation of [FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.1](#) if claimed there.

## FTP\_ITC.1/ESC Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (ESC Communications)

### FTP\_ITC.1.1/ESC

The TSF shall provide a **signaling** channel between itself and an **ESC using TLS as specified in FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 and [selection: DTLS as specified in FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2, no other protocol]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note:** FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1, FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2, FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1, and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2 are defined in the .

### FTP\_ITC.1.2/ESC

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

### FTP\_ITC.1.3/ESC

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*all communications with the ESC*].

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FTP\\_ITC.1/ESC](#)

This SFR is an iteration of FTP\_ITC.1 as defined in the NDcPP. The evaluator shall repeat the EAs defined for FTP\_ITC.1 in the NDcPP for this iteration of the SFR.

## FTP\_ITC.1/VVoIP Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VVoIP Communications)

### FTP\_ITC.1.1/VVoIP

The TSF shall **be capable of using SRTP, [selection: SIP-TLS, IPsec, H.235, [assignment: other protocols]]** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: VVoIP signaling and media channels** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note:** FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1, FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2, FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1, and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2 are defined in the .

### FTP\_ITC.1.2/VVoIP

The T.SF shall permit [**selection:** *the T.SF, the authorized IT entities*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3/VVoIP

The T.SF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**assignment:** *list of functions for which a trusted channel is required*].

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### *FTP\_ITC.1/VVoIP*

*This SFR is an iteration of FTP\_ITC.1 as defined in the NDcPP. The evaluator shall repeat the EAs defined for FTP\_ITC.1 in the NDcPP for this iteration of the SFR.*

## 5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:

**Table 2: SFR Rationale**

| Threat              | Addressed by  | Rationale  |
|---------------------|---------------|--|
| T.MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC | FAU_ARP_EXT.1 | Mitigates the threat by defining the ability to generate security violations that are transmitted to external entities.  |
|                     | FAU_GEN.1/SBC | Mitigates the threat by iterating a Base-PP requirement to define additional auditable events that are specific to SBC functionality.  |
|                     | FAU_SAA.1     | Mitigates the threat by defining a set of rules to monitor auditable events for potential security violations.   |
|                     | FAU_SEL.1     | Mitigates the threat by allowing for some monitoring functions to be selectively enabled and disabled as needed so that the generation of lower-priority audit records can be suppressed when it is not practical to generate those records for performance reasons. |
|                     | FTP_ITC.1/ARP | Mitigates the threat by defining the trusted channel used to securely communicate potential security violations.   |
| T.NETWORK_ACCESS    | FAU_ARP_EXT.1 | Mitigates the threat by defining the ability to generate security violations that are transmitted to external entities.  |
|                     | FAU_GEN.1/SBC | Mitigates the threat by iterating a Base-PP requirement to define additional auditable events that are specific to SBC functionality.  |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| FAU_SAA.1                           | Mitigates the threat by defining a set of rules to monitor auditable events for potential security violations.   |
| FAU_SEL.1                           | Mitigates the threat by allowing for some monitoring functions to be selectively enabled and disabled as needed so that the generation of lower-priority audit records can be suppressed when it is not practical to generate those records for performance reasons. |
| FCS_SRTP_EXT.1                      | Mitigates the threat by defining the TOE's implementation of the SRTP protocol that is used to protect VVoIP endpoint communications.  |
| FDP_IFC.1                           | Mitigates the threat by defining a B2BUA policy so that VVoIP endpoints are only connected to each other through the TOE as an intermediary.   |
| FDP_IFF.1                           | Mitigates the threat by defining the specific rules that the B2BUA policy enforces.  |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1                       | Mitigates the threat by defining capabilities for traffic filtering of network packets.  |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2                       | Mitigates the threat by defining specific methods of stateful traffic inspection for specific protocols.   |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1                       | Mitigates the threat by defining the capability to perform DPI for certain network traffic.  |
| FFW_NAT_EXT.1                       | Mitigates the threat by defining the use of NAT to obfuscate IP addresses of endpoint devices on the TOE's internal network.   |
| FIA_SIPT_EXT.1                      | Mitigates the threat by defining secure behavior for SIP trunking.   |
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC                       | Mitigates the threat by defining TSF management functions that require authorizations to use.  |
| FTP_ITC.1/ARP                       | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications of potential security violations are protected.  |
| FTP_ITC.1/ESC                       | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications with an external ESC are protected.  |
| FTP_ITC.1/H323<br>(selection-based) | Mitigates the threat by defining H.323 as a permitted method of protected communications for when a conformant TOE implements this logical interface.  |
| FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP                     | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications with an external VVoIP endpoint are protected.   |
| T.RESOURCE_EXHAUSTION               | FAU_ARP_EXT.1<br>Mitigates the threat by defining the ability to generate security violations that are transmitted to external entities.   |

|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| FAU_GEN.1/SBC                              | Mitigates the threat by iterating a Base-PP requirement to define additional auditable events that are specific to SBC functionality.  |   |
| FAU_SAA.1                                  | Mitigates the threat by defining a set of rules to monitor auditable events for potential security violations.   |   |
| FAU_SEL.1                                  | Mitigates the threat by allowing for some monitoring functions to be selectively enabled and disabled as needed so that the generation of lower-priority audit records can be suppressed when it is not practical to generate those records for performance reasons. |   |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1                              | Mitigates the threat by defining capabilities for traffic filtering of network packets.  |   |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2                              | Mitigates the threat by defining specific methods of stateful traffic inspection for specific protocols.   |   |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1                              | Mitigates the threat by defining the capability to perform DPI for certain network traffic.  |   |
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC                              | Mitigates the threat by defining TSF management functions that require authorizations to use.  |   |
| FRU_PRS_EXT.1                              | Mitigates the threat by requiring the TSF to implement priority of service to ensure that low-priority traffic cannot cause a DoS.   |   |
| FRU_RSA.1                                  | Mitigates the threat by enforcing quotas for TSF resources to prevent DoS.   |   |
| FTP_ITC.1/ARP                              | Mitigates the threat by defining the trusted channel used to securely communicate potential security violations.   |   |
| T.UNTRUSTED_<br>COMMUNICATION_<br>CHANNELS | FCS_SRTP_EXT.1   | Mitigates the threat by defining the TOE's implementation of the SRTP protocol that is used to protect VVoIP endpoint communications.                 |
|  | FIA_SIPT_EXT.1   | Mitigates the threat by defining secure behavior for SIP trunking.  |
|  | FTP_ITC.1/ARP  | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications of potential security violations are protected.   |
|  | FTP_ITC.1/ESC  | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications with an external ESC are protected.   |
|  | FTP_ITC.1/H323<br>(selection-based)  | Mitigates the threat by defining H.323 as a permitted method of protected communications for when a conformant TOE implements this logical interface. |
|  | FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP  | Mitigates the threat by defining how communications with an external VVoIP endpoint are protected.  |

|                          |  |  |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <p>T.USER_DATA_REUSE</p> | <p>FDP_IFC.1</p>                                     | <p>Mitigates the threat by defining a B2BUA policy that is used by the TOE to establish connections between VoIP endpoints.</p>  |
|                          | <p>FDP_IFF.1</p>                                     | <p>Mitigates the threat by defining the rules that the B2BUA policy enforces.</p>  |
|                          | <p>FFW_NAT_EXT.1</p>                                 | <p>Mitigates the threat by requiring the use of NAT to maintain a unique relationship between how external entities identify entities on the TOE's internal network and how they are actually addressed by that network.</p> |
|                          | <p>FIA_SIPS_EXT.1<br/>(implementation-dependent)</p> | <p>Mitigates the threat by defining an optional capability to handle SIP registration in cases where the OE does not include an ESC that will provide that functionality.</p>  |
|                          | <p>FIA_SIPT_EXT.1</p>                                | <p>Mitigates the threat by defining the use of SIP trunking, which requires authentication of endpoints to ensure data is only transmitted to the intended endpoint.</p>   |

# 6 Consistency Rationale

## 6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices

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### 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module is used to extend the NDcPP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a network device. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include SBC functionality that is provided by the network device.

### 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 3: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (NDcPP base)

| PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP | Consistency Rationale  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| T.MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC               | The Base-PP does not define a threat for malicious traffic because all of its security-relevant external interfaces define the network device as the endpoint. This PP-Module defines interfaces where the TOE is facilitating a connection between two external entities, such that traffic between them will flow through the TOE as opposed to and from the TOE. This threat is consistent with the Base-PP because it is only applied to the interfaces defined in this PP-Module where it is relevant; it does not apply to the interfaces defined in the Base-PP.                  |
| T.NETWORK_ACCESS                  | The Base-PP does not define a threat for access to network resources because all of its security-relevant external interfaces define the network device as the endpoint. This PP-Module defines interfaces where the TOE is facilitating a connection between two external entities, such that traffic between them will flow through the TOE as opposed to into and out of the TOE. This threat is consistent with the Base-PP because it is only applied to the interfaces defined in this PP-Module where it is relevant; it does not apply to the interfaces defined in the Base-PP. |
| T.RESOURCE_EXHAUSTION             | The threat of network traffic causing the TOE to be unable to perform its functions is similar to T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE in the Base-PP because the intent of the threat is to cause the TSF to fail. The Base-PP does not define DoS protections because it does not define logical interfaces that are intended to process large volumes of network traffic. This PP-Module extends the threat by defining a specific example of it that applies to an SBC device that has this functionality.   |

**T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS** The threat of disclosure of data in transit is fundamentally the same as the NDcPP threat with the same name. This PP-Module extends the threat to apply to the external interfaces that are defined specifically in support of SBC functions.

**T.USER\_DATA\_REUSE** The Base-PP does not define a threat of user data transmitted to the wrong destination because all of its security-relevant external interfaces define the network device as the endpoint. This PP-Module defines interfaces where the TOE is facilitating a connection between two external entities, such that traffic between them will flow through the TOE as opposed to and from the TOE. This threat is consistent with the Base-PP because it is only applied to the interfaces defined in this PP-Module where it is relevant; it does not apply to the interfaces defined in the Base-PP.

### 6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

### 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the NDcPP that are needed to support Session Border Controller functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the NDcPP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the NDcPP are as follows:

**Table 4: Consistency of Requirements (NDcPP base)**

| PP-Module Requirement  | Consistency Rationale  |
|--|--|
| <b>Modified SFRs</b>   |  |
| FTP_ITC.1  | This PP-Module refines the Base-PP SFR to mandate the use of one of the trusted protocols defined by the Base-PP.  |
| <b>Additional SFRs</b>   |  |
| This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the NDcPP is the base. |  |
| <b>Mandatory SFRs</b>  |  |
| FAU_ARP_EXT.1  | This SFR applies to the generation of alerts when a given auditable event is detected, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.  |
| FAU_GEN.1/SBC  | This SFR is an iteration of a Base-PP requirement that defines additional auditable events for SBC functionality that the Base-PP could not be expected to cover.                        |
| FAU_SAA.1  | This SFR applies to the detection of auditable events as potential security violations requiring the generation of alerts, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.            |
| FAU_SEL.1  | This SFR applies to the behavior of the audit function with respect to the auditable events defined in this PP-Module. It does not affect the audit functions that apply to the Base-PP. |

|                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| <a href="#">FCS_SRTP_EXT.1</a>  | This <del>SFR</del> applies to the implementation of <del>SRTP</del> , which is a protocol that is not used for any <del>Base-PP</del> functionality.   |
| <a href="#">FDP_IFC.1</a>       | This <del>SFR</del> applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's implementation of a <del>B2BUA</del> policy, which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FDP_IFF.1</a>       | This <del>SFR</del> applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's implementation of a <del>B2BUA</del> policy, which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FFW_ACL_EXT.1</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> applies to traffic filtering, which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FFW_ACL_EXT.2</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> applies to traffic filtering, which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FFW_DPI_EXT.1</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> applies to <del>DPI</del> , which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FFW_NAT_EXT.1</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> applies to <del>NAT</del> , which applies to the <del>TOE</del> 's through-traffic interfaces and is therefore beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FIA_SIPT_EXT.1</a>  | This <del>SFR</del> applies to <del>SIP</del> trunking, which is a logical interface that is beyond the original scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> .  |
| <a href="#">FMT_SMF.1/SBC</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> is an iteration of a <del>Base-PP</del> requirement that defines additional management functions for SBC functionality that the <del>Base-PP</del> could not be expected to cover.  |
| <a href="#">FRU_PRS_EXT.1</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> applies to enforcement of bandwidth priority of service, which is a mechanism that is beyond the scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> and does not interfere with the ability of the <del>Base-PP</del> to process valid network traffic securely.   |
| <a href="#">FRU_RSA.1</a>       | This <del>SFR</del> applies to enforcement of resource quotas, which is a mechanism that is beyond the scope of the <del>Base-PP</del> and does not interfere with the ability of the <del>Base-PP</del> to process valid network traffic securely.   |
| <a href="#">FTP_ITC.1/ARP</a>   | This <del>SFR</del> is used to specify the trusted channel used for transmission of alerts as specified in <a href="#">FAU_ARP_EXT.1</a> .  |
| <a href="#">FTP_ITC.1/ESC</a>   | This <del>PP-Module</del> iterates an <del>SFR</del> defined in the <del>Base-PP</del> to define a new external interface for communications with an <del>ESC</del> . This does not interfere with the ability of the <del>Base-PP</del> to enforce its security functionality on the existing logical interfaces.          |
| <a href="#">FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP</a> | This <del>PP-Module</del> iterates an <del>SFR</del> defined in the <del>Base-PP</del> to define a new external interface for communications with a <del>VVoIP</del> endpoint. This does not interfere with the ability of the <del>Base-PP</del> to enforce its security functionality on the existing logical interfaces. |

### Optional ~~SFRs~~

This ~~PP-Module~~ does not define any Optional requirements.

### Objective ~~SFRs~~

This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.

### **Implementation-dependent SFRs**

[FIA\\_SIPS\\_EXT.1](#) This SFR applies to SIP registration, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.

### **Selection-based SFRs**

[FTP\\_ITC.1/H323](#) This PP-Module iterates an SFR defined in the Base-PP to define a new external interface for communications using H.323. This does not interfere with the ability of the Base-PP to enforce its security functionality on the existing logical interfaces.

# Appendix A - Optional SFRs

## A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Strictly Optional SFRs or SARs.

## A.2 Objective Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

## A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

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### A.3.1 Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs

Table 5: Auditable Events for Implementation-dependent Requirements

| Requirement                    | Auditable Events          | Additional Audit Record Contents   |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| <a href="#">FIA_SIPS_EXT.1</a> | Call Detail Record (CDR). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Calling party.</li><li>• Called party.</li><li>• Start time of the call.</li><li>• Call duration.</li><li>• Call type.</li></ul> |

### A.3.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Registration

##### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the [selection: SIP that complies with RFC 3261, H.323 protocol that complies with ITU-REC H.235.0] using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) complying with RFC 4566 to describe the multimedia session that will be used to carry the VoIP traffic.

**Application Note:** If “H.323 protocol that complies with ITU-REC H.235.0” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC.1/H323](#).

##### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require password authentication for SIP REGISTER function requests as specified in Section 22 of RFC 3261.

##### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall support ESC authentication passwords that contain at least [assignment: positive integer of eight or more] characters in the set of [upper case

characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")", and [assignment: other supported special characters]].

#### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.4

The TSSF shall provide the ability to modify SIP header values for SIP traffic received by the TOE prior to retransmitting the traffic.

**Application Note:** This SFR is optional because this functionality is not standard for SBCs because device registration can generally be handled by an ESC in the TOE's OE. However, in some cases, SIP registration directly to the SBC is required. If an SBC advertises this service, it is expected that this functionality be included within the TOE boundary. This SFR is therefore implementation-based on whether the SBC has the capability to perform its own SIP registration of devices.

## Evaluation Activities

### [FIA\\_SIPS\\_EXT.1](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to support SIP in compliance with RFC 3261, including the ability to require password authentication for SIP REGISTER function requests. The evaluator shall also verify that the TSS describes the allowed composition of SIP authentication passwords.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TSSF to modify SIP header values for SIP traffic received by the TOE prior to retransmitting it.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation indicates that SIP REGISTER requests must be authenticated by the TOE along with the minimum password strength required for the authentication credential.

The evaluator shall also verify that the guidance documentation provides instructions for how to configure the TOE to manipulate SIP header values.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1:1: Attempt to have a SIP client issue a SIP REGISTER request without providing authentication credentials. Observe that the request is rejected and logged by the TSSF.
- Test FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1:2: Attempt to have a SIP client issue a SIP REGISTER request with authentication credentials using characters not supported by the TSSF. Observe that the request is rejected and logged by the TSSF.
- Test FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1:3: Attempt to have a SIP client issue a SIP REGISTER request with valid authentication credentials using characters supported by the TSSF. Observe that the request is accepted and logged by the TSSF. Repeat this test as many times as necessary to ensure that passwords of the minimum and maximum supported lengths are used and that each supported character is used in at least one password.

Configure the TOE to manipulate SIP header values. Place a call through the TOE. Capture traffic both before it is received by the TOE and after it exits the TOE. Verify that the SIP

*header values have been modified. Repeat for each supported header modification, as necessary.*

# Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

## B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-Based SFRs

Table 6: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements

| Requirement    | Auditable Events                          | Additional Audit Record Contents                                   |
|----------------|---|--|
| FTP_ITC.1/H323 | Failure of the trusted channel functions. | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                | Initiation of the trusted channel.        | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |
|                | Termination of the trusted channel.       | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel. |

## B.2 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### FTP\_ITC.1/H323 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (H.323 Communications)

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1.2](#), [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.1](#), [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1.1](#), [FIA\\_SIPS\\_EXT.1.1](#).*

#### FTP\_ITC.1.1/H323

The TSF shall provide a **n H.323** communication channel **in accordance with ITU-REC H.235.0** between itself and a **gatekeeper using TLS as specified in FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 and [selection: IPsec as specified in FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1, no other protocol]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note:** FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 is defined in the Base-PP. FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 are defined in the .

#### FTP\_ITC.1.2/H323

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

#### FTP\_ITC.1.3/H323

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*all communications with the gatekeeper*].

**Application Note:** This SFR is claimed if H.323 is specified as being supported by the TOE in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.1](#), [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2](#), [FFW\\_DPI\\_EXT.1](#), or [FIA\\_SIPS\\_EXT.1](#).

## Evaluation Activities

### *FTP\_ITC.1/H323*

*This SFR is an iteration of FTP\_ITC.1 as defined in the NDcPP. The evaluator shall repeat the EAs defined for FTP\_ITC.1 in the NDcPP for this iteration of the SFR.*

# Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

## C.1 Extended Components Table

---

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

**Table 7: Extended Component Definitions**

| Functional Class                        | Functional Components  |
|---|--|
| Cryptographic Support (FCS)             | FCS_SRTP_EXT Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol   |
| Firewall (FFW)                          | FFW_ACL_EXT Traffic Filtering<br>FFW_DPI_EXT Deep Packet Inspection<br>FFW_NAT_EXT Network Address Translation |
| Identification and Authentication (FIA) | FIA_SIPS_EXT Session Initiation Protocol Registration<br>FIA_SIPT_EXT Session Initiation Protocol Trunking     |
| Resource Utilization (FRU)              | FRU_PRS_EXT Limited Priority of Service  |
| Security Audit (FAU)                    | FAU_ARP_EXT Security Audit Automatic Response  |

## C.2 Extended Component Definitions

---

### C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### C.2.1.1 FCS\_SRTP\_EXT Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol

##### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of SRTP.

##### Component Leveling

FCS\_SRTP\_EXT ————— 1

[FCS\\_SRTP\\_EXT.1](#), Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol, requires the TSF to implement SRTP in accordance with specified standards, and for some of this functionality to be configurable.

##### Management: FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of ports and cryptography for signaling communications.

## Audit: FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1 Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FMT\_SMR.1 Security Roles

FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that complies with RFC 3711, and use Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDMS) in compliance with RFC 4568 to provide key information for the SRTP connection.

### FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall implement SDMS-SRTP supporting the following ciphersuites [**assignment:** *list of supported ciphersuites and the standard in which they are defined*].

### FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure the SRTP NULL algorithm [**selection:** *is disabled, can be disabled by a [assignment: administrator role]*].

### FCS\_SRTP\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall allow the SRTP ports to be used for SRTP communications to be specified by a [**assignment:** *administrator role*].

## C.2.2 Firewall (FFW)


Firewall functionality involves selective processing of network traffic such that the traffic is routed or discarded based on some notion of whether the traffic is valid. Requirements in this class define capabilities for these processing functions.

### C.2.2.1 FFW\_ACL\_EXT Traffic Filtering

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for controlling traffic filtering, including the use of stateful traffic filtering on protocols and ports.

#### Component Leveling



FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1, Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering, requires the TSF to implement traffic filtering rules based on network protocol attributes.

[FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2](#), Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering, requires the TSE to perform stateful traffic filtering on traffic that matches certain unauthorized state conditions.

### **Management: FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of traffic filtering rules.

### **Audit: FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Application of traffic filtering rules.

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1 Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: None

#### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.1**

The TSE shall perform traffic filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

#### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.2**

The TSE shall allow the definition of traffic filtering for real-time communications traffic using the following network protocol fields:

- IPv4
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- IPv6
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- TCP
  - source port
  - destination port
- UDP
  - source port
  - destination port
- Distinct Interface
- [assignment: *other protocols or protocol types*]

#### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.3**

The TSE shall allow the following operations to be associated with traffic filtering rules: permit or drop with the capability to log the operation.

#### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.4**

The TSSF shall allow the traffic filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.5**

The TSSF shall:

- Accept a network packet without further processing of traffic filtering rules if it matches an allowed established session for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, based on the following network packet attributes:
  - TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, flags
  - UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports
- Remove existing traffic flows from the set of established traffic flows based on the following: [selection: *session inactivity timeout, completion of the expected information flow*].

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.6**

The TSSF shall process the applicable traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order.

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.1.7**

The TSSF shall deny packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.

## **Management: FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

## **Audit: FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Application of traffic filtering rules.

## **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2 Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: None

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.1**

The TSSF shall perform stateful traffic filtering on the following VVoIP protocols: [assignment: VVoIP protocols].

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.2**

The TSSF shall enforce the following default stateful traffic filtering rules on all network traffic matching protocol types identified in [FFW\\_ACL\\_EXT.2.1](#):

- [assignment: *default stateful traffic filtering rules*]

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.3**

The TSSF shall terminate any connection found to be in violation of the default stateful traffic filtering rules and provide the ability to generate an audit record of the event.

### **FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.4**

The TSSF shall dynamically open media ports to VVoIP protocol traffic upon negotiation of a session and close these ports upon termination of a session.

## FFW\_ACL\_EXT.2.5

The TSSF shall not define a static range of ports to remain open indefinitely for the purpose of allowing VVoIP protocol traffic.

### C.2.2.2 FFW\_DPI\_EXT Deep Packet Inspection

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for implementation of DPI functionality.

#### Component Leveling

FFW\_DPI\_EXT — 1

FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1, Deep Packet Inspection, defines traffic that the TSSF is expected to be able to perform DPI on, the specific elements of that traffic that is subject to DPI, and the action that is taken when invalid traffic is discovered by the DPI mechanism.

#### Management: FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Application of DPI rules.

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1 Deep Packet Inspection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: None

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall implement DPI for the following protocols: [**assignment:** *communications protocols*].

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall enforce the following rules for DPI: [**assignment:** *for each protocol listed in FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.1, list elements of the packet data that are examined for potentially malicious content or compatibility with the protocol definition*].

#### FFW\_DPI\_EXT.1.3


When traffic is found to be in violation of a DPI rule, the TSSF shall take the following action: [**assignment:** *action taken in response to rule violation*].

### C.2.2.3 FFW\_NAT\_EXT Network Address Translation

## Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for implementation of NAT.

## Component Leveling



[FFW\\_NAT\\_EXT.1](#), Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal, requires the TSE to implement NAT for defined network protocols.

### Management: FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of NAT.

### Audit: FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1 Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FDP\\_IFC.1](#) Subset Information Flow Control  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security Roles

### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.1

The TSE shall support NAT of signaling and media channel traffic through the TOE that is mediated by the [assignment: *information flow control policy*] defined by [FDP\\_IFC.1](#).

### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.2

The TSE shall support NAT for the following protocols: [assignment: *list of protocols*].

### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.3

The TSE shall use NAT to replace the IP address header value of traffic originating from the internal network with [selection: *the IP address of the TOE, a [assignment: administrator role]-defined value*].

### FFW\_NAT\_EXT.1.4

The TSE shall maintain a NAT table to ensure that traffic bound for the internal network is directed to only the intended recipient.

## C.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.3.1 FIA\_SIPT\_EXT Session Initiation Protocol Trunking

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for SIP validation, authentication, and traffic encryption.

## Component Leveling



[FIA\\_SIPT\\_EXT.1](#), Session Initiation Protocol Trunking, requires the TSF to implement SIP trunking using defined authentication and encryption methods.

### Management: FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of SIP communications.

### Audit: FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- All SIP trunk authentication attempts.

## FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Trunking

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol without Mutual Authentication  
FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication  
FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol without Mutual Authentication  
FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication  
FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide support for SIP trunking.

### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require a service provider to provide valid identification in the form of a [**selection:** *username and password, X.509 certificate*] and IP address in order to establish a SIP trunk.

### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall require a service provider to provide a valid authentication credential in order to establish a SIP trunk.

### FIA\_SIPT\_EXT.1.4


The TSF shall require a service provider to encrypt traffic using TLS in order to establish a SIP trunk.

## C.2.3.2 FIA\_SIPS\_EXT Session Initiation Protocol Registration

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for SIP registration.

## Component Leveling



**FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1**, Session Initiation Protocol Registration, defines requirements for how the T<sub>TSF</sub> must implement SIP registration, including protocol implementations and constraints on authentication.

### Management: FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of SIP communications.

### Audit: FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Call Detail Record (CDR)

## FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Registration

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: None

### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.1

The T<sub>TSF</sub> shall implement the [**selection:** *SIP that complies with RFC 3261, H.323 protocol that complies with ITU-REC H.235.0*] using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) complying with RFC 4566 to describe the multimedia session that will be used to carry the VoIP traffic.

### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.2

The T<sub>TSF</sub> shall require password authentication for SIP REGISTER function requests as specified in Section 22 of RFC 3261.

### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.3

The T<sub>TSF</sub> shall support ESC authentication passwords that contain at least [**assignment:** *minimum numeric length*] characters in the set of [**assignment:** *supported character set*].

### FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1.4

The T<sub>TSF</sub> shall provide the ability to modify SIP header values for SIP traffic received by the TOE prior to retransmitting the traffic.

## C.2.4 Resource Utilization (FRU)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FRU class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.4.1 FRU\_PRS\_EXT Limited Priority of Service

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for prioritizing communication packets and bandwidth.

## Component Leveling



[FRU\\_PRS\\_EXT.1](#), Limited Priority of Service, requires the TSSF to implement mechanisms to limit the amount of network bandwidth that is available to subjects based on certain attributes.

### Management: FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1 Limited Priority of Service

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: None

### FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall assign a priority to each type of communications packet that traverses the TSSF.

### FRU\_PRS\_EXT.1.2

The TSSF shall ensure that each access to network bandwidth shall be mediated on the basis of the subject's assigned priority.

## C.2.5 Security Audit (FAU)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FAU class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.5.1 FAU\_ARP\_EXT Security Audit Automatic Response

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for secure external transmission of detected security violations to the OE.

#### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.1](#), Security Audit Automatic Response, defines the mechanism used by the TOE to securely transmit security alerts to the OE.

### Management: FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## **FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1 Security Audit Automatic Response**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FAU\\_SAA.1](#) Potential Violation Analysis

[FTP\\_ITC.1](#) Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### **FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1.1**

The ~~TSF~~ shall be capable of using [**assignment:** *trusted channel defined in FTP\_ITC.1*] to transmit potential security violations to an external IT entity in the ~~OE~~ upon detection.

# Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SERs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SERs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.3 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

**Table 8: Implicitly Satisfied Requirements**

| Requirement  | Rationale for Satisfaction  |
|--|---|
| <b>FMT_MSA.3 – Static Attribute Initialization</b> | <p data-bbox="354 747 1520 1031"><b>FDP_IFF.1</b> has a dependency on FMT_MSA.3 to define the default security posture of security attributes for the purpose of information flow control enforcement. This SER has not been defined by this PP-Module because the enforcement of <b>FDP_IFF.1</b> is not dependent on the initial state of security attributes. For example, <b>FDP_IFF.1.2</b> requires the TSE to determine if a communication attempt is valid before authorizing it. This is true regardless of whether the default value of security attributes associated with the connection attempt are permissive or restrictive; there is no difference in how the TSE determines “validity” in this case.</p> <p data-bbox="354 1056 1520 1262">The default values of security attributes do not cause the information flow control policy to behave differently for those rules that must always be enforced by the TSE. <b>FDP_IFF.1.4</b> requires that all allowlisted calling parties be authorized while all denylisted calling parties be rejected. It does not matter for the purpose of enforcing this SER whether the absence of a calling party from both the allowlist and the denylist means they are authorized or rejected by default.</p> |

# Appendix E - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

The ~~TOE~~ does not require any additional supplementary information to describe its entropy sources beyond the requirements outlined in the ~~Base-PP~~.

# Appendix F - Allocation of Requirements in Distributed TOEs

For a distributed TOE, the SFRs in this PP-Module need to be met by the TOE as a whole, but not all SFRs will necessarily be implemented by all components. The following categories are defined in order to specify when each SFR must be implemented by a component:

- **All Components ("All"):** All components that comprise the distributed TOE must independently satisfy the requirement.
- **At least one Component ("One"):** This requirement must be fulfilled by at least one component within the distributed TOE.
- **Feature Dependent ("Feature Dependent"):** These requirements will only be fulfilled where the feature is implemented by the distributed TOE component (note that the requirement to meet the PP-Module as a whole requires that at least one component implements these requirements if they are claimed by the TOE).

The table below specifies how each of the SFRs in this PP-Module must be met, using the categories above.

| Requirement                           | Description                                       | Distributed TOE SFR Allocation |
|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| FAU_ARP_EXT.1                         | Security Audit Automatic Response                 | Feature Dependent              |
| FAU_GEN.1/SBC                         | Audit Data Generation (Session Border Controller) | All                            |
| FAU_SAA.1                             | Potential Violation Analysis                      | Feature Dependent              |
| FAU_SEL.1                             | Selective Audit                                   | Feature Dependent              |
| FCS_SRTP_EXT.1                        | Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol               | Feature Dependent              |
| FDP_IFC.1                             | Subset Information Flow Control                   | Feature Dependent              |
| FDP_IFF.1                             | Simple Security Attributes                        | Feature Dependent              |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1                         | Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering        | Feature Dependent              |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2                         | Stateful VoIP Traffic Filtering                   | Feature Dependent              |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1                         | Deep Packet Inspection                            | Feature Dependent              |
| FFW_NAT_EXT.1                         | Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal                     | Feature Dependent              |
| FIA_SIPS_EXT.1 (implementation-based) | Session Initiation Protocol Registration          | Feature Dependent              |
| FIA_SIPT_EXT.1                        | Session Initiation Protocol Trunking              | Feature Dependent              |

|                                  |  |                   |
|----------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC                    | Specification of Management Functions (SBC)      | Feature Dependent |
| FRU_PRS_EXT.1                    | Limited Priority of Service                      | Feature Dependent |
| FRU_RSA.1                        | Maximum Quotas                                   | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/ESC                    | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (ESC Communications)   | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/H323 (selection-based) | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (H.323 Communications) | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP                  | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VVoIP Communications) | Feature Dependent |

# Appendix G - Acronyms

**Table 9: Acronyms**

| <b>Acronym</b>   | <b>Meaning</b>                           |
|------------------|--|
| ACL              | Access Control List                      |
| B2BUA            | Back-To-Back User Agent                  |
| Base-PP          | Base Protection Profile                  |
| CC               | Common Criteria                          |
| CDR              | Call Detail Record                       |
| CEM              | Common Evaluation Methodology            |
| cPP              | Collaborative Protection Profile         |
| DoS              | Denial of Service                        |
| DPI              | Deep Packet Inspection                   |
| ESC              | Enterprise Session Controller            |
| IP-PBX           | Internet Protocol Public Branch Exchange |
| MGCP             | Media Gateway Control Protocol           |
| NAT              | Network Address Translation              |
| OE               | Operational Environment                  |
| PP               | Protection Profile                       |
| PP-Configuration | Protection Profile Configuration         |
| PP-Module        | Protection Profile Module                |
| QoS              | Quality of Service                       |
| RTCP             | RTP Control Protocol                     |
| RTP              | Real-Time Transport Protocol             |
| SAR              | Security Assurance Requirement           |
| SDS              | Security Descriptions for Media Streams  |
| SDP              | Session Description Protocol             |

|      |                                     |
|------|-------------------------------------|
| SFR  | Security Functional Requirement     |
| SIP  | Session Initiation Protocol         |
| SRTP | Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol |
| ST   | Security Target                     |
| TOE  | Target of Evaluation                |
| TSE  | TOE Security Functionality          |
| TSEI | TSE Interface                       |
| TSS  | TOE Summary Specification           |
| VoIP | Voice/Video Over IP                 |

# Appendix H - Bibliography

Table 10: Bibliography

| Identifier | Title  |
|------------|--|
| [CC]       | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and general model</a>, CCMB-2022-11-001, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security functional requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-002, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security assurance requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-003, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities</a>, CCMB-2022-11-004, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-005, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li></ul> |
| [GEM]      | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Evaluation methodology</a>, CCMB-2022-11-006, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li></ul>  |
| [NDcPP]    | <a href="#">collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 4.0, December 22, 2025</a>   |