The scope of this Protection Profile (PP) is to describe the security functionality of operating systems in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. An operating system is software that manages computer hardware and software resources, and provides common services for application programs. The hardware it manages may be physical or virtual.
1.2 Terms
The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.
1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms
Assurance
Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)
Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)
A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE
A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)
A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)
A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)
Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)
An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)
A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
1.2.2 Technical Terms
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.
Administrator
An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
Application (app)
Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
Application Programming Interface (API)
A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Credential
Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
DAR Protection
Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer
An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System
A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems which are typically used in routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall
A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
Hybrid Authentication
A hybrid authentication factor is one where a user has to submit a combination of a cryptographic token and a PIN or password and both must pass. If either factor fails, the entire attempt fails.
Operating System (OS)
Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document.
Personal Identification Number (PIN)
An authentication factor that is comprised of a set of numeric or alphabetic characters that may be used in addition to a cryptographic token to provide a hybrid authentication factor. At this time it is not considered as a stand-alone authentication mechanism. A PIN is distinct from a password in that the allowed character set and required length of a PIN is typically smaller than that of a password as it is designed to be input quickly.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual.[OMB]
Sensitive Data
Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
User
A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation
Compliant TOEs will implement security functionality in the following general areas:
Accountability: ensuring that information exists to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the TOE so that the root cause can be determined.
Integrity: ensuring the integrity of updates to the TOE and enforcing mechanisms that control the deployment and execution of applications running on it.
Management: providing mechanisms for configuration of the TSF and deployment of applications running on the TOE.
Protected Storage: ensuring that credentials and file system data are not subject to unauthorized disclosure.
Protected Communications: ensuring that sensitive data in transit to and from the TOE is adequately protected from unauthorized modification and disclosure.
1.3.1 TOE Boundary
The TOE boundary encompasses the OS kernel and its drivers, shared software libraries, and some application software included with the OS. The applications considered within the TOE are those that provide essential security services, many of which run with elevated privileges. Applications which are covered by more-specific Protection Profiles cannot claim evaluation as part of the OS evaluation, even when it is necessary to evaluate some of their functionality as it relates to their role as part of the OS.
The TOE platform, which consists of the physical or virtual hardware on which the TOE executes, is outside the scope of evaluation. At the same time, the security of the TOE relies upon it. Other hardware components which independently run their own software and are relevant to overall system security are also outside the scope of evaluation.
1.4 Use Cases
Requirements in this Protection Profile are designed to address the security problems in at least the following use cases. These use cases are intentionally very broad, as many specific use cases exist for an operating system. These use cases may also overlap with one another. An operating system's functionality may even be effectively extended by privileged applications installed onto it. However, these are out of scope of this PP.
[USE CASE 1] End User Devices
The OS provides a platform for end user devices such as desktops, laptops, convertibles, and tablets. These devices may optionally be bound to a directory server or management server.
As this Protection Profile does not address threats against data-at-rest, enterprises deploying operating systems in mobile scenarios should ensure that these systems include data-at-rest protection spelled out in other Protection Profiles. Specifically, this includes the Protection Profiles for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition, and Software File Encryption. The Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals includes requirements for data-at-rest protection and is appropriate for many mobile devices.
[USE CASE 2] Server Systems
The OS provides a platform for server-side services, either on physical or virtual hardware. Many specific examples exist in which the OS acts as a platform for such services, including file servers, mail servers, and web servers.
[USE CASE 3] Cloud Systems
The OS provides a platform for providing cloud services running on physical or virtual hardware. An OS is typically part of offerings identified as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS).
This use case typically involves the use of virtualization technology which should be evaluated against the Protection Profile for Server Virtualization.
2 Conformance Claims
Conformance Statement
An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP, as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017). The following .
The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.
CC Conformance Claims
This PP is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (extended) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.
PP Claim
This PP does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP. :
PP-Modulefor Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version
This PP is Functional Package for X.509 Version 1.0 conformant.
This PP does not conform to any assurance packages.
The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SFRs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSF and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made.
3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the OS is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that the OS is expected to enforce.
3.1 Threats
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS, resulting in modification or disclosure of sensitive communications.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device, resulting in unauthorized disclosure or modification of the TSF's data or behavior.
3.2 Assumptions
A.PLATFORM
The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the
TOE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
Conformant OSes ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.
O.INTEGRITY
Conformant OSes ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSes are seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSes provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.
O.MANAGEMENT
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSes provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant OSes provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSes also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the same system.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant OSes provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the OS in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.
OE.PLATFORM
The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
OE.PROPER_USER
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4.3 2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section describes how the assumptions , threats, and organizational security policies map to the operational environment security objectives.
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred.
The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred.
This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
Refinement operation (denoted by bold text or strikethrough text): Is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
Selection (denoted by italicized text): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
Assignment operation (denoted by italicized text): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
Iteration operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."
The TSF shall record within the audit data at least the following information:
Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP, PP-Module, functional package, or ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information]
.
Application Note: The term subject here is understood to be the user that the process is acting on behalf of. If no auditable event definitions of functional components are provided, then no additional audit-relevant information is required.
The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type selected in the ST is included.
The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit data. Each audit data format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall ensure that the fields contains the information required.
Tests
The evaluator shall test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit data by having the TOE generate audit data for the events listed in the ST. This should include all instance types of an event specified. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit data generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the audit data provides the required information.
OS RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 3072-bit or greater
TSFshall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm] and specified cryptographic algorithm parameterskey sizes [selection: Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters] that meet the following: [selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations of FCS_CKM.1/AKG.
4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4
FFC schemes using [selection: cryptographic key sizes of 3072-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.1, safe primes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes" ]
The ST author will select all key generation schemes used for key establishment and entity authentication. When key generation is used for key establishment, the schemes in FCS_CKM.2 and selected cryptographic protocols must match the selection. When key generation is used for entity authentication, the public key is expected to be associated with an X.509v3 certificate.
If the OS acts only as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the OS does not need to implement RSA key generation.
identifies the key sizes supported by the OS. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator will
to verify that it describes how the TOE generates a key based on output from a random bit generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1. The evaluator shall review the TSS to verify that it describes how the functionality described by FCS_RBG.1 is invoked.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage and key lifecycle for keys generated using each
scheme
selected algorithm.
The evaluator
will verify that the AGD
shall examine the TSS to verify that any one-time values such as nonces or masks are constructed in accordance with the relevant standards.
If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain or hierarchy then the evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes how the key is used as part of the key chain or hierarchy.
Guidance
The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the
may require the vendor to furnish a developer environment and developer tools that are typically not available to end-users of the OS. The following content should be included if:
Key Generation for FIPS PUB 186-4 RSA Schemes The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the OS using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the
are conditional based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
RSA Key Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
List of Standards
RSA
RSA
Modulus of size [selection:3072, 4096, 6144, 8192] bits
Rabin-Miller prime test [2100, 2Security String] (methods 2, 4, 5 only)
p mod 8 value [0,1,3,5,7]
q mod 8 value [0,1,3,5,7]
Private key format [standard, Chinese Remainder Theorem]
Public exponent [fixed value, random]
The evaluator shall verify the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the RSA key components, including the public verification exponent e, the private prime factors pand q, the public modulus n, and the calculation of the private signature exponent d.
Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes p and q. These include:
Random Primes:
Provable primes
Probable primes
Primes with Conditions:
Primes p1, p2, q1,q2, p and q shall all be provable primes
Primes p1, p2, q1, and q2 shall be provable primes and p and q shall be probable primes
Primes p1, p2, q1,q2, p and q shall all be probable primes
Testing for Random Provable Primes and Conditional Methods
To test the key generation method for the
Random Provable
random provable primes method and for all the
Primes
primes with
Conditions
conditions methods (methods 1, 3-5), the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair.
This includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported
For each supported combination of the above input parameters, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator
For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-384 and P-521, the evaluator will require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator will submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using elliptic curves, the evaluator shall perform the ECC Key Generation Test and the ECC Key Validation Test using the following input parameters.
Elliptic curve [P-384, P-521]
Key pair generation method [extra random bits, rejection sampling]
ECC Key Generation Test For each supported combination of the above input parameters the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to generate 10 private and public key pairs (d, Q). The private key, d, shall be generated using a random bit generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1. The private key, d, is used to compute the public key, Q'. The evaluator shall confirm that 0<d<n (where n is the order of the group), and the computed value Q' is then compared to the generated public and private key pairs’ public key, Q, to confirm that Q is equal to Q'.
ECC Key Validation Test For each supported combination of the above parameters the evaluator shall generate 12 private and public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation
and modify five of the public key values
. For each set of 12 public keys, the evaluator shall modify four public key values by shifting x or y out of range by adding the order of the field and modify four other public key values by shifting x or yso that they are
incorrect, leaving five values
still in bounds, but not on the curve. The remaining public key values are left unchanged (i.e., correct).
The evaluator will obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values. The following content should be included if:
Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)
The evaluator will verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime p, the cryptographic prime q (dividing p-1), the cryptographic group generator g, and the calculation of the private key x and public key y.
The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime q and the field prime p:
Cryptographic and Field Primes:
Primes q and p shall both be provable primes
Primes q and field prime p shall both be probable primes
and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator g:
Cryptographic Group Generator:
Generator g constructed through a verifiable process
Generator g constructed through an unverifiable process
The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key x:
len(q) + 64 bit output of RBG, followed by a mod q-1 operation where 1 ≤ x ≤ q-1
The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set. To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator g for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set. For each key length supported, the evaluator will have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's
To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the public keys to the public key validation (PKV) function of the TOE and confirm that the results correspond as expected for the modified and unmodified values.
Finite Field Cryptography Key Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
List of Standards
FFC-ERB
FFC – Extra Random Bits
Static domain parameters approved for [selection:IKE groups [selection: MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192], TLS groups [selection: ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192]]]
Static domain parameters approved for [selection: IKE groups [selection:MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192], TLS groups [selection: ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192]]]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using finite fields, the evaluator shall perform the Safe Primes Generation Test and the Safe Primes Validation Test using the following input parameter:
Safe Primes Generation Test For each supported safe primes group, generate 10 key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
Safe Primes Verification Test For each supported safe primes group, use a known good implementation to generate 10 key pairs. For each set of 10, the evaluator shall modify three so they are incorrect. The remaining values are left unmodified (i.e. correct). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the key pairs to the public key validation (PKV) function of the TOE and shall confirm that the results correspond as expected for the modified and unmodified values.
LMS Key Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
List of Standards
LMS
LMS Key Generation
Private key size = [selection: 192 bits with [selection:SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with [selection:SHA-256, SHAKE256]]; Winternitz parameter = [selection:1, 2, 4, 8]; Tree height = [selection:5, 10, 15, 20, 25]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using LMS, the evaluator shall perform the LMS Key Generation Test using the following input parameters:
LMS Key Generation Test For each supported combination of the hash algorithm, Winternitz parameter, and tree height, the evaluator shall generate one public key for each of the test cases. The number of test cases depends on the tree height:
Table 4: Number of LMS Test Cases
Height
Number of test cases
5
5
10
4
15
3
20
2
25
1
The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation by comparing the public key generated by the TSF with that generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using ML-KEM, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
Parameter set [ML-KEM-1024]
Random seed d [32 bytes]
Random seed z [32 bytes]
Algorithm Functional Test For each supported parameter set the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to generate 25 key pairs using 25 different randomly generated pairs of 32-byte seed values (d, z). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting key pairs (ek, dk) with those generated using a known good implementation using the same inputs.
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using ML-DSA, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
Parameter set [ML-DSA-87]
Random seed [32 bytes]
Algorithm Functional Test For each supported parameter set the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to generate 25 key pairs using 25 different randomly generated 32-byte seed values. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting key pairs with those generated using a known good implementation using the same inputs.
XMSS Key Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
List of Standards
XMSS
XMSS
Private key size = [selection:192 bits with [selection:SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with [selection:SHA-256, SHAKE256]], tree height = [selection:10, 16, 20]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys using XMSS, the evaluator shall perform the XMSS Key Generation Test using the following input parameters:
XMSS Key Generation Test For each supported combination of hash algorithm and tree height, the evaluator shall generate one public key for each test case. The number of test cases depends on the tree height as specified in Table 5.
The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated
from
by a known good implementation
. Verification must also confirm:
g != 0,1
q divides p-1
gq mod p = 1
gx mod p = y
for each FFC parameter set and key pair
using the same input parameters.
Note: The number of test cases is limited due to the extreme amount of time it can take to generate XMSS trees.
The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key establishmentTSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishmentdistribution method : [selection:
RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"
Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
key encapsulation, key wrapping, encrypted channels] that meets the following: [none].
Application Note:
The ST author will select all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.
The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme shall correlate with the curves specified in FCS_CKM.1.1/AKG. The domain parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are specified by the key generation according to FCS_CKM.1.1/AKG. The finite field-based key establishment schemes that conform to NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3 correspond to the "safe-prime" groups selection in FCS_CKM.1.1/AKG.
shall ensure that the TSS documents that the security strength supported
key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS_CKM.1.1 If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator will examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme. The evaluator will
by the selected key distribution methods is sufficient for the security strength of the keys distributed through those methods.
It is not necessary to identify the services that use each key distribution method here. That information should be documented in the requirements for the individual services and protocols that invoke key distribution.
Guidance
The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the
Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.
Key Establishment Schemes
The evaluator will verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes supported by the OS using the applicable tests below.
The evaluator will verify the OS's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that the OS has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the discrete logarithm cryptography (DLC) primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator will also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MAC data and the calculation of MAC tag.
Function Test
The Function test verifies the ability of the OS to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator will generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the OS's supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role- key confirmation type combination, the tester will generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FCC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.
The evaluator will obtain the DKM, the corresponding OS's public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and OS id fields.
If the OS does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator will obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.
The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.
If key confirmation is supported, the OS will perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.
Validity Test
The Validity test verifies the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator will obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A Revision 3 key agreement implementation to determine which errors the OS should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 FCC or 30 ECC test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the OS's public/private key pairs, MAC tag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and OS id fields.
The evaluator will inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the OS recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MACed, or the generated MAC tag. If the OS contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the OS's static private key to assure the OS detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors will remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).
The OS will use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator will compare the OS's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the OS detects these errors.
The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.
FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups (identified in Appendix D of SP 800-56A Revision 3)
The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of "safe-prime" groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 that uses "safe-prime" groups. This test must be performed for each "safe-prime" group that each protocol uses.
The TSF shall destroy [all keys and key material] when [no longer needed].
Application Note: For the purposes of this requirement, key material refers to authentication data, passwords, secret/private symmetric keys, private asymmetric keys, data used to derive keys, values derived from passwords, etc.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
single overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG, zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [assignment: any value that does not contain any CSP]]
removal of power to the memory
destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection
]
For non-volatile memory that consists of [selection:
destruction of all key encrypting keys (KEKs) protecting the target key according to FCS_CKM
2, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived
the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [selection:
logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection: single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]]overwrite consisting of [selection: zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: any value that does not contain any CSP]]
instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that represents the key
]
]
] .
Application Note:
The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction visible. For instance, in a given implementation that overwrites a key stored in non-volatile memory, the application may have access to the file system details and may be able to logically address specific memory locations. In another implementation, that instructs the underlying platform to destroy the representation of a key stored in non-volatile memory, the application may simply have a handle to a resource and can only ask the platform to delete the resource, as may be the case with a platforms secure key store. The latter implementation should only be used for the most restricted access. The level of detail to which the TOE has access will be reflected in the TSS section of the ST.
Several selections allow assignment of a 'value that does not contain any CSP.' This means that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from a source that may contain key material or reveal information about key material, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase 'does not contain any CSP' is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general 'pool' that might contain current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.
2, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived , a key can be considered destroyed by destroying the key that protects the key. If a key is wrapped or encrypted it is not necessary to "overwrite" that key, overwriting the key that is used to wrap or encrypt the key used to encrypt/decrypt data, using the appropriate method for the memory type involved, will suffice. For example, if a product uses a KEK to encrypt a Data Encryption Key (DEK), destroying the KEK using one of the methods in FCS_CKM
6is sufficient, since the DEK would no longer be usable (of course, presumes the DEK is still encrypted and the KEK cannot be recovered or re-derived.).
The OS shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
Application Note:
For the purposes of this requirement, key material refers to authentication data, passwords, secret/private symmetric keys, private asymmetric keys, data used to derive keys, values derived from passwords, etc.
Key destruction procedures are performed in accordance with FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1.
The evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how the keys are managed in volatile memory. This description includes details of how each identified key is introduced into volatile memory (e.g. by derivation from user input, or by unwrapping a wrapped key stored in non-volatile memory) and how they are overwritten.
The evaluator
will
shall check to ensure the TSS lists each type of key that is stored in
in
non-volatile memory, and identifies how the TOE interacts with the underlying platform to manage keys (e.g., store, retrieve, destroy). The description includes details on the method of how the TOE interacts with the platform, including an identification and description of the interfaces it uses to manage keys (e.g., file system APIs, platform key store APIs).
If the ST makes use of the open assignment and fills in the type of pattern that is used, the evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how that pattern is obtained and used. The evaluator
will
shall verify that the pattern does not contain any CSPs.
The evaluator
will
shall check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement.
If the selection "destruction of all key encrypting keys (KEKs) protecting the target key according to FCS_CKM
6.2, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived" is included, the evaluator
will
shall examine the TOE’s keychain in the TSS and identify each instance when a key is destroyed by this method. In each instance the evaluator will verify all keys capable of decrypting the target key are destroyed in accordance with a specified key destruction method in FCS_CKM
shall verify that all of the keys capable of decrypting the target key are not able to be derived to reestablish the keychain after their destruction.
Guidance
Operational Guidance
There are a variety of concerns that may prevent or delay key destruction in some cases. The evaluator
will
shall check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS and any other relevant Required Supplementary Information. The evaluator
will
shall check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer and how such situations can be avoided or mitigated if possible.
Some examples of what is expected to be in the documentation are provided here.
When the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may be implementing wear-leveling and garbage collection. This may create additional copies of the key that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. In this case, to mitigate this the drive should support the TRIM command and implements garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies when not actively engaged in other tasks.
Drive vendors implement garbage collection in a variety of different ways, as such there is a variable amount of time until data is truly removed from these solutions. There is a risk that data may persist for a longer amount of time if it is contained in a block with other data not ready for erasure. To reduce this risk, the operating system and file system of the OE should support TRIM, instructing the non-volatile memory to erase copies via garbage collection upon their deletion. If a RAID array is being used, only set-ups that support TRIM are utilized. If the drive is connected via PCI-Express, the operating system supports TRIM over that channel.
The drive should be healthy and contains minimal corrupted data and should be end-of-lifed before a significant amount of damage to drive health occurs, this minimizes the risk that small amounts of potentially recoverable data may remain in damaged areas of the drive.
Tests
Test FCS_CKM.6:1: Applied to each key held as in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE (whether or not the value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory). In the case where the only selection made for the destruction method key was removal of power, then this test is unnecessary. The evaluator
will
shall:
Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
Cause the TOE to dump the entire memory of the TOE into a binary file.
Search the content of the binary file created in Step #5 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.
Steps 1-6 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a copy is found, then the test fails.
Test FCS_CKM.6:2: Applied to each key help in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by the TOE. The evaluator
will
shall use special tools (as needed), provided by the TOE developer if necessary, to ensure the tests function as intended.
Identify the purpose of the key and what access should fail when it is deleted. (e.g. the data encryption key being deleted would cause data decryption to fail.)
Tests 3 and 4 do not apply for the selection instructing the underlying platform to destroy the representation of the key as the TOE has no visibility into the inner workings and completely relies on the underlying platform.
The following tests are used to determine if the TOE is able to request the platform to overwrite the key with a TOE supplied pattern.
Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator
will
shall use a tool that provides a logical view of the media (e.g., MBR file system):
Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
For the second selection, the ST author should choose the mode or modes in which AES operates. For the third selection, the ST author should choose the key sizes that are supported by this functionality.
The intent of this requirement is to specify the hashing function. The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used.
will verify that the AGD documents contains instructions required to configure the OS to use the required modes and key sizes.
Tests
The evaluator will execute all instructions as specified to configure the OS to the appropriate state. The evaluator will perform all of the following tests for each algorithm implemented by the OS and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP:
Three data unit (i.e., plaintext) lengths. One of the data unit lengths will be a nonzero integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. One of the data unit lengths will be an integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. The third data unit length will be either the longest supported data unit length or 216 bits, whichever is smaller.
using a set of 100 (key, plaintext and 256-bit random tweak value) 3-tuples and obtain the ciphertext that results from XTS-AES encrypt.
The evaluator may supply a data unit sequence number instead of the tweak value if the implementation supports it. The data unit sequence number is a base-10 number ranging between 0 and 255 that implementations convert to a tweak value internally.
The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality of XTS-AES using the same test as for encrypt, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and XTS-AES encrypt with XTSAES decrypt.
There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values will be 256-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation. Test 5: To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of 5 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. The plaintext values will encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using 5 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.Test 6: To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of five 256-keys and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.Test 7: To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the a sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Key i will have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost N-i bits be zeros, for i in [1,N]. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the set of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The set of key/ciphertext pairs will have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key i in each set will have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost N-i bits be zeros, for i in [1,N]. The ciphertext value in each pair will be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.Test 8: To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the set of 256 plaintext values described below and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros. Plaintext value i in each set will have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost 256-i bits be zeros, for i in [1,256]. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption. AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an i-block message where 1 < i ≤ 10. The evaluator will choose a key, an IV and plaintext message of length i blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext will be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator will also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an i-block message where 1 < i ≤10. The evaluator will choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length i blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext will be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 100 plaintext, IV, and key 3-tuples. The keys, plaintext, and IV values are each 256-bits. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations will be run as follows:
shall examine the TSS to verify that if SHA-256 is selected, that it is being used only as a PRF or MAC step in a key derivation function or as part of LMS, and not as a hash algorithm.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests may require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.
The following tests are conditional, based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
To test the TOE’s ability to generate hash digests using SHA2, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test, Monte Carlo Test, and Large Data Test for each claimed SHA2 algorithm.
Algorithm Functional Test
The evaluator shall generate a number of test cases equal to the block size of the hash (512 for SHA2-256; 1024 for the other SHA2 algorithms).
Each test case is to consist of random data of a random length between 0 and 65536 bits, or the largest size supported.
Monte Carlo Test
Monte Carlo tests begin with a single seed and run 100 iterations of the chained computation.
There are two versions of the Monte Carlo Test for SHA-1 and SHA-2. Either one is acceptable. For the standard Monte Carlo test the message hashed is always three times the length of the initial seed.
For j = 0 to 99
A = B = C = SEED
For i = 0 to 999
MSG = A || B || C
MD = SHA(MSG)
A = B
B = C
C = MD
Output MD
SEED = MD
For the alternate version of the Monte Carlo Test, the hashed message is always the same length as the seed.
INITIAL_SEED_LENGTH = LEN(SEED)
For j = 0 to 99
A = B = C = SEED
For i = 0 to 999
MSG = A || B || C
if LEN(MSG) >= INITIAL_SEED_LENGTH:
MSG = leftmost INITIAL_SEED_LENGTH bits of MSG
else:
MSG = MSG || INITIAL_SEED_LENGTH - LEN(MSG) 0 bits
MD = SHA(MSG)
A = B
B = C
C = MD
Output MD
SEED = MD
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
Large Data Test
The implementation must be tested against one test case each on large data messages of 1GB, 2GB, 4GB, and 8GB of data as supported. The data need not be random. It may, for example, consist of a repeated pattern of 64 bits.
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
To test the TOE’s ability to generate hash digests using SHA3 the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test, Monte Carlo Test, and Large Data Tests for each claimed SHA3 algorithm.
Algorithm Functional Test
Generate a test case consisting of random data for every message length from 0 bits (or the smallest supported message size) to rate bits, where rate equals
832 for SHA3-384 and
576 for SHA3-512.
Additionally, generate tests cases of random data for messages of every multiple of (rate+1) bits starting at length rate, and continuing until 65535 is exceeded.
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
Monte Carlo Test
Monte Carlo tests begin with a single seed and run 100 iterations of the chained computation.
For this Monte Carlo Test, the hashed message is always the same length as the seed.
The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result will be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.
The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.
There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs) described below. For all KATs, the plaintext, initialization vector (IV), and ciphertext values shall be 256-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the validator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.
Test 9: To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator will supply 5 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of the given plaintext using a 256-bit key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using the 5 ciphertext values as input. Test 10: To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator will supply 5 256-bit key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all zero ciphertext value as input. Test 11: To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator will supply a set of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key values and an IV of all zeros. The set of keys shall have shall have 256 256-bit keys. Keyi shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost 256-i bits be zeros, for i in [1, N]. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator will supply the set of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key values and an IV of all zeros. The set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit pairs. Keyi shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost 256-i bits be zeros for i in [1, N]. The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key. Test 12: To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator will supply the set of 256 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from encryption of the given plaintext using a 256 bit key value of all zeros, respectively, and an IV of all zeros. Plaintext value i in each set shall have the leftmost bits be ones and the rightmost 256-i bits be zeros, for i in [1, 256]. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input.
Multi-Block Message Test
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an i-block message where 1 less-than i less-than-or-equal to 10. For each i the evaluator will choose a key, IV, and plaintext message of length i blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator will also test the decrypt functionality by decrypting an i-block message where 1 less-than i less-than-or-equal to 10. For each i the evaluator will choose a key and a ciphertext message of length i blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key using a known good implementation.
Monte-Carlo Test
For AES-CTR mode perform the Monte Carlo Test for ECB Mode on the encryption engine of the counter mode implementation. There is no need to test the decryption engine.
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using 100 plaintext/key pairs. Each key shall be 256-bit. The plaintext values shall be 256-bit blocks. For each pair, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:
# Input: PT, Key
for i = 1 to 1000:
CT[i] = AES-ECB-Encrypt(Key, PT)
PT = CT[i]
The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.
AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) and Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP) Test
The evaluator will test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for EACH combination of the following input parameter lengths:
256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)
Three plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths will be two semi-blocks (256 bits). One of the plaintext lengths will be three semi-blocks (192 bits). The third data unit length will be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).
using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.
The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption.
The evaluator will test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the three plaintext lengths:
One plaintext length will be one octet. One plaintext length will be 20 octets (160 bits).
One plaintext length will be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096 bits).
The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption.
The evaluator will test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:
256 bit key
Two payload lengths. One payload length will be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. The other payload length will be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits).
Two or three associated data lengths. One associated data length will be 0, if supported. One associated data length will be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. One associated data length will be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits). If the implementation supports an associated data length of 2 16 bytes, an associated data length of 216 bytes will be tested.
Nonce lengths. The evaluator will test all nonce lengths between 7 and 13 bytes, inclusive, that are supported by the OS.
Tag lengths. The evaluator will test all of the following tag length values that are supported by the OS: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 bytes.
To test the generation-encryption functionality of AES-CCM, the evaluator will perform the following four tests: Test 13: For EACH supported key and associated data length and ANY supported payload, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext. Test 14: For EACH supported key and payload length and ANY supported associated data, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext. Test 15: For EACH supported key and nonce length and ANY supported associated data, payload and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value and 10 associated data, payload and nonce value 3-tuples and obtain the resulting ciphertext. Test 16: For EACH supported key and tag length and ANY supported associated data, payload and nonce length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
To determine correctness in each of the above tests, the evaluator will compare the ciphertext with the result of generation-encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.
To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for EACH combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length and tag length, the evaluator will supply a key value and 15 nonce, associated data and ciphertext 3-tuples and obtain either a FAIL result or a PASS result with the decrypted payload. The evaluator will supply 10 tuples that should FAIL and 5 that should PASS per set of 15.
Additionally, the evaluator will use tests from the IEEE 802.11-02/362r6 document "Proposed Test vectors for IEEE 802.11 TGi", dated September 10, 2002, Section 2.1 AESCCMP Encapsulation Example and Section 2.2 Additional AES CCMP Test Vectors to further verify the IEEE 802.11-2007 implementation of AES-CCMP.
The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:
256 bit keys
Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths will be a non-zero integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length will not be an integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported.
Three AAD lengths. One AAD length will be 0, if supported. One AAD length will be a non-zero integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. One AAD length will not be an integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported.
Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits will be one of the two IV lengths tested.
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length will be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.
The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set will include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.
The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.
The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:
256 bit keys
Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths will be a non-zero integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length will not be an integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported.
Three AAD lengths. One AAD length will be 0, if supported. One AAD length will be a non-zero integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported. One AAD length will not be an integer multiple of 256 bits, if supported.
Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits will be one of the two IV lengths tested.
The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length will be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.
The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set will include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.
The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.
] that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4]. Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the hashing function. The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used
Output MD[0]
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
Large Data Test
The implementation must be tested against one test case each on large data messages of 1GB, 2GB, 4GB, and 8GB of data as supported. The data need not be random. It may, for example, consist of a repeated pattern of 64 bits.
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
The TSF shall perform [keyed hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: Keyed Hash Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations of FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash.
The intent of this requirement is to specify the keyed-hash message authentication function used for key establishment purposes for the various cryptographic protocols used by the OS (e.g., trusted channel). The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for FCS_COP.1/HASH.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that the size of the key is sufficient for the desired security strength of the output.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that if HMAC-SHA-256 is selected, that it is being used only as a PRF or MAC step in a key derivation function.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests are conditional based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
[selection:ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”), FIPS PUB 198-1]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate keyed hashes using HMAC the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test for each combination of claimed HMAC algorithm the following parameters:
MAC length [32-[digest size of hash function (256, 384, 512)]] bits
Algorithm Functional Test
For each supported Hash function the evaluator shall generate 150 test cases using random input messages of 128 bits, random supported key lengths, random keys, and random supported MAC lengths such that across the 150 test cases:
The key length includes the minimum, the maximum, a key length equal to the block size, and key lengths that are both larger and smaller than the block size.
The MAC size includes the minimum, the maximum, and two other random values.
The evaluator shall compare the output against results generated by a known good implementation with the same input.
The TSF shall perform [digital signature generation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations in FCS_COP.1/SigGen.
Elliptic Curve [selection: P-384, P-521], per-message secret number generation [selection: extra random bits, rejection sampling, deterministic] and hash function using [selection: SHA-384, SHA-512]
Application Note: The ST author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures; if more than one algorithm is available, this requirement should be iterated to specify the functionality. For the algorithm chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments and selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that any hash function is the appropriate security strength for the signing algorithm.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that any one-time values such as nonces or masks are constructed and used in accordance with the relevant standards.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the TOE has appropriate measures in place to ensure that hash-based signature algorithms do not reuse private keys.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests are conditional based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
To test the TOE’s ability to perform RSA Digital Signature Generation using PKCS1-v1,5 signature type, the evaluator shall perform the Generated Data Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate three test cases using random data. The evaluator shall compare the results against those from a known good implementation.
RSA-PSS Signature Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
RSA-PSS
RSASSA-PSS
Modulus of size [selection:3072, 4096, 6144, 8192] bits, hash [selection:SHA-384, SHA-512], Salt Length (sLen) such that [assignment:0 ≤ sLen ≤ hLen (Hash Output Length)] and Mask Generation Function = MGF1
To test the TOE’s ability to perform RSA Digital Signature Generation using PSS signature type, the evaluator shall perform the Generated Data Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate three test cases using random data. The evaluator shall compare the results against those from a known good implementation.
Elliptic Curve [selection:P-384, P-521], per-message secret number generation [selection:extra random bits, rejection sampling, deterministic] and hash function using [selection:SHA-384, SHA-512]
To test the TOE’s ability to perform ECDSA Digital Signature Generation using extra random bits or rejection sampling for secret number generation, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
To test the TOE’s ability to perform ECDSA Digital Signature Generation using deterministic secret number generation, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate 10 test cases using random data. The evaluator shall compare the results against those from a known good implementation.
LMS Signature Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
LMS
LMS
Private key size = [selection:192 bits with [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with [selection:SHA-256, SHAKE256]] , Winternitz parameter = [selection:1, 2, 4, 8], and tree height = [selection:5, 10, 15, 20, 25]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate cryptographic digital signatures using LMS, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall generate 10 signatures. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the implementation by comparing values generated by the TOE with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
To test the TOE’s ability to generate digital signatures using ML-DSA, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
Parameter set [ML-DSA-87]
Seed [32 random bytes] (for non-deterministic signature testing), or
Seed [32 zero bytes] (for deterministic signature testing)
Message to sign [8-65535] bytes
Mu value (if generated externally)
Previously generated private key (sk)
Context (for external interface testing)
Algorithm Functional Test
For each combination of supported parameter set and capabilities, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to generate 15 signatures pairs using 15 different randomly generated 32-byte seed values. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting key pairs with those generated using a known good implementation using the same inputs.
Known Answer Test for Rejection Cases
For each supported parameter set, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate signatures using the data below and a deterministic seed of all 0’s. Correctness is determined by comparing the hash of the resulting signature with the hash in the fourth row for each corresponding test case below.
The test values are defined as follows:
Seed is the seed to generate the key pair (pk, sk)
Test case 87-RC-01
Seed: E4F5AFCF697E0EC3C1BDEB66FAA903221E803902F9C3F716E1056A63D77DC250
Hash of Keys: 61618E8DDA6998072C8EB36974E03880D741CAF0BD523356DFC161E7C9E63934
Message: F4F1C05004D5B946F69EAFE104C4020519086ADDB9582A20FDE887D13DFC36B1
Hash of sig: B584E38FA442FC3C81A147D4BDBF058D73C822CAF5CA4C06B0110867F60A8001
Test case 87-RC-02
Seed: 8B828D871254D6C57384A8E7025AA3F7160CAD1D2C754499DF3844426062C3DD
Hash of Keys: BB64481317D6C0DBAD20C0C7EF11078AD54E5D574F4A07652115A95F77C655FA
Message: 0F9409C5A4930C25B83FC5B77FDB5BB49C75372DE724D9C1A77DB700CF0CF154
Hash of sig: F86B49BE9DEB2B209BDEB4E922E5939E92D38E562C44BB09AFBD67323C345192
Test case 87-RC-03
Seed: E693D282CACB8CE65FD4D108DA7A373F097F0AA9713550BE242AAD5BD3E2E452
Hash of Keys: B0BEAF56713A69BD4AB2CBEE006FA5001E7B41F3AE541E05F088933AA0CC78DF
Message: 24DABB9D57ADEBD560ED65D9451C5106D437061708F849BA53F3543CDF9AAAE0
Hash of sig: DBF65CEFF9F96A74AAF6F3AB27B043231BE6AA04FBA2EEC987A24A00BDD6A08E
Test case 87-RC-04
Seed: 4002163EB8EED01A8E0919BA8C07D291341EDCAE25B02B9779A2CFFE50561AF0
Hash of Keys: FED1BE685C20ECB322FC40D41DEE7E0E98D0409FBF989CAE71B8AD2D58AD645E
Message: EE316BB5EBED53325B4A55571C60657B53E353B51B831F4A0BBB28107EBA4BA8
Hash of sig: 3BE9B5545FDCED92547B3409C83B3312CCB5792A8EC3A4DA63BA692C79BEF17C
Test case 87-RC-05
Seed: 9C7AD524F65854C27E565BCEDF8E86D650F13A40D0448F9AE10C05F10F777120
Hash of Keys: 0EA872CA5A4BEA94F4E8EF7ED31800727899A51059FDEE111E5CB15F0233B534
Message: CE09831294AA96CAF684B9E667947B021C57B24C138EC7D4DA270694C82F2E08
Hash of sig: 3B9526CEE6587F2418BFE603ADB0F7DF0D69EBA31C9F9F005C60C993945EBD33
Test case 87-RC-06
Seed: 2EB7676D4A28700DA7772A7A035EB495CAA6F842352A74824EF5FD891BC38B2A
Hash of Keys: D5B73703A1DDC5BCB0D14AE39B193A25D6ADA6535827973181ADB0BE70435A5B
Message: C2B3A0AC483A5517682285C205974B2A506946448A8F7D3E1934C155EFDFE922
Hash of sig: 375D598704B722C8A1FEF1626FD7738A532C06329AA4217357460E3B729660F8
Test case 87-RC-07
Seed: E4E80CCE8B26DF1B02B99949851EE2F907FE4F0CC34790352C76D5D91634D073
Hash of Keys: 84B7E61684A12698400B09EA332EA3C4FBCFA47FE37FD6AE725CBC5FA8A99D3F
Message: 89E6AB43C9CB1CC59C3986D53217A558357E62102A26F666F2B64CD1DBB7A536
Hash of sig: 7C4AABD163CAEF8F6EBFDA3E3EEBC0A9604675B0E991ABAFD284F1AE8BA07B2A
Test case 87-RC-08
Seed: 5787262B803499223D4E5A8C1EE572E89F7A69B359B3F8505355B0BDEAB95E5C
Hash of Keys: 85AE1DE605A7B479C02730BF4B7DD6D0FD8FFE5C980893CA6DAD00BD8BD1CE68
Message: D3230C4E061964BBFB17702432D5D36FC1EB3D1068F8CCAA84044776E3B5CC55
Hash of sig: D3ABE460EE2DD9595F413CFE2780A319E4E4DFD6592995298A7AB0B82A5E2815
Test case 87-RC-09
Seed: CE099B99330537DD153052243FC32ACAD509A126AB982410258858567D410D79
Hash of Keys: E04A9F15EDF8F078EB336CE624249EF2A8EDF2CDBF6A8276E9F5E92ED9B0BAE8
Message: 0035931762665F561A1B22176567E3B10FDE2441521F77030733A8E39312EEEE
Hash of sig: 3EEF413CB5EB179896ECA172D0DBFB9B251545DC561D61580BD5BBC8B6D734E1
Test case 87-RC-10
Seed: FC8F2929878CBD81E1CCC23913F290380120C043A4A8A251AEEBF09705B8E590
Hash of Keys: 7E2ECCA86F532E8E8092FEBB6E0007F92E7909AD2BCBE2E02AB375DAC9969E5E
Message: D3C28875D2671C0EF23BFDC8869E8ECF8868D3F0561C3134D254F7479D0CE0E5
Hash of sig: EB69A908EDCC04320A0B61AD57E21B044465F2037698636B64229CF2DB259789
Known Answer Test for Large Number of Rejection Cases (Total Rejection Count)
For each supported parameter set, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate signatures using the data below and a deterministic seed of all 0’s. Correctness is determined by comparing the hash of the resulting signature with the hash in the fourth row of the corresponding test case below.
ML-DSA-87 Test Cases for Total Rejection Count
Test case 87-LN-01
Seed: 98B6298051D92BF37293C93C97370747BF527B87B71F6C4264182F45155ADE4C
Hash of Keys: 04A135B5C9B7020332C7B16E7108E8FF7FC1EAE1C23C5FA0B5D5CED0FEEE7424
Message: D7B0341269259083ABF3C8DC47559A19D57669B4486E0224F376DC43E577A3D8
Hash of sig: 58D72D76EC0FB65BFB9893C4479366B79DD7B8B7577E4291D13514FCC76C26DD
Test case 87-LN-02
Seed: DFB5BDD90F58571DCA962426C623F13D046BBE814D183886AC90D143EAD725A7
Hash of Keys: 2B6AB8CFCCCC41F759CAF01932E9413F5DC6D949BC827F739866929683FB155E
Message: 21005DB2B583CC826A9684BFFD0EE00AB97E0479FE4A1D266699337540145778
Hash of sig: C93EA34E00FFFFC3ECEA072D5FB038A83B5539CAF7B831AEDCFA785E50B3CA5E
Test case 87-LN-03
Seed: 5AD414E0DD0EF2FE685F342871875FDF06F503717A86C3B3466565ADD2096417
Hash of Keys: BD9C2D52F3FC78DB17E682DA2E78947ECFC0898333838D60C892700B2B0DDA9F
Message: 29139C279816B25F2D6BB52C8247D163544F7BA332C3CF63359B9E23FBC56515
Hash of sig: DB4BE2DE19FB40437BDB7E9B6578D665DB05B4E88C16907DF4546EBA9BE03AEA
Test case 87-LN-04
Seed: 484DD2F406A4D15F49A91AD5FC3BDC1D0FF253622EB68F83D6E1C870D0E89E29
Hash of Keys: A719DC9A77C91C46295555C2353BA0CBEA513DA9A92A5C34D2E949EFF46A12D8
Message: 6AD6E959F0EA60126364FB7C95FA71133F246A9265A11B4965EE78AB0CB5AF0E
Hash of sig: 5050D7A665074EC63D9F3966C1F01A1BFB18F9E83AE0B09F838BC1E2342ED6F4
Test case 87-LN-05
Seed: B25C1816F82D59940D5CB829BAC364AAD013C4C16415CE1CF6DCC2F15199B391
Hash of Keys: ADBB2CD43F222640BD9FF4E61C80E63853E8DC1F759C581B7447C9C166EAA38E
Message: 824E47322895BFFE37B6B4AFC41CF6115C07EEC0C24EB81076C87A1B01AE8617
Hash of sig: 667ADA46073BC69D64DC47BB9A76DD0D78302E7415D87D5E816B05FB95F9E84D
Test case 87-LN-06
Seed: B2CE72B3560AF07E06465881F56ADA00262BA708D87B73F39E04E310F3B8A3E9
Hash of Keys: FD9C4AC53AE803242A62DF933B8E8BAD6CE5207AC4A73683B6D9383B5E70B17A
Message: A1501CC84C917E0D2D7C27C2AC382220BD8FFFE807DB38E37A9E429EC2781911
Hash of sig: 779553B195E11558EE59EF3942F5F6B446A2144600D1F4F50B300C6C56504760
Test case 87-LN-07
Seed: AB01D0E591B7DDCD3C03395AED808FA2763C0A486D44119D621BE0FD0B022B25
Hash of Keys: 93B6ADE34F78A4ADB36B2F6D2C51DB793E659E1243E80488AE1C03B65125D6D7
Message: 8DE8122D89D15FE84A4C34F6B59B2C4B11F33B6A053154D199B634F557FDF5F6
Hash of sig: 0483045999A79B583F403DB96A736F0F0B24E2DFBC4E5CFA9B50E3D910786F07
Test case 87-LN-08
Seed: 15D60D3693762F82C9AC1DCB0576936651AC81D863842EDB91109C8EE83AE705
Hash of Keys: 2DF544E2E939AA717741C2437288FAEB308DEB8FF37A2652FAE34BAE8B84D779
Message: F05946A6113905C34163AEF2246FD69016CE24A7BA40F8E7E42EDAC2D0A44605
Hash of sig: F8383917AF79C8E540D2356AB05F08B465BF32DFEC444B787CE31BF48CC6C3DD
Test case 87-LN-09
Seed: 21212285BED53B3411705DAF5F3BDDB6F0618EB571B36EE11A74053407A269F5
Hash of Keys: 737061155A9A03F11F9FEBBB940BED4DD54542C4A6212F89A5EB4EC2BE542782
Message: FFE38246BF3DEFD9CAD15CC17CEA511C067D582E04227B479E32F9197CF91482
Hash of sig: C4C12C58032052FB2D21F0C6A7388A63154FB85B74287D2859DE6C1C6F7F277B
Test case 87-LN-10
Seed: A2744470587C71BA43EC26DC390CE3531978F315993C653E5D3EFD2849D5D9F1
Hash of Keys: B1BF37BFFB11531B6ADD697870D7DB2E2462D0A97A63F09C1D0038457C6D795A
Message: 9831A830231A160B9847203341A5F30BF3E87A2A482AEEA6886315C92B5C4E4C
Hash of sig: 46C669D2FEB643A38E54FF87B790CC33F44043A1B6B31DB9474D301328CA2A7F
XMSS Signature Generation
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
XMSS
XMSS
Private key size = [selection:192 bits with [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with [selection:SHA-256, SHAKE256]], and tree height = [selection:10, 16, 20]
To test the TOE’s ability to generate digital signatures using XMSS, the evaluator shall perform the XMSS Key Generation Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall generate 10 signatures. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the implementation by comparing values generated by the TOE with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
The TSF shall perform [digital signature verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations in FCS_COP.1/SigVer.
Application Note: The ST author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures; if more than one algorithm is available, this requirement should be iterated to specify the functionality. For the algorithm chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments and selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.
will check that the association of the hash function with other application cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS.
The TSF hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF only hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented test MACs. The evaluator will perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP.
The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.Test 17: Short Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of m+1 messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to m bits. The message text will be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.Test 18: Short Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of m/8+1 messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to m/8 bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text will be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.Test 19: Selected Long Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of m messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the ith message is 512 + 99⋅i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The message text will be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.Test 20: Selected Long Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of m/8 messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the ith message is 512 + 8⋅99⋅i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m/8. The message text will be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.Test 21: Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test - This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluator will randomly generate a seed that is n bits long, where n is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluator will then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluator will then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF. FCS_COP.1/SIGN Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined)
shall examine the TSS to verify that any one-time values such as nonces or masks are constructed and used in accordance with the relevant standards.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests are conditional based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
To test the TOE’s ability to perform RSA Digital Signature Verification using PKCS1-v1,5 signature type, the evaluator shall perform Generated Data Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate six test cases using a random message and its signature such that the test cases are modified as follows:
One test case is left unmodified
For one test case the Message is modified
For one test case the Signature is modified
For one test case the exponent (e) is modified
For one test case the IR is moved
For one test case the Trailer is moved
The TOE must correctly verify the unmodified signatures and fail to verify the modified signatures.
To test the TOE’s ability to perform RSA Digital Signature Verification using PSS signature type, the evaluator shall perform the Generated Data Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate six test cases using random data such that the test cases are modified as follows:
One test case is left unmodified
For one test case the Message is modified
For one test case the Signature is modified
For one test case the exponent (e) is modified
For one test case the IR is moved
For one test case the Trailer is moved
The TOE must correctly verify the unmodified signatures and fail to verify the modified signatures.
DSA Signature Verification
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
DSA
DSA
Domain parameters for (L, N) = [(3072, 256)] bits
FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section 4.7) [DSA Signature Verification]
To test the TOE’s ability to perform DSA Digital Signature Verification, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate 15 test cases consisting of messages and signatures such that the 15 test cases are modified as follows:
Three test cases are left unmodified
For three test cases the Message is modified
For three test cases the key is modified
For three test cases the r value is modified
For three test cases the s value is modified
The TOE must correctly verify the unmodified signatures and fail to verify the modified signatures.
To test the TOE’s ability to perform ECDSA Digital Signature Verification, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall cause the TOE to generate test cases consisting of messages and signatures such that the 21 test cases are modified as follows:
Three test cases are left unmodified
For three test cases the Message is modified
For three test cases the key is modified
For three test cases the r value is modified
For three test cases the s value is modified
For three test cases the value r is zeroed
For three test cases the value s is zeroed
The TOE must correctly verify the unmodified signatures and fail to verify the modified signatures.
LMS Signature Verification
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
LMS
LMS
Private key size = [selection:192 bits with [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with [selection:SHA-256, SHAKE256]], Winternitz parameter = [selection:1, 2, 4, 8], and tree height = [selection:5, 10, 15, 20, 25]
To test the TOE’s ability to verify cryptographic digital signature using LMS, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
To test the TOE’s ability to verify digital signatures using XMSS or XMSS MT, the evaluator shall perform the XMSS digital signature verification test using the following input parameters:
For each supported combination of the above parameters, the evaluator shall generate four test cases consisting of signed messages and keys, such that
One test case is unmodified (i.e. correct)
For one test case modify the message, i.e. the message is different
For one test case modify the signature, i.e. signature is different
For one test case modify the signature header so that it is a valid header for a different XMSS parameter set
The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the implementation by verifying that the TOE correctly verifies the unmodified test case and fails to verify the modified test cases.
To test the TOE’s ability to validate digital signatures using ML-DSA, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test using the following input parameters:
Parameter set [ML-DSA-87]
Previously generated signed Message [8-65535] bytes
Mu value (if generated externally)
Context (for external interface testing)
Previously generated public key (pk)
Previously generated Signature
Algorithm Functional Test
For each combination of supported parameter set and capabilities, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to validate 15 signatures. Each group of 15 test cases is modified as follows:
Three test cases are left unmodified
For three test cases the Signed message is modified
For three test cases the component of the signature that commits the signer to the message is modified
For three test cases the component of the signature that allows the verifier to construct the vector z is modified
For three test cases the component of the signature that allows the verifier to construct the hint array is modified
The TOE must correctly verify the unmodified signatures and fail to verify the modified signatures.
cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)RSA schemes using
symmetric-key encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection:
Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
of 2048-bit or greater
[selection: Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 4
ECDSA schemes using "NIST curves" P-384 and [selection: P-521, no other curves ] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. Application Note: The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures; if more than one algorithm is available, this requirement should be iterated to specify the functionality. For the algorithm chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm
[selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations in FCS_COP.1/SKC.
AES CCMP (which uses AES in CCM as specified in SP 800-38C) becomes mandatory and must be selected if the ST includes the PP-Module for Wireless LAN Clients.
AES-CCM becomes mandatory and must be selected if the ST includes the PP-Module for Bluetooth.
For the second selection, the ST author should choose the mode or modes in which AES operates.
For the third selection, the ST author may only choose 128-bit if the ST includes the PP-Module for Bluetooth, and it may only be used specifically with AES-CCM for Bluetooth functions.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes the construction of any IVs, tweak values, and counters in conformance with the relevant specifications.
If XTS-AES is claimed then the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the TOE creates full-length keys by methods that ensure that the two key halves are different and independent.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test
application
platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.
The following tests are conditional based on the selections made in the
Test 22: ECDSAFIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values R and S. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the signature verification function of a known good implementation. Test 23: ECDSAFIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator will verify that 5 responses indicate success and 5 responses indicate failure. The following content should be included if:
Test 24: Signature Generation Test. The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Signature Generation by the OS using the Signature Generation Test. To conduct this test the evaluator must generate or obtain 10 messages from a trusted reference implementation for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the TSF. The evaluator will have the OS use its private key and modulus value to sign these messages. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF' signature using a known good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures. Test 25: Signature Verification Test. The evaluator will perform the Signature Verification test to verify the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator will inject errors into the test vectors produced during the Signature Verification Test by introducing errors in some of the public keys, e, messages, IR format, and/or signatures. The evaluator will verify that the OS returns failure when validating each signature.
The OS shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 ] with key sizes [assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC] and message digest sizes [selection: 160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits ] that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard].
Application Note:
The intent of this requirement is to specify the keyed-hash message authentication function used for key establishment purposes for the various cryptographic protocols used by the OS (e.g., trusted channel). The hash selection must support the message digest size selection. The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for FCS_COP.1/HASH.
The evaluator will perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.
For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator will compose 15 sets of test data. Each set consists of a key and message data. The evaluator will have the OS generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data. The resulting MAC tags will be compared against the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key using a known-good implementation.
The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A
evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described. AES-CBC
To test the TOE’s ability to encrypt and decrypt data using AES in CBC mode, the evaluator shall perform Algorithm Functional Tests and Monte Carlo Tests using the following input parameters:
Key size [256] bits
Direction [encryption, decryption]
Algorithm Functional Tests
Algorithm Functional Tests are designed to verify the correct operation of the logical components of the algorithm implementation under normal operation using different block sizes. For AES-CBC, there are two types of AFTs:
Known-Answer Tests
For each combination of direction and claimed key size, the TOE must be tested using the GFSBox, KeySbox, VarTxt, and VarKey test cases listed in Appendixes B through E of The Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS), NIST, 15 November 2002.
Multi-Block Message Tests
For each combination of direction and claimed key size, the TOE must be tested against 10 test cases consisting of a random IV, random key, and random plaintext or ciphertext. The plaintext or ciphertext starts with a length of 16 bytes and increases by 16 bytes for each test case until reaching 160 bytes.
Monte Carlo Tests
Monte Carlo tests are intended to test the implementation under strenuous conditions. The TOE must process the test cases according to the following algorithm once for each combination of direction and key size:
Key[0] = Key
IV[0] = IV
PT[0] = PT
for i = 0 to 99 {
Output Key[i], IV[i], PT[0]
for j = 0 to 999 {
if (j == 0) {
CT[j] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key[i], IV[i], PT[j])
PT[j+1] = IV[i]
} else {
CT[j] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key[i], PT[j])
PT[j+1] = CT[j-1]
}
}
Output CT[j]
AES_KEY_SHUFFLE(Key, CT)
IV[i+1] = CT[j]
PT[0] = CT[j-1]
}
The above pseudocode is for encryption. For decryption, swap all instances of CT and PT.
The initial IV, key, and plaintext or ciphertext should be random.
The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as above, exchanging CT and PT, and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.
XTS-AES
Identifier
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Key Sizes
List of Standards
XTS-AES
AES in XTS mode with unique tweak values that are consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer
512 bits
[selection:ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Subclause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]
To test the TOE’s ability to encrypt and decrypt data using AES in XTS mode, the evaluator shall perform the Single Data Unit Test and the Multiple Data Unit Test using the following input parameters:
Direction [encryption, decryption]
Key size [512] bits
Tweak value format [128-bit hex string, data unit sequence number]
Single Data Unit Test
For each combination of claimed key size, direction, and supported tweak value format, the evaluator shall generate 50 test cases consisting of random payload data. The payload data size is determined randomly for each test case from supported values within the range [128-65536] bits. The payload size and data unit size must be equal.
Multiple Data Unit Test
For each combination of claimed key size, direction, and supported tweak value format, the evaluator shall generate 50 test cases consisting of random payload data. The payload data size is determined randomly for each test case from supported values within the range [128-65536] bits. Likewise, the data unit size is determined randomly for each test case from supported values within the range [128-65535] bits. The payload size and data unit size must not be equal.
The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
To test the TOE’s ability to encrypt and decrypt data using AES in CTR mode, the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test and the Counter Test using the following input parameters:
Direction [encryption, decryption]
Key size [256] bits
Algorithm Functional Tests
Algorithm Functional Tests are designed to verify the correct operation of the logical components of the algorithm implementation under normal operation using different block sizes. For AES-CTR, there are three types of AFTs:
Known-Answer Tests
For each combination of direction and claimed key size, the TOE must be tested using the GFSBox, KeySbox, VarTxt, and VarKey test cases listed in Appendixes B through E of The Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS), NIST, 15 November 2002.
Single Block Message Tests
For each combination of direction and claimed key, the evaluator shall generate 10 test cases with a data size of 128 bits.
Partial Block Message Tests
Monte Carlo tests are intended to test the implementation under strenuous conditions. The TOE must process the test cases according to the following algorithm once for each combination of direction and key size:
For each combination of direction and claimed key, the evaluator shall generate five test cases such that the data size is not a multiple of 128 bits.
The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.
Counter Test
The evaluator shall generate a single message of 1000 blocks (128000 bits) and either encrypt or decrypt it. Back-compute the IVs used and verify that they are unique and increasing (encryption) or decreasing (decryption).
] in accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A] after initialization with a seed.
Application Note: NIST SP 800-90A contains three different methods of generating random numbers; each of these, in turn, depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). The ST author will select the function used and include the specific underlying cryptographic primitives used in the requirement or in the TSS.
While any of the identified hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) are allowed for Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, only AES-based implementations for CTR_DRBG are allowed.
] with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate
], multiple TSF noise sources [assignment: names of noise sources], TSF interface for seeding] for initialized seeding.
Application Note:
For the
first
selection in this requirement, the ST author selects
a single noise source is used as input to the DRBG.
In the second selection in this requirement, the ST author selects the appropriate number of bits of entropy that corresponds to the greatest security strength of the algorithms included in the ST. Security strength is defined in Tables 2 and 3 of NIST SP 800-57A. For example, if the implementation includes 3072-bit RSA (security strength of 128 bits), AES 256 (security strength 256 bits), and HMAC-SHA-256 (security strength 256 bits), then the ST author would select 256 bits
The ST author selects "multiple TSF noise sources" if a seed is formed from a combination of two or more noise sources within the TOE boundary. If the TSF implements two or more separate DRBGs that are seeded in separate manners, this SFR should be iterated for each DRBG. It multiple distinct noise sources exist such that each DRBG only uses one of them, then each iteration would select "TSF noise source"; "multiple TSF noise sources" is only selected if a single DRBG uses multiple noise sources for its seed. The ST author selects "TSF interface for seeding" if noise source data is generated outside the TOE boundary.
If "TSF noise source" is selected, FCS_RBG.3 must be claimed.
If "multiple TSF noise sources" is selected, FCS_RBG.4 and FCS_RBG.5 must be claimed.
If "TSF interface for seeding" is selected, FCS_RBG.2 must be claimed.
The TSF shall update the RBG state by [selection: reseeding, uninstantiating and reinstantiating] using a [selection: TSF noise source [assignment: name of noise source], TSF interface for seeding] in the following situations: [selection:
never
on demand
on the condition: [assignment: condition]
after [assignment: time]
] in accordance with [assignment: list of standards].
The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies the DRBGs used by the TOE.
Guidance
If the DRBG functionality is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance includes instructions on how to configure this behavior.
Tests
The evaluator
will
shall perform the following tests:
The evaluator
will
shall perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator
will
shall perform 15 trials for each configuration. The evaluator
will
shall also confirm that the operational guidance contains appropriate instructions for configuring the RNG functionality.
If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator
will
shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. "generate one block of random bits" means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP 800-90A).
If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator
will
shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.
The following list contains more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.
Entropy input: The length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.
Nonce: If a nonce is supported (CTR_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.
Personalization string: The length of the personalization string must be less than or equal to seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator
will
shall use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.
Additional input: The additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.
The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies how the DRBG state is updated, and the situations under which this may occur.
Guidance
If the ST claims that the DRBG state can be updated on demand, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance has instructions for how to perform this operation.
The OSTSFshall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this functionality.
Application Note: Sensitive data will be identified in the TSS by the ST author, and minimally includes credentials and keys. The interface for invoking the functionality could take a variety of forms: it could consist of an API, or simply well-documented conventions for accessing credentials stored as files.
shall check the TSS to ensure that it lists all persistent sensitive data for which the OS provides a storage capability. For each of these items, the evaluator
will
shall confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it can be used, and how it is stored. The evaluator
will
shall confirm that cryptographic operations used to protect the data occur as specified in FCS_COP.1/
The OSTSFshall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users from accessing files and directories owned by other users.
Application Note: Effective protection by access controls may also depend upon system configuration. This requirement is designed to ensure that, for example, files and directories owned by one user in a multi user system can be protected from access by another user in that system.
shall confirm that the TSS comprehensively describes the access control policy enforced by the OS. The description must include the rules by which accesses to particular files and directories are determined for particular users. The evaluator
will
shall inspect the TSS to ensure that it describes the access control rules in such detail that given any possible scenario between a user and a file governed by the OS the access control decision is unambiguous.
Guidance
TBD
Tests
The evaluator
will
shall create two new standard user accounts on the system and conduct the following tests:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an account has been [met], The TSF shall: [selection: Account Lockout, Account Disablement, Mandatory Credential Reset, [assignment: list of actions]] .
Application Note: The action to be taken will be populated in the assignment of the ST and defined in the administrator guidance.
The evaluator shall set an administrator-configurable threshold for failed attempts, or note the ST-specified assignment. The evaluator will then (per selection) repeatedly attempt to authenticate with an incorrect password, PIN, or certificate until the number of attempts reaches the threshold. Note that the authentication attempts and lockouts must also be logged as specified in FAU_GEN.1.
Test FIA_AFL.1:1: [conditional, to be performed if "authentication based on user name and password" is selected in FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.5]: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad password. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator shall ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator shall ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
Test FIA_AFL.1:2: [conditional, to be performed if "authentication based on user name and a PIN that releases an asymmetric key stored in OE-protected storage" is selected in FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.5]: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad PIN. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator shall ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator shall ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
Test FIA_AFL.1:3: [conditional, to be performed if "authentication based on X.509 certificates" is selected in FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.5]:The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system using a known bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator shall ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator shall ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication ].
The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the rules as to how each authentication mechanism specified in FIA_UAU.5.1 is implemented and used. Example rules are how the authentication mechanism authenticates the user (i.e. how does the TSF verify that the correct password or authentication factor is used), the result of a successful authentication (i.e. is the user input used to derive or unlock a key) and which authentication mechanism can be used at which authentication factor interfaces (i.e. if there are times, for example, after a reboot, that only specific authentication mechanisms can be used). Rules regarding how the authentication factors interact in terms of unsuccessful authentication are covered in FIA_AFL.1.
Guidance
The evaluator shall verify that configuration guidance for each authentication mechanism is addressed in the AGD guidance.
Test FIA_UAU.5:1: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and password. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
Test FIA_UAU.5:2: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS for guidance on supported protected storage and will then configure the TOE or OE to establish a PIN which enables release of the asymmetric key from the protected storage (such as a TPM, a hardware token, or isolated execution environment) with which the OS can interface. The evaluator shall then conduct the following tests:
Test FIA_UAU.5:3: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and PIN. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
Test FIA_UAU.5:4: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect PIN. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.
The evaluator shall configure the OS to authentication to authenticate to the OS using a username, password, and one-time password mechanism. The evaluator shall then perform the following tests.
Test FIA_UAU.5:5: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using a valid username, valid password, and valid one-time password. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
Test FIA_UAU.5:6: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using a valid username, invalid password, and valid one-time password. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt fails.
Test FIA_UAU.5:7: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using a valid username, valid password, and invalid one-time password. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt fails.
Test FIA_UAU.5:8: The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using a valid username, invalid password, and invalid one-time password. The evaluator shall ensure that the authentication attempt fails.
The OSTSFshall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the "Administrator" column in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.
Application Note: The functions with an "XM" in the "Administrator" column must be restricted to (or overridden by) the administrator in the TOE. The functions with an "O" in the "Administrator" column may be restricted to (or overridden by) the administrator when implemented in the TOE at the discretion of the ST author. For such functions, the ST author indicates this by replacing an "O" with an "XM" in the ST.
shall verify that the TSS describes those management functions that are restricted to Administrators, including how the user is prevented from performing those functions, or not able to use any interfaces that allow access to that function.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1:1: For each function that is indicated as restricted to the administrator, the evaluation will perform the function as an administrator, as specified in the Operational Guidance, and determine that it has the expected effect as outlined by the Operational Guidance and the SFR. The evaluator
will
shall then perform the function (or otherwise attempt to access the function) as a non-administrator and observe that they are unable to invoke that functionality.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
Configure minimum number of special characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
7
Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
8
Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
9
Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
10
Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through [selection: timeouts between attempts, limiting number of attempts during a time period]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
11
Configure host-based firewall
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
12
Configure name/address of directory server with which to bind
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
13
Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive management settings
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
14
Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging records
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
15
Configure audit rules
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
16
Configure name/address of network time server
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
17
Enable/disable automatic software update
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
18
Configure Wi-Fi interface
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
19
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
20
Enable/disable [assignment: list of other external interfaces]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
21
[assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the TSF]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
.
Application Note:
The ST should indicate which of the optional management functions are implemented in the TOE. This can be done by copying the above table into the ST and adjusting the "Administrator" and "User" columns to "XM" according to which capabilities are present or not present, and for which privilege level. The Application Note for FMT_MOF_EXT.1 explains how to indicate Administrator or User capability.
The terms "Administrator" and "User" are defined in the glossary. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the ST is populated with the relevant management functions that are provided by the OS.
Sophisticated account management policies, such as intricate password complexity requirements and handling of temporary accounts, are a function of directory servers. The OS can enroll in such account management and enable the overall information system to achieve such policies by binding to a directory server.
shall verify that every management function captured in the ST is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function.
Tests
The evaluator
will
shall test the OS's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the operating system and testing each option selected from above. The evaluator is expected to test these functions in all the ways in which the ST and guidance documentation state the configuration can be managed.
shall confirm that the TSS specifies the locations of kernel drivers/modules, security audit logs, shared libraries, system executables, and system configuration files. Every file does not need to be individually identified, but the system's conventions for storing and protecting such files must be specified.
Guidance
TBD
Tests
The evaluator
will
shall create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator
will
shall ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):
shall attempt to modify any additional components selected.
The evaluator
will
shall create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator
will
shall ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):
The OSTSFshall always randomize process address space memory locations with [selection: 8, [assignment: number greater than 8]] bits of entropy except for [assignment: list of explicit exceptions].
shall select 3 executables included with the TSF. If the TSF includes a web browser it must be selected. If the TSF includes a mail client it must be selected. For each of these apps, the evaluator
will
shall launch the same executables on two separate instances of the OS on identical hardware and compare all memory mapping locations. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that no memory mappings are placed in the same location. If the rare chance occurs that two mappings are the same for a single executable and not the same for the other two, the evaluator
will
shall repeat the test with that executable to verify that in the second test the mappings are different. This test can also be completed on the same hardware and rebooting between application launches.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [DRBG self-test failure].
Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that cryptographic services requiring random bit generation cannot be performed if a failure of a self-test defined in FPT_TST.1 occurs.
The evaluator shall verify that the TSF describes how the TOE enters an error state in the event of a DRBG self-test failure.
Guidance
The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes the error state that results from a DRBG self-test failure and the actions that a user or administrator should take in response to attempt to resolve the error state.
The OSTSFshall [selection: employ stack-based buffer overflow protections, not store parameters /or variables in the same data structures as control flow values].
Application Note: Many OSes store control flow values (i.e. return addresses) in stack data structures that also contain parameters and variables. For these OSes, it is expected that most of the OS, to include the kernel, libraries, and application software from the OS vendor be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled. OSes that store parameters and variables separately from control flow values do not need additional stack protections.
shall determine that the TSS contains a description of stack-based buffer overflow protections used by the OS. These are referred to by a variety of terms
, such as
. These include, but are not limited to, ASLR, tagging, stack cookie, stack guard, and stack canaries. The TSS must include a rationale for any binaries that are not protected in this manner. The evaluator
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1:1: [Conditional: if stack-based overflow detection can be determined by inventorying]: The evaluator shall inventory the kernel, libraries, and application binaries to determine those that do not implement stack-based buffer overflow protections. This list should match up with the list provided in the TSS.
For OSes that store parameters/variables separately from control flow values, the evaluator
will
shall verify that the TSS describes what data structures control values, parameters, and variables are stored. The evaluator
will
shall also ensure that the TSS includes a description of the safeguards that ensure parameters and variables do not intermix with control flow values.
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [[TSFDRBG specified in FCS_RBG.1]].
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [[TSFDRBG specified in FCS_RBG.1]].
Application Note: This SFR is a required dependency of FCS_RBG.1. It is intended to require that any DRBG implemented by the TOE undergo health testing to ensure that the random bit generation functionality has not been degraded. If the TSF supports multiple DRBGs, this SFR should be iterated to describe the self-test behavior for each.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF along with how they are run. This description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the DRBG is operating correctly.
If a self-test can be executed at the request of an authorized user, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to execute that self-test.
Tests
For each self-test, the evaluator shall verify that evidence is produced that the self-test is executed when specified by FPT_TST.1.1.
If a self-test can be executed at the request of an authorized user, the evaluator shall verify that following the steps documented in the operational guidance to perform the self-test will result in execution of the self-test.
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it lists each security function that makes use of time. The TSS provides a description of how the time is maintained and considered reliable in the context of each of the time related functions. This documentation must identify whether the TSF uses a NTP server or the cell carrier’s network time as the primary time sources.
Guidance
The evaluator examines the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to set the time.
Tests
Test FPT_STM.1:1: The evaluator uses the operational guide to set the time. The evaluator shall then use an available interface to observe that the time was set correctly.
The OSTSFshall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel and [selection:
all executable code stored in mutable media
[assignment: list of other executable code]
no other executable code
] prior to its execution through the use of [selection:
a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key
a digital signature using an X509 X.509 certificate with hardware-based protection
a hardware-protected hash
] .
Application Note:
The bootchain of the OS is the sequence of software, to include the OS loader, the kernel, system drivers or modules, and system files, which ultimately result in loading the OS. The first part of the OS, usually referred to as the first-stage bootloader, must be loaded by the platform. Assessing its integrity, while critical, is the platform's responsibility; and therefore outside the scope of this PP. All software loaded after this stage is potentially within the control of the OS and is in scope.
The verification may be transitive in nature: a hardware-protected public key, X509 X.509 certificate, or hash may be used to verify the mutable bootloader code which contains a key, certificate, or hash used by the bootloader to verify the mutable OS kernel code, which contains a key, certificate, or hash to verify the next layer of executable code, and so on. However, the way in which the hardware stores and protects these keys is out of scope.
If all executable code (including bootloader(s), kernel, device drivers, pre-loaded applications, user-loaded applications, and libraries) is verified, all executable code stored in mutable media should be selected.
If certificates are used, they can be hardware-protected trust store elements or leaf certificates in a certificate chain that terminates in a root CA which is an element of a hardware protected trust store. If the certificates themselves are not trust store elements, revocation information is expected to be available for each CA certificate in the chain that is not a trust element, in accordance to with FIA_X509_EXT.1 as defined in the Functional Package for X.509, version 1.0.
shall verify that the TSS section of the ST includes a comprehensive description of the boot procedures, including a description of the entire bootchain, for the TSF. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that the OS cryptographically verifies each piece of software it loads in the bootchain to include bootloaders and the kernel. Software loaded for execution directly by the platform (e.g. first-stage bootloaders) is out of scope. For each additional category of executable code verified before execution, the evaluator
will
shall verify that the description in the TSS describes how that software is cryptographically verified.
The evaluator
will
shall verify that the TSS contains a description of the protection afforded to the mechanism performing the cryptographic verification.
shall perform actions to cause TSF software to load and observe that the integrity mechanism does not flag any executables as containing integrity errors and that the OS properly boots.
shall modify a TSF executable that is part of the bootchain verified by the TSF (i.e. Not the first-stage bootloader) and attempt to boot. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that an integrity violation is triggered and the OS does not boot (Care must be taken so that the integrity violation is determined to be the cause of the failure to load the module, and not the fact that in such a way to invalidate the structure of the module.).
]: If the ST author indicates that the integrity verification is performed using public key in an X509 certificate, the evaluator
will
shall verify that the boot integrity mechanism includes a certificate validation according to in accordance with FIA_X509_EXT.1 as defined in the Functional Package for X.509, version 1.0 for all certificates in the chain from the certificate used for boot integrity to a certificate in the trust store that are not themselves in the trust store. This means that, for each
X509
X.509 certificate in this chain that is not a trust store element, the evaluator must ensure that revocation information is available to the TOE during the bootstrap mechanism (before the TOE becomes fully operational).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Integrity for Installation and Update
The OSTSFshall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGNSigGen to validate the authenticity of the response.
Application Note: This requirement is about the ability to check for the availability of authentic updates, while the installation of authentic updates is covered by FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2. Use of the digital signature scheme ensures that an attacker cannot influence the response, regarding of whether updates are available.
The OSTSFshall [selection: cryptographically verify, invoke platform-provided functionality to cryptographically verify] updates to itself using a digital signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGNSigGen.
Application Note: The intent of the requirement is to ensure that only digitally signed and verified TOE updates are applied to the TOE.
shall check for an update using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require installing and temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update.
The evaluator is also to ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/
SIGN
SigGen. The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol occurs over a trusted channel as described in FTP_ITC_EXT.1.) If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator
will
shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator
will
shall then send a query response with a good signature and verify that the signature verification is successful.
For the following tests, the evaluator
will
shall initiate the download of an update and capture the update prior to installation. The download could originate from the vendor's website, an enterprise-hosted update repository, or another system (e.g. network peer). All supported origins for the update must be indicated in the TSS and evaluated.
shall ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the vendor prior to its installation. The evaluator
will
shall modify the downloaded update in such a way that the digital signature is no longer valid. The evaluator will then attempt to install the modified update. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that the OS does not install the modified update.
The OSTSFshall provide the ability to check for updates to application software and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGNSigGen to validate the authenticity of the response.
Application Note: This requirement is about the ability to check for authentic updates, while the actual installation of such updates is covered by FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2. Use of the digital signature scheme ensures that an attacker cannot influence the response, regarding of whether updates are available.
The OSTSFshall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications using a digital signature specified by FCS_COP.1/SIGNSigGen prior to installation.
shall check for updates to application software using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update.
The evaluator
is
shall also
to
ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/
SIGN
SigGen. The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol as described in FTP_ITC_EXT.1. If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator
will
shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator
will
shall then send a query response with a good signature and verify that the signature verification is successful.
The evaluator
will
shall initiate an update to an application. This may vary depending on the application, but it could be through the application vendor's website, a commercial app store, or another system. All origins supported by the OS must be indicated in the TSS and evaluated. However, this only includes those mechanisms for which the OS is providing a trusted installation and update functionality. It does not include user or administrator-driven download and installation of arbitrary files.
The OS shall prevent allocation of any memory region with both write and execute permissions except for [assignment: list of exceptions].
Application Note: Requesting a memory mapping with both write and execute permissions subverts the platform protection provided by DEP. If the OS provides no exceptions (such as for just-in-time compilation), then "no exceptions" should be indicated in the assignment. Full realization of this requirement requires hardware support, but this is commonly available.
The evaluator will inspect the vendor-provided developer documentation and verify that no memory-mapping can be made with write and execute permissions except for the cases listed in the assignment.
Tests
The evaluator will also perform the following tests. Test 50: The evaluator will acquire or construct a test program which attempts to allocate memory that is both writable and executable. The evaluator will run the program and confirm that it fails to allocate memory that is both writable and executable. Test 51: The evaluator will acquire or construct a test program which allocates memory that is executable and then subsequently requests additional write/modify permissions on that memory. The evaluator will run the program and confirm that at no time during the lifetime of the process is the memory both writable and executable. Test 52: The evaluator will acquire or construct a test program which allocates memory that is writable and then subsequently requests additional execute permissions on that memory. The evaluator will run the program and confirm that at no time during the lifetime of the process is the memory both writable and executable.
The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information]
.
Application Note: The term subject here is understood to be the user that the process is acting on behalf of. If no auditable event definitions of functional components are provided, then no additional audit-relevant information is required.
The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator will check to make sure that every audit event type selected in the ST is included.
The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator will ensure that the fields contains the information required.
Tests
The evaluator will test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. This should include all instance types of an event specified. When verifying the test results, the evaluator will ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.
The evaluator will test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. The evaluator will ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record provide the required information.
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an account has been met, the OS shall: [selection: Account Lockout, Account Disablement, Mandatory Credential Reset, [assignment: list of actions] ] .
Application Note: The action to be taken will be populated in the assignment of the ST and defined in the administrator guidance.
The evaluator will set an administrator-configurable threshold for failed attempts, or note the ST-specified assignment. The evaluator will then (per selection) repeatedly attempt to authenticate with an incorrect password, PIN, or certificate until the number of attempts reaches the threshold. Note that the authentication attempts and lockouts must also be logged as specified in FAU_GEN.1. Test 53: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad password. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied. Test 54: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied. Test 55: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system using both a bad password and a bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication ].
The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes the rules as to how each authentication mechanism specified in FIA_UAU.5.1 is implemented and used. Example rules are how the authentication mechanism authenticates the user (i.e. how does the TSF verify that the correct password or authentication factor is used), the result of a successful authentication (i.e. is the user input used to derive or unlock a key) and which authentication mechanism can be used at which authentication factor interfaces (i.e. if there are times, for example, after a reboot, that only specific authentication mechanisms can be used). Rules regarding how the authentication factors interact in terms of unsuccessful authentication are covered in FIA_AFL.1.
Guidance
The evaluator will verify that configuration guidance for each authentication mechanism is addressed in the AGD guidance.
Test 56: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful. Test 57: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful. The following content should be included if:
The evaluator will examine the TSS for guidance on supported protected storage and will then configure the TOE or OE to establish a PIN which enables release of the asymmetric key from the protected storage (such as a TPM, a hardware token, or isolated execution environment) with which the OS can interface. The evaluator will then conduct the following tests: Test 58: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful. Test 59: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful. The following content should be included if:
The evaluator will configure the OS to authentication to authenticate to the OS using a username, password, and one-time password mechanism. The evaluator will then perform the following tests. Test 60: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using a valid username, valid password, and valid one-time password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful. Test 61: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using a valid username, invalid password, and valid one-time password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt fails. Test 62: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using a valid username, valid password, and invalid one-time password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt fails. Test 63: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using a valid username, invalid password, and invalid one-time password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt fails.
The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes "Certificate Signing" as a purpose the key usage field
The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [selection: OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, CRL as specified in RFC 8603, an OCSPTLS Status Request Extension (OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066, OCSPTLS Multi-Certificate Status Request Extension (i.e., OCSP Multi-Stapling) as specified in RFC 6961 ] with [selection: no exceptions, [assignment: exceptional use cases and alternative status check] ]
The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing Purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field. (conditional)
.
Application Note:
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 lists the rules for validating certificates. The ST author will select whether revocation status is verified using OCSP or CRLs. FIA_X509_EXT.2 requires that certificates are used for HTTPS, TLS, and DTLS; this use requires that the extendedKeyUsage rules are verified.
OCSP stapling and OCSP multi-stapling only support TLS server certificate validation. If other certificate types are validated, either OCSP or CRL should be claimed. If OCSP is not supported the EKU provision for checking the OCSP Signing purpose is met by default.
If the OS receives server certificates presented for EST, then the ST author should make the selection for EST in the SFR.
If the OS cannot perform revocation in accordance with one of the specified revocation methods, then the specific use cases where revocation checking is not possible must be described, along with any alternative to certificate status checking for each use case. For example, for the use case "update functions when network connections are not available, notice of a compromised certificate disables automatic updates."
The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Application Note: This requirement applies to certificates that are used and processed by the TSF and restricts the certificates that may be added as trusted CA certificates.
The evaluator will ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.
If the OS cannot perform revocation in accordance with one of the revocation methods, the evaluator will ensure the TSS describes each revocation checking exception use case, and for each exception, the alternate functionality the TOE implements to determine the status of the certificate and disable functionality dependent on the validity of the certificate.
Tests
The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA. Test 64: The evaluator will demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing, for each of the following reasons, in turn: by establishing a certificate path in which one of the issuing certificates is not a CA certificate, by omitting the basicConstraints field in one of the issuing certificates, by setting the basicConstraints field in an issuing certificate to have CA=False, by omitting the CA signing bit of the key usage field in an issuing certificate, and by setting the path length field of a valid CA field to a value strictly less than the certificate path. The evaluator will then establish a valid certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator will then remove trust in one of the CA certificates, and show that the function fails. Test 65: The evaluator will demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.Test 66: The evaluator will test that the OS can properly handle revoked certificates - conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, OCSP stapling, or OCSP multi-stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then a test will be performed for each method. The evaluator will test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). If OCSP stapling per RFC 6066 is the only supported revocation method, testing revocation of the intermediate CA certificate is omitted. The evaluator will ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.Test 67: If any OCSP option is selected, the evaluator will configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator will configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set and verify that validation of the CRL fails.Test 68: The evaluator will modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)Test 69: The evaluator will modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)Test 70: The evaluator will modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature of the certificate will not validate.)Test 71[conditional, to be performed if
]: Test 71.1: The evaluator will establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator will confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain. Test 71.2: The evaluator will replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 71.1 with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 71.1, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator will confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid. Test 72[conditional, to be performed if
]: For each exceptional use case for revocation checking described in the ST, the evaluator shall attempt to establish the conditions of the use case, designate the certificate as invalid and perform the function relying on the certificate. The evaluator shall observe that the alternate revocation checking mechanism successfully prevents performance of the function. The evaluator will generate an X.509v3 certificate for a user with the Client Authentication Extended Key Usage field set. The evaluator will provision the OS for authentication with the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the certificates are validated by the OS as per FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 and then conduct the following tests: Test 73: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful. Test 74: The evaluator will generate a second certificate identical to the first except for the public key and any values derived from the public key. The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS with this certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful. The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA. Test 75: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails. Test 76: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails. Test 77: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension set to TRUE. The validation of the certificate path succeeds.
The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and [selection: DTLS, HTTPS, [assignment: other protocols], no other protocols ] connections.
The evaluator will acquire or develop an application that uses the OSTLS mechanism with an X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will then run the application and ensure that the provided certificate is used to authenticate the connection.
The evaluator will repeat the activity for any other selections listed.
5.1.7 5.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communicationChannel Communication
] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [selection: audit server, authentication server, management server, [assignment: other capabilities]] using certificates as defined in [Functional Package for X.509, version 1.0] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
Application Note:
The ST author must include the security functional requirements for the trusted channel protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 in the main body of the ST.
Claims from the Functional Package for X.509, version 1.0 are only required to the extent that they are needed to support the functionality required by the trusted protocols that are claimed.
If the TSF implements a protocol that requires the validation of a certificate presented by an external entity, FIA_X509_EXT.1 and FIA_X509_EXT.2 will be claimed, as will FIA_TSM_EXT.1 for management of the trust store.
If the TSF implements a protocol that requires the presentation of any certificates to an external entity, FIA_XCU_EXT.2 will be claimed. FIA_X509_EXT.3 will also be claimed, along with any applicable dependencies, depending on how the certificates presented by the TOE are obtained.
The OSTSFshall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].
Application Note:
This requirement ensures that all remote administrative actions are protected. Authorized remote administrators must initiate all communication with the OS via a trusted path and all communication with the OS by remote administrators must be performed over this path. The data passed in this trusted communication channel is encrypted as defined in FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1. If local users access is selected and no unprotected traffic is sent to remote users, then this requirement is met. If remote users access is selected, the ST author must include the security functional requirements for the trusted channel protocol selected in FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 in the main body of the ST.
The OSTSFshall require use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [all remote administrative actions]] .
Application Note:
This requirement ensures that authorized remote administrators initiate all communication with the OS via a trusted path, and that all communication with the OS by remote administrators is performed over this path. The data passed in this trusted communication channel is encrypted as defined in FTP_ITC_EXT.1.
If "remote" is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1, "all remote administrative actions" must be selected in FTP_TRP.1.3.
If "local" is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1, then "initial user authentication" must be selected in FTP_TRP.1.3.
shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote or local OS administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected.
The evaluator will
[Conditional: if "remote" is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1], the evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of OS administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.
Guidance
The evaluator
will
shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions or initial user authentication for each supported method.
shall ensure that communications using each remote or local administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections or initial user authentication as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
FTP_TRP.1:2: [Conditional: if "remote" is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1]: For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator
will
shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish a remote administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1:3: [Conditional: if “remote” is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1]: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
FTP_TRP.1:4: [Conditional: if “remote” is selected in FTP_TRP.1.1]: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, modification of the channel data is detected by the OS.
5.1.8 9 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective SFRfor the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectivesaddress the specified threats:
The Security Objectives in Section 4 Security Objectives were constructed to address threats identified in Section 3.1 Threats. The Security
FCS_COP.1/HASH helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that secure hash algorithms are used for trusted communications.
FCS_COP.1/HASHSupports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement hash algorithms that are used in support of protected KeyedHash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that secure HMAC algorithms are used for trusted communications.
FCS_COP.1/SIGNSupports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement SigGen
FCS_COP.1/SigGen helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that secure digital signature algorithms that are used in support of protected for trusted communications.
FIA_AFL.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by preventing an unprivileged user from logging into a network interface by brute force guessing the credential.
Supports the objective by requiring the TSF restrict unprivileged users from changing critical componentsFPT_ACF_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by limiting the ability of an unprivileged user to modify the behavior of the TSF.
FPT_FLS.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that a malfunctioning DRBG function cannot be used to generate potentially insecure keys.
Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to validate certificates using industry standardshelps mitigate the threat of a network attack by limiting the ability to modify the behavior of the TSF via stack overflow.
FPT_EXTTST.1Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to verify executable code critical to its operationhelps mitigate the threat of a network attack by implementing a mechanism to detect when the DRBG may be failing to generate secure cryptographic keys.
Supports the objective FTP_ITC_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by requiring the OSTSFto provide a implement trusted channel protocols for critical network communication.
Supports the objective by requiring the OS to provide standard authentication mechanismsFTP_TRP.1
FTP_TRP.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by requiring the use of a trusted path for any remote administration that can be performed on the TOE.
FCS_RBG.6 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by providing a secure DRBG service for third-party applications running on the TOE which may use this service to generate their own cryptographic keys for trusted communications.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by enforcing data execution prevention so that an external interface cannot attempt to write data to executable memory.
FPT_BLT_EXT.1supports the objective by requiring the TSF to disable certain Bluetooth profiles when they are inactive such that explicit user authorization is required to re-enable them.
FCS_RBG.2 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.3 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.4 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.5 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a network attack by ensuring that the TOE has the ability to enforce the use of an IPsec VPN for all network traffic.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that secure digital signature algorithms are used for trusted communications.
FPT_FLS.1 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that a malfunctioning DRBG function cannot be used to generate potentially insecure keys.
FPT_TST.1 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by implementing a mechanism to detect when the DRBG may be failing to generate secure cryptographic keys.
FTP_TRP.1 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by requiring the use of a trusted path for any remote administration that can be performed on the TOE.
FCS_RBG.6 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by providing a secure DRBG service for third-party applications running on the TOE which may use this service to generate their own cryptographic keys for trusted communications.
FCS_RBG.2 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.3 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.4 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FCS_RBG.5 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that the TOE's DRBG is seeded with sufficient entropy to ensure the generation of strong cryptographic keys.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of network eavesdropping by ensuring that the TOE has the ability to enforce the use of an IPsec VPN for all network traffic.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a local attack by providing a mechanism to restrict the ability of one user account to access data owned by another user.
FIA_AFL.1 helps mitigate the threat of a local attack by preventing an unprivileged user from gaining access to the TSF by brute force guessing the credential.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat of a local attack by enforcing data execution prevention so that an application cannot attempt to write data to executable memory.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat by providing a mechanism to protect sensitive data at rest which prevents exfiltration of sensitive data during a limited access window.
FIA_AFL.1 helps mitigate the threat by preventing an unprivileged user from gaining access to the TSF by brute force guessing the credential in a limited time window.
FIA_UAU.5 helps mitigate the threat by providing specified authentication mechanisms for user authentication to prevent unauthorized access to the TOE.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat by limiting the management functions that are available to a given user which minimizes the impact of compromise should illicit access be gained.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat by limiting the management functions that are available to a given user which minimizes the impact of compromise should illicit access be gained.
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 helps mitigate the threat by limiting the ability of an unprivileged user to modify the behavior of the TSF should illicit access be gained.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. specified to mitigate the threats defined in Section 3.1 Threats. The PP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.
This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this PP. Individual evaluation activities to be performed are specified both in Section 5 Security Requirements as well as in this section.
The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this PP is as follows:
After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the OS, supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the OS. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the evaluation activities contained within Section 5 Security Requirements, which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the OS. The evaluation activities that are captured in Section 5 Security Requirements also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the OS is compliant with the PP.
5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target
The following ASE components as defined in [CEM]are required:
The information about the OS is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST. The OS developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The evaluation activities contained in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.
The functional specification describes the TSFIs. It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because OSes conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the operational environment that are not directly invokable by OS users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this PP, the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional "functional specification" documentation is necessary to satisfy the evaluation activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
Application Note: As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The evaluation activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.
There are no specific evaluation activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements, and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other evaluation activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.
5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation
The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the operational environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the Evaluation Activities specified with each requirement.
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Application Note: The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the evaluation activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will shall be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
Application Note: User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
Application Note: This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the OS(including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the evaluation activities in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements and evaluation of the OS according to the [CEM]. The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the OS, the operational guidance ill contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the OS. It will provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the OS. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the OS by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the OS or the underlying platform. The evaluator will shall verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the OS (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The OS will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance will make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.
The developer shall provide the OS, including its preparative procedures.
Application Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the evaluation activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered OSin accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the OSand for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support OS functional requirements. The evaluator will check to ensure that the guidance provided for the OS adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the OS in the ST.
5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
At the assurance level provided for OSes conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the OS vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
This component is targeted at identifying the OS such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.
The evaluator will shall check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will shall check the AGD guidance and OS samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the OS, the evaluator will shall examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's evaluation activities are covered by the evaluation activities listed for ALC_CMC.1.
The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the OS is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the evaluation activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.
The evaluator will shall ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer will provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will shall ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will shall ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
This component requires the OS developer, in conjunction with any other necessary parties, to provide information as to how the end-user devices are updated to address security issues in a timely manner. The documentation describes the process of providing updates to the public from the time a security flaw is reported/discovered, to the time an update is released. This description includes the parties involved (e.g., the developer, carriers(s)) and the steps that are performed (e.g., developer testing, carrier testing), including worst case time periods, before an update is made available to the public.
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the OS.
Note: The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).
The evaluator will shall verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will shall verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will shall also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will shall also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.
The evaluator will shall verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will shall verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days.
The evaluator will shall verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator will verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.
5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests
Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.
Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in Section 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements. The evaluation activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/OS combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP. Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's evaluation activities are covered by the evaluation activities listed for ALC_CMC.1.
The evaluator will shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator will determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [CEM]and the body of this PP's evaluation activities.
While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an evaluation activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the OS and its platform.
This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.
The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This will be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.
5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will shall not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the OS. The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.
The evaluator will shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the OS.
Application Note: Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.
The evaluator will shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the OSis resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
The evaluator will shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.
For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.
Appendix A - Optional Requirements
As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this PP. This appendix contains three other types of optional requirementsthat may be included in the ST, but are not required in order to conform to this PP. However, applied modules, packages and/or use cases may refine specific requirements as mandatory. :
The first type(, defined in Appendix A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements) , are strictly optional requirementsthat are independent of the TOE implementing any function. If the TOEfulfills meets any of these requirements or supports a certain functionality, the vendor is encouraged to include claim the associated SFRs in the ST, but are doing so is not required in order to conform to this PP.
The second type(, defined in Appendix A.2 Objective Requirements) , are objective requirementsthat . These describe security functionality that is not yet widely available in commercial technology. The Objective requirements are not currently mandated in the body of by this PP, but will be included mandated in the baseline requirements in futureversions of this PP. Adoption by vendors is encouragedand expected as soon as possible, but claiming these SFRs is not required in order to conform to this PP.
The third type(, defined in Appendix A.3 Implementation-based dependent Requirements) , are Implementation-dependent requirements. If the TOE implements the product features associated with the listed SFRs, either the SFRs must be claimed or the product features must be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements
A.1.1 Auditable Events for Strictly Optional Requirements
Table 11: Auditable Events for Strictly Optional Requirements
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
TOE implementing a particular function. If the TOE fulfills any of these requirements, the vendor must either add the related SFR or disable the functionality for the evaluated configuration.
A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements
A.1.1
information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
The flaw remediation procedures shall include a procedure requiring timely response and the automatic distribution of security flaw reports and the associated corrections to registered users who might be affected by the security flaw.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users may register with the developer, to be eligible to receive security flaw reports and corrections.
The TSF shall provide a [selection: hardware, software, [assignment: other interface type]] interface to make the RBG output, as specified in FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (RBG), available as a service to entities outside of the TOE.
Application Note: This SFR is defined for the case where an operating system includes a mechanism for
The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies the interface that the TSF makes available for calling applications to obtain DRBG output.
Guidance
The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation includes an API specification for the random bit generation service such that it is clear how a calling application is able to obtain DRBG output from the TSF.
Tests
The evaluator shall invoke the API specified by the guidance documentation to determine that the TSF provides DRBG output upon proper invocation of the API.
The TSF shall prevent allocation of any memory region with both write and execute permissions except for [assignment: list of exceptions].
Application Note: Requesting a memory mapping with both write and execute permissions subverts the platform protection provided by DEP. If the OS provides no exceptions (such as for just-in-time compilation), then "no exceptions" should be indicated in the assignment. Full realization of this requirement requires hardware support, but this is commonly available.
The evaluator shall inspect the vendor-provided developer documentation and verify that no memory-mapping can be made with write and execute permissions except for the cases listed in the assignment.
Guidance
TBD
Tests
The evaluator shall also perform the following tests.
Test FPT_W^X_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall acquire or construct a test program which attempts to allocate memory that is both writable and executable. The evaluator shall run the program and confirm that it fails to allocate memory that is both writable and executable.
Test FPT_W^X_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall acquire or construct a test program which allocates memory that is executable and then subsequently requests additional write/modify permissions on that memory. The evaluator shall run the program and confirm that at no time during the lifetime of the process is the memory both writable and executable.
Test FPT_W^X_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall acquire or construct a test program which allocates memory that is writable and then subsequently requests additional execute permissions on that memory. The evaluator shall run the program and confirm that at no time during the lifetime of the process is the memory both writable and executable.
shall configure the OS, per instructions in the OS manual, to display the advisory warning message "TEST TEST Warning Message TEST TEST". The evaluator
will
shall then log out and confirm that the advisory message is displayed before logging in can occur.
A.2 Objective Requirements
A.2.1 Auditable Events for Objective Requirements
Table 12: Auditable Events for Objective Requirements
The TSF shall disable support for [assignment: list of Bluetooth profiles] Bluetooth profiles when they are not currently being used by an application on the TOE and shall require explicit user action to enable them.
Application Note:
Some Bluetooth services incur more serious consequences if unauthorized remote devices gain access to them. Such services should be protected by measures like disabling support for the associated Bluetooth profile unless it is actively being used by an application on the OS (in order to prevent discovery by a Service Discovery Protocol search), and then requiring explicit user action to enable those profiles in order to use the services. It may be further appropriate to require additional user action before granting a remote device access to that service.
For example, it may be appropriate to disable the OBEX Push Profile until a user pushes a button in an application indicating readiness to transfer an object. After completion of the object transfer, support for the OBEX profile should be suspended until the next time the user requests its use.
shall ensure that the TSS lists all Bluetooth profiles that are disabled while not in use by an application and which need explicit user action in order to become enabled.
Guidance
There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.
shall perform this test with a test device that does not have a trust relationship with the TOE. While the service is not in active use by an application on the TOE, the evaluator
will
shall attempt to discover a service associated with a "protected" Bluetooth profile (as specified by the requirement) on the TOE via a Service Discovery Protocol search. The evaluator
will
shall verify that the service does not appear in the Service Discovery Protocol search results. Next, the evaluator shall attempt to gain remote access to the service from a device that does not currently have a trusted device relationship with the TOE. The evaluator
will
shall verify that this attempt fails due to the unavailability of the service and profile.
The OSTSFshall restrict execution to only programs which match an administrator-specified [selection:
file path
file digital signature
version
hash
[assignment: other characteristics]
] .
Application Note: The assignment permits implementations which provide a low level of granularity such as a volume. The restriction is only against direct execution of executable programs. It does not forbid interpreters which may take data as an input, even if this data can subsequently result in arbitrary computation.
shall ensure that the description of the supported characteristics in the TSS is consistent with the SFR. The evaluator
will
shall also ensure that any characteristics specified by the ST-author are described in sufficient detail to understand how to test those characteristics.
Guidance
The evaluator
will
shall ensure that
that
the characteristics are described in sufficient detail for administrators to configure policies using them, and that the list of characteristics in the guidance is consistent with the information in the TSS.
shall configure the OS to allow execution based on the hash of the application executable. The evaluator
will
shall modify the application in such a way that the application hash is changed. The evaluator will then attempt to execute the application with the matching hash. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that the code they attempted to execute has not been executed.
shall then attempt to run an application that should not be allowed the defined software restriction policy and ensure that it does not run.
A.3 Implementation-based dependent Requirements
This PP does not define any Implementation-based dependent requirements.
Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements
As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below must be included.
B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements
Table 13: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements
The TSF shall perform [extendable-output function] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: Cryptographic Algorithm] and parameters [selection: Parameters] that meet the following: [selection: List of Standards]
The following table provides the recommended choices for completion of the selection operations of FCS_COP.1/XOF.
Application Note: In accordance with CNSA 2.0, SHAKE is permitted to be used only as a component of LMS or XMSS. Therefore this component is claimed only if LMS or XMSS is claimed in FCS_COP.1/SigVer.
Since LMS and XMSS use both SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 internally, claiming and testing of both functions is mandatory.
There are no additional TSS evaluation activities for this component.
Guidance
There are no additional Guidance evaluation activities for this component.
Tests
The following tests are conditional based on the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following tests or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.
To test the TOE’s implementation of the SHAKE Extendable Output Function the evaluator shall perform the Algorithm Functional Test, Monte Carlo Test, and Variable Output Test using the following input parameters:
Function [SHAKE128, SHAKE256]
Output length [16-65536] bits
Algorithm Functional Test
For each supported function, generate test cases consisting of random data for every message length from 0 bits (if supported) to rate-1 bits, where rate equals
1344 for SHAKE128, and
1088 for SHAKE256.
Additionally, generate tests cases of random data for messages of every multiple of (rate+1) bits starting at length rate, and continuing until 65535 is exceeded. For SHAKE128, this should result in a total of 1391 test cases.
Monte Carlo Test
The Monte Carlos test takes in a single 128-bit message (SEED) and desired output length in bits, and runs 100 iterations of the chained computation. MaxOutBytes and MinOutBytes are the largest and smallest supported input and output sizes in bytes, respectively.
Range = maxOutBytes - minOutBytes + 1
OutputLen = maxOutBytes
For j = 0 to 99
MD[0] = SEED
For i = 1 to 1000
MSG[i] = 128 leftmost bits of MD[i-1]
if (MSG[i] < 128 bits)
Append 0 bits on rightmost side of MSG[i] til MSG[i] is 128 bits
MD[i] = SHAKE(MSG[i], OutputLen * 8)
RightmostOutputBits = 16 rightmost bits of MD[i] as an integer
OutputLen = minOutBytes + (RightmostOutputBits % Range)
Output MD[1000], OutputLen
SEED = MD[1000]
Variable Output Test
This test measures the ability of the TOE to generate output digests of varying sizes.
The evaluator shall generate 512 test cases such that the input for each test case consists of 128- bits of random data, and the output length includes the minimum supported value, the maximum supported value, and 510 random values between the minimum and maximum digest sizes supported by the implementation.
FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall be able to accept a minimum input of [assignment: minimum input length greater than zero] from a TSF interface for the purpose of seeding.
Application Note: This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from one or more noise source that is outside the TOE boundary. Typically the entropy produced by an environmental noise source is conditioned such that the input length has full entropy and is therefore usable as the seed. However, if this is not the case, it should be noted what the minimum entropy rate of the noise source is so that the TSF can collect a sufficiently large sample of noise data to be conditioned into a seed value.
The evaluator shall examine the entropy documentation required by FCS_RBG.1.2 to verify that it identifies, for each DRBG function implemented by the TOE, the TSF external interface used to seed the TOE's DRBG. The evaluator shall verify that this includes the amount of sampled data and the min-entropy rate of the sampled data such that it can be determined that sufficient entropy can be made available for the highest strength keys that the TSF can generate (e.g., 256 bits). If the seed data cannot be assumed to have full entropy (e.g., the min-entropy of the sampled bits is less than 1), the evaluator shall ensure that the entropy documentation describes the method by which the TOE estimates the amount of entropy that has been accumulated to ensure that sufficient data is collected and any conditioning that the TSF applies to the output data to create a seed of sufficient size with full entropy.
The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using a [selection, choose one of: TSF software-based noise source, TSF hardware-based noise source [assignment: name of noise source]] with a minimum of [assignment: number of bits] bits of min-entropy.
Application Note: This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from a single noise source that is within the TOE boundary. Min-entropy should be expressed as a ratio of entropy bits to sampled bits so that the total amount of data needed to ensure full entropy is known, as well as the conditioning function by which that data is reduced in size to the seed.
The evaluator shall examine the entropy documentation required by FCS_RBG.1.2 to verify that it identifies, for each DRBG function implemented by the TOE, the TSF noise source used to seed the TOE's DRBG. The evaluator shall verify that this includes the amount of sampled data and the min-entropy rate of the sampled data such that it can be determined that sufficient entropy can be made available for the highest strength keys that the TSF can generate (e.g., 256 bits). If the seed data cannot be assumed to have full entropy (e.g., the min-entropy of the sampled bits is less than 1), the evaluator shall ensure that the entropy documentation describes the method by which the TOE estimates the amount of entropy that has been accumulated to ensure that sufficient data is collected and any conditioning that the TSF applies to the output data to create a seed of sufficient size with full entropy.
The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using [selection: [assignment: number] TSF software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number] TSF hardware-based noise source(s)].
Application Note: This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from multiple noise sources that are within the TOE boundary. FCS_RBG.5 defines the mechanism by which these sources are combined to ensure sufficient minimum entropy.
The evaluator shall examine the entropy documentation required by FCS_RBG.1.2 to verify that it identifies, for each DRBG function implemented by the TOE, each TSF noise source used to seed the TOE's DRBG. The evaluator shall verify that this includes the amount of sampled data and the min-entropy rate of the sampled data from each data source.
The TSF shall [assignment: combining operation] [selection: output from TSF noise source(s), input from TSF interface(s) for seeding] to create the entropy input into the derivation function as defined in [assignment: list of standards], resulting in a minimum of [assignment: number of bits] bits of min-entropy.
Using the entropy sources specified in FCS_RBG.4, the evaluator shall examine the entropy documentation required by FCS_RBG.1.2 to verify that it describes the method by which the various entropy sources are combined into a single seed. This should include an estimation of the rate at which each noise source outputs data and whether this is dependent on any system-specific factors so that each source's relative contribution to the overall entropy is understood. The evaluator shall verify that the resulting combination of sampled data and the min-entropy rate of the sampled data is described in sufficient detail to determine that sufficient entropy can be made available for the highest strength keys that the TSF can generate (e.g., 256 bits). If the seed data cannot be assumed to have full entropy (e.g., the min-entropy of the sampled bits is less than 1), the evaluator shall ensure that the entropy documentation describes the method by which the TOE estimates the amount of entropy that has been accumulated to ensure that sufficient data is collected and any conditioning that the TSF applies to the output data to create a seed of sufficient size with full entropy.
provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic using IPsec
provide a VPN client that can protect all IP traffic using IPsec
] with the exception of IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection and [selection: signed updates directly from the OS vendor, no other traffic] .
Application Note:
Typically, the traffic required to establish the VPN connection is referred to as "Control Plane" traffic, whereas the IP traffic protected by the IPsec VPN is referred to as "Data Plane" traffic. All Data Plane traffic must flow through the VPN connection and the VPN must not split-tunnel.
If no native IPsec client is validated or third-party VPN clients may also implement the required Information Flow Control, the first option must be selected. In these cases, the TOE provides an API to third-party VPN clients that allows them to configure the TOE's network stack to perform the required Information Flow Control.
In the future, this requirement may also make a distinction between the current requirement (which requires that when the IPsec trusted channel is enabled, all traffic from the TSF is routed through that channel) and having an option to force the establishment of an IPsec trusted channel to allow any communication by the TSF.
shall verify that the TSS section of the ST describes the routing of IP traffic when a VPN client is enabled. The evaluator
will
shall ensure that the description indicates which traffic does not go through the VPN and which traffic does, and that a configuration exists for each in which only the traffic identified by the ST author as necessary for establishing the VPN connection (IKE traffic and perhaps HTTPS or DNS traffic) is not encapsulated by the VPN protocol (IPsec).
shall sniff packets while performing running applications that use the network such as web browsers and email clients. The evaluator
will
shall verify that the sniffer captures the traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.
Step 2: The evaluator
will
shall configure an IPsec VPN client that supports the routing specified in this requirement. The evaluator
will
shall turn on the sniffing tool, establish the VPN connection, and perform the same actions with the device as performed in the first step. The evaluator
will
shall verify that the sniffing tool captures traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.
Step 3: The evaluator
will
shall examine the traffic from both step one and step two to verify that all non-excepted Data Plane traffic in Step 2 is encapsulated by IPsec. The evaluator
will
shall examine the Security Parameter Index (SPI) value present in the encapsulated packets captured in Step 2 from the TOE to the Gateway and will verify this value is the same for all actions used to generate traffic through the VPN. Note that it is expected that the SPI value for packets from the Gateway to the TOE is different than the SPI value for packets from the TOE to the Gateway.
Step 4: The evaluator
will
shall perform a ping on the TOE host on the local network and verify that no packets sent are captured with the sniffer. The evaluator
will
shall attempt to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN tunnel (i.e. not through the VPN gateway), including from the local network, and verify that the TOE discards them.
Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions
This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP.
C.1 Extended Components Table
All extended components specified in the PP are listed in this table:
Table 315: Extended Component Definitions
Functional Class
Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Handling FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation Services FCS_STO_EXT Storage of Special Sensitive Data
FPT_ACF_EXT Access controlsControls
FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization
FPT_BLT_EXT Limitation of Bluetooth Profile Support
FPT_SBOP_EXT Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
FPT_SRP_EXT Software Restriction Policies
FPT_TST_EXT Boot IntegrityTests
FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update
FPT_W^X_EXT Write XOR Execute Memory Pages
Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF_EXT Management of security functions behaviorFunctions Behavior
FMT_SMF_EXT Specification of Management Functions
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC_EXT Trusted channel communicationChannel Communication
User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACF_EXT Access Controls for Protecting User Data
FDP_IFC_EXT Information flow controlFlow Control
C.2 Extended Component Definitions
C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.1.1 FCS_
CKM
STO_EXT
Cryptographic Key Handling
Storage of Sensitive Data
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for generating random bits
Component Leveling
FCS_RBG_EXTC.2.1.3
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for handling cryptographic keys.Components in this family describe the requirements for storing sensitive data (such as cryptographic keys). This is a new family defined for the FCS class.
Component Leveling
CKM
C.2.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_STO_EXT.1, Storage of Sensitive Data, requires the TSF to include a mechanism that encrypts sensitive data and that can be invoked by third-party applications in addition to internal TSF usage.
Management: FCS_STO_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_STO_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of
Special
Sensitive Data
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements concerning the storage of certain types of data.
Component Leveling
FCS_STO_EXT
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this functionality.
C.2.2
Identification and Authentication (FIA
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FIA FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.2.1
FIA
FPT_
X509
ACF_EXT
X.509 Certificate Validation
Access Controls
Family Behavior
This family
of requirements defines how the X.509 performs validation and what they should be used for
defines specific TOE components that are protected against unprivileged access. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FIA
X509
C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.3.1 FPT_ACF_EXT Access controls
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines the access controls to system resources.
Component Leveling
FPT_ACF_EXTC.2.3
FPT_ACF_EXT.1, Access Controls, requires the TSF to prohibit unauthorized users from reading or modifying specific TSF data.
Management: FPT_ACF_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FPT_ACF_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
Unauthorized attempts to perform operations against protected data
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from modifying:
Kernel and its drivers/modules
Security audit logs
Shared libraries
System executables
System configuration files
[assignment: other objects]
.
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from reading:
Security audit logs
System-wide credential repositories
[assignment: list of other objects]
.
C.2.2.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines the behavior of ASLR.ability of the TOE to implement address space layout randomization (ASLR). This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1, Address Space Layout Randomization, defines the ability of the TOE to use ASLR as well as the objects that ASLR is applied to.
Management: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall always randomize process address space memory locations with [selection: 8, [assignment: number greater than 8]] bits of entropy except for [assignment: list of explicit exceptions].
C.2.32.3 FPT_BLT_EXT Limitation of Bluetooth Profile Support
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for limiting Bluetooth capabilities without user action. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_BLT_EXT.1, Limitation of Bluetooth Profile Support, requires the TSF to maintain a disabled by default posture for Bluetooth profiles.
Management: FPT_BLT_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_BLT_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_BLT_EXT.1 Limitation of Bluetooth Profile Support
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall disable support for [assignment: list of Bluetooth profiles] Bluetooth profiles when they are not currently being used by an application on the TOE and shall require explicit user action to enable them.
This family of requirements defines the protections for the stackrequires the TSF to be compiled using stack-based buffer overflow protections. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1, Stack Buffer Overflow Protection, requires the TSF to be compiled using stack-based buffer overflow protections or to store data in such a manner that a stack-based buffer overflow cannot compromise the TSF.
Management: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [selection: employ stack-based buffer overflow protections, not store parameters or variables in the same data structures as control flow values].
This family of requirements defines how access to executes is restricteddefines the ability of the TOE to restrict the execution of software unless it meets defined criteria. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_SRP_EXT.1, Software Restriction Policies, defines the criteria the TSF can use to prevent execution of restricted programs.
Management: FPT_SRP_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Specification of restriction policies
Audit: FPT_SRP_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_SRP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict execution to only programs which match an administrator-specified [selection:
file path
file digital signature
version
hash
[assignment: other characteristics]
] .
C.2.32.6 FPT_TST_EXT Boot IntegrityTests
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines how the TOE validates the integrity of critical components.
Component Leveling
ability of the TOE to provide a mechanism that can be used to verify its integrity when started.
Component Leveling
FPT_TST_EXT.1, Boot Integrity, defines the mechanisms that the TSF uses to assert its own integrity at startup.
Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel and [selection:
all executable code stored in mutable media
[assignment: list of other executable code]
no other executable code
] prior to its execution through the use of [selection:
a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key
a digital signature using an X.509 certificate with hardware-based protection
a hardware-protected hash
] .
C.2.32.7 FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines how the TOE validates software updates.ability of the TOE to provide mechanisms for assuring the integrity of updates to the TSF or to non-TOE components that rely on the TSF to function. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_TUD_EXT.1, Integrity for Installation and Update, requires the TOE to provide a mechanism to verify the integrity of updates to itself.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2, Integrity for Installation and Update of Application Software, requires the TOE to provide a mechanism to verify the integrity of updates to non-TSF applications that are running on the TOE.
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Configuration of update checking mechanism
Initiation of update
Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
Failure of the integrity checking mechanism
Successful completion of updates
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen to validate the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall [selection: cryptographically verify, invoke platform-provided functionality to cryptographically verify] updates to itself using a digital signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen.
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Configuration of update checking mechanism
Initiation of update
Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
Failure of the integrity checking mechanism
Successful completion of updates
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update of Application Software
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen to validate the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications using a digital signature specified by FCS_COP.1/SigGen prior to installation.
This family of requirements defines how the TOE ensures that it executes only those items that are non-writable with specified exceptions. ability of the TOE to implement data execution prevention (DEP) by preventing memory from being both writable and executable. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.
Component Leveling
FPT_W^X_EXT.1, Write XOR Execute Memory Pages, defines the ability of the TOE to prevent memory from being simultaneously writable and executable unless otherwise specified.
Management: FPT_W^X_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FPT_W^X_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR Execute Memory Pages
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent allocation of any memory region with both write and execute permissions except for [assignment: list of exceptions].
C.2.4 3 Security Management (FMT)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.43.1 FMT_MOF_EXT Management of security functions behaviorFunctions Behavior
Family Behavior
This family of requirements define the defines the administrative privileges required to modify the behavior of security function managementthe security functions that are defined specifically for operating systems.
Component Leveling
FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Management of Functions Behavior, requires the TSF to define a set of management functions for the TOE and the privileges that are required to administer them.
Management: FMT_MOF_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Configuration of the roles that may manage the behavior of the TSF management functions
Audit: FMT_MOF_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
Successful or unsuccessful management of the behavior of any TOE functions
Change in permissions to a set of users that have the ability to manage a given function
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Functions Behavior
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the "Administrator" column in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.
C.2.43.2 FMT_SMF_EXT Specification of Management Functions
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines the management of security functionsfunctions that are defined specifically for operating systems.
Component Leveling
C.2.5
FMT_SMF_EXT.1, Specification of Management Functions, requires the TSF to define a set of management functions for the TOE.
Management: FMT_SMF_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FMT_SMF_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
Configure minimum number of special characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
7
Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
8
Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
9
Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
10
Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through [selection: timeouts between attempts, limiting number of attempts during a time period]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
11
Configure host-based firewall
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
12
Configure name/address of directory server with which to bind
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
13
Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive management settings
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
14
Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging records
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
15
Configure audit rules
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
16
Configure name/address of network time server
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
17
Enable/disable automatic software update
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
18
Configure Wi-Fi interface
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
19
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
20
Enable/disable [assignment: list of other external interfaces]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
21
[assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the TSF]
OOptional/Conditional
OOptional/Conditional
.
C.2.4 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FTP class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.54.1 FTP_ITC_EXT Trusted channel communicationChannel Communication
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines communication for trusted channels.defines the ability of the TOE to use specific trusted communications channels to communicate with specific non-TOE entities in the Operational Environment. This family differs from FTP_ITC in Part 2 by defining technology-specific details for the implementation of these functions.
Component Leveling
FTP_ITC_EXT.1, Trusted Channel Communication, defines the specific secure communications protocols the TSF uses to communicate with a specific set of non-TOE entities in the Operational Environment.
Management: FTP_ITC_EXT.1
There are no management functions foreseen.
Audit: FTP_ITC_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
The TSF shall use [assignment: trusted protocol], to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [selection: audit server, authentication server, management server, [assignment: other capabilities]] using certificates as defined in [assignment: requirement or standard defining the use of certificates] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
C.2.6 5 User Data Protection (FDP)
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the FDP class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.65.1 FDP_ACF_EXT Access Controls for Protecting User Data
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for controlling access to user data.specifies methods for ensuring that data stored or maintained by the TSF cannot be accessed without authorization. This family differs from FDP_ACF in CC Part 2 by defining technology-specific details for the implementation of these functions.
Component Leveling
FDP_ACF_EXT.1, Access Controls for Protecting User Data, requires the TSF to prevent unprivileged users from accessing operating system objects owned by other users.
Management: FDP_ACF_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Configuration of object ownership and allowed access
Audit: FDP_ACF_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP or ST:
Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access data
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies to:
No dependencies.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users from accessing files and directories owned by other users.
C.2.65.2 FDP_IFC_EXT Information flow controlFlow Control
Family Behavior
This family of requirements defines how flows of information are controlled.the ability of the TSF to control information flows by ensuring that it is possible to use IPsec to encapsulate all traffic bound to or from the TOE. This family differs from FDP_IFC in CC Part 2 by defining technology-specific details for the implementation of these functions.
Component Leveling
FDP_IFC_EXT.1, Information Flow Control, requires the TSF to provide the ability to protect IP traffic using IPsec.
provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic using IPsec
provide a VPN client that can protect all IP traffic using IPsec
] with the exception of IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection and [selection: signed updates directly from the OS vendor, no other traffic] .
Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements
This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.2 3 Dependencies between components.
This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.
Requirement
Rationale for Satisfaction
FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
FIA_UID.1 - Timing of identification
FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements.
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
FTA_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
FAU_STG.1 2 - Protected audit trail data storage
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements.
FAU_GEN.2 - User identity association
FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event.
FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information.
Appendix E - Entropy Documentation and Assessment
This appendix describes the required supplementary information for the entropy source used by the OS.
The documentation of the entropy source should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will shall thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS.
E.1 Design Description
Documentation will include the design of the entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.
The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include, how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.
This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.
If implemented, the design description will include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on will be included.
E.2 Entropy Justification
There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses made of the RBG output (by this particular OS). This argument will include a description of the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the OS randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.
The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the type of entropy source included in the product.
For developer provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed, and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.
For third-party provided entropy sources, in which the OS vendor has limited access to the design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor to "assume" an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the assumption included in the ST.
Regardless of type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is initialized with the entropy stated in the ST, for example by verifying that the min-entropy rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered complete.
The entropy justification will not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.
E.3 Operating Conditions
The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such, documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. It will clearly describe the measures that have been taken in the system design to ensure the entropy source continues to operate under those conditions. Similarly, documentation will describe the conditions under which the entropy source is known to malfunction or become inconsistent. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source will be included.
E.4 Health Testing
More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This includes a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at start, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.
Appendix F - Validation Guidelines
This appendix contains "rules" specified by the PP Authors that indicate whether certain selections require the making of other selections in order for a Security Target to be valid. For example, selecting "HMAC-SHA-3-384" as a supported keyed-hash algorithm would require that "SHA-3-384" be selected as a hash algorithm.
This appendix contains only such "rules" as have been defined by the PP Authors, and does not necessarily represent all such dependencies in the document.
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