1.1 National Information Assurance Partnership 2023-12-11 Mobile Device Management; MDM; MDM Agents 1.0 2019-03-01 Initial publication as PP-Module. 1.1 2023-12-11 Added GPOS PP base and incorporated NIAP Technical Decisions. TDs Applied

The scope of the MDM Agent PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of a Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agent in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management (MDM PP), Version 4.0 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF PP), Version 3.3 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems (GPOS PP), Version 4.3 These Base-PPs are valid because a MDM Agent is either a 3rd party application manufactured by the MDM Server vendor or is a native application deployed on a mobile device.

The person who is responsible for management activities, including setting the policy that is applied by the enterprise on the mobile device. The state in which a mobile device is managed by a policy from an MDM. Mobile Application Store Mobile Device Management The person who uses and is held responsible for a mobile device. Software which runs at the highest privilege level and can directly control hardware resources. Modern mobile devices typically have at least two primary operating systems: one which runs on the cellular baseband processor and one which runs on the application processor. The platform of the application processor handles most user interaction and provides the execution environment for apps. The platform of the cellular baseband processor handles communications with the cellular network and may control other peripherals. The term OS, without context, may be assumed to refer to the platform of the application The state in which a mobile device is not managed by an MDM system. See Mobile Device User.

The MDM system consists of two primary components: the MDM Server software and the MDM Agent. This PP-Module specifically addresses the MDM Agent. The MDM Agent establishes a secure connection back to the MDM Server, from which it receives policies to enforce on the mobile device. Optionally, the MDM Agent interacts with the Mobile Application Store (MAS) Server to download and install enterprise-hosted applications. A compliant MDM Agent is installed on a mobile device as an application (supplied by the developer of the MDM Server software) or is part of the mobile device's OS.This PP-Module builds on either the MDF PP or the MDM PP. A TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module must also claim conformance to one of those PPs as its Base-PP. A compliant TOE is obligated to implement the functionality required in the Base-PP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in order to mitigate the threats that are defined by this PP-Module. This PP-Module shall build on the MDF PP if the TOE is a native part of a mobile operating system. The TOE for this PP-Module combined with the MDF PP is the mobile device itself plus the MDM Agent. If the MDM Agent is part of the mobile device’s OS, the MDM Agent may present multiple interfaces for configuring the mobile device, such as a local interface and a remote interface. Agents conforming to this PP-Module must at least offer an interface with a trusted channel that serves as one piece of an MDM system. Conformant MDM Agents may also offer other interfaces, and the configuration aspects of these additional interfaces are in scope of this PP-Module. This PP-Module shall build on the MDM Server PP if the TOE is a third-party application that is provided with an MDM Server and installed on a mobile device by the user after acquiring the mobile device. The distributed TOE for this PP-Module combined with the MDM Server PP is the entire MDM environment, which includes both the MDM Server and the MDM Agent. Even though the mobile device itself is not part of the TOE, it is expected to be evaluated against the MDF PP so that its baseline security capabilities can be assumed to be present.

Figure 1 shows a high-level example of the PP-Module TOE boundary and its Operational Environment. As stated above, the MDM Agent may either be provided as part of the mobile device itself (shown in red) or distributed as a third-party application from the developer of the MDM Server software (shown in blue).

The MDM Agent must closely interact with or be part of the mobile device’s platform in order to establish policies and to perform queries about device status. The mobile device, in turn, has its own security requirements specified in the MDF PP.

This PP-Module defines 4 use cases: An Enterprise-owned device for general-purpose business use is commonly called Corporately Owned, Personally Enabled (COPE). This use case entails a significant degree of Enterprise control over configuration and software inventory. Enterprise administrators use an MDM product to establish policies on the mobile devices prior to user issuance. Users may use Internet connectivity to browse the web or access corporate mail or run Enterprise applications, but this connectivity may be under significant control of the Enterprise. The user may also be expected to store data and use applications for personal, non-enterprise use. The Enterprise administrator uses the MDM product to deploy security policies and query mobile device status. The MDM may issue commands for remediation actions. An Enterprise-owned device with intentionally limited network connectivity, tightly controlled configuration, and limited software inventory is appropriate for specialized, high-security use cases. As in the previous use case, the MDM product is used to establish such policies on mobile devices prior to issuance to users. The device may not be permitted connectivity to any external peripherals. It may only be able to communicate via its Wi-Fi or cellular radios with the Enterprise-run network, which may not even permit connectivity to the Internet. Use of the device may require compliance with usage policies that are more restrictive than those in any general-purpose use case, yet may mitigate risks to highly sensitive information. Based upon the operation environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this PP-Module along with the selections in the Use Case 2 template defined in are sufficient for the high-security use case. A personally owned device, which is used, for both personal activities and enterprise data is commonly called Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). The device may be provisioned for access to enterprise resources after significant personal usage has occurred. Unlike in the enterprise-owned cases, the enterprise is limited in what security policies it can enforce because the user purchased the device primarily for personal use and is unlikely to accept policies that limit the functionality of the device. However, because the Enterprise allows the user full (or nearly full) access to the Enterprise network, the Enterprise will require certain security policies, for example a password or screen lock policy, and health reporting, such as the integrity of the mobile device system software, before allowing access. The administrator of the MDM can establish remediation actions, such as wipe of the Enterprise data, for non-compliant devices. These controls could potentially be enforced by a separation mechanism built-in to the device itself to distinguish between enterprise and personal activities, or by a third-party application that provides access to enterprise resources and leverages security capabilities provided by the mobile device. Based upon the Operational Environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this PP-Module along with the selections in the Use Case 3 template defined in are sufficient for the secure implementation of this BYOD use case. A personally owned device may also be given access to limited enterprise services such as enterprise email. Because the user does not have full access to the enterprise or enterprise data, the enterprise may not need to enforce any security policies on the device. However, the enterprise may want secure email and web browsing with assurance that the services being provided to those clients by the mobile device are not compromised. Based upon the Operational Environment and the acceptable risk level of the enterprise, those security functional requirements outlined in Section 5 of this PP-Module are sufficient for the secure implementation of this BYOD use case.

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PP and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017). The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module. collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrollment and verification - for unlocking the device, Version 1.1 PP-Module for Bluetooh, Version 1.0 PP-Module for VPN Client, Version 2.4 PP-Module for Wireless LAN Clients, Version 1.0 This PP-Module is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Release 5 [CC]. This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile. This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS Version 1.1 Conformant. This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS Version 2.0 Conformant. The following threats are specific to MDM Agents, and represents an addition to those identified in the Base-PPs. FILL IN The threat T.MALICIOUS_APPS is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides the capability to protect app loading/updates against malicious insertion from the network. The threat T.MALICIOUS_APPS is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides policy preventing loading of unapproved apps into the TOE. An attacker may try to target backups of data or credentials and exfiltrate data. Since the backup is stored on either a personal computer or end user’s backup repository, it’s not likely the enterprise would detect compromise. The threat T.BACKUP is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides the capability to communicate using one (or more) standard protocols as a means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted between the Agent and other entities. The threat T.BACKUP is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides policy to enforce that backups be stored only in secure, protected locations. FILL IN The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides the capability to communicate using one (or more) standard protocols as a means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted between the Agent and other entities. The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides a secure configuration of the Agent to protect data that it processes. The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by OE.IT_ENTERPRISE by reducing the network exposure of the mobile device. FILL IN The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT as this provides the capability to communicate using one (or more) standard protocols as a means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted between the Agent and other entities. The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides a secure configuration of the Agent to protect data that it processes. The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by OE.IT_ENTERPRISE by reducing the network exposure of the mobile device. FILL IN The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides the capability to log attempts by unauthorized personnel to access data, and to log any access to the data or the device, as well as changes to the device during the time when it is not under the control of an authorized user. The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered by O.APPLY_POLICY as this provides a secure configuration of the Agent to protect data that it processes. The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered by O.STORAGE as this provides the capability to encrypt all user and enterprise data and authentication keys to ensure the confidentiality of data that it stores.

The TOE relies on network connectivity to carry out its management activities. The TOE will robustly handle instances when connectivity is unavailable or unreliable. The Operational Environment objective OE.WIRELESS_NETWORK is realized through A.CONNECTIVITY. The MDM Agent relies upon mobile platform and hardware evaluated against the MDF PP and assured to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic services and data protection. The mobile platform provides trusted updates and software integrity verification of the MDM Agent. The Operational Environment objective OE.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM. One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the TOE Administrators, and do so using and abiding by guidance documentation. The Operational Environment objective OE.DATA_PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN. Mobile device users are not willfully negligent or hostile, and use the device within compliance of a reasonable Enterprise security policy. The Operational Environment objective OE.DATA_PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.

Personnel operating the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the TOE. O.ACCOUNTABILITY provides logging of personnel actions in order to provide accountability of all personnel actions within the TOE. The configuration of the mobile device security functions must adhere to the Enterprise security policy. The TOE adheres to the Enterprise security policy through the application of O.APPLY_POLICY. A mobile device must be enrolled for a specific user by the administrator of the MDM prior to being used in the Enterprise network by the user. The TOE enrolls mobile devices for specific users with policy through the application of O.APPLY_POLICY. The mobile user must immediately notify the administrator if a mobile device is lost or stolen so that the administrator may apply remediation actions via the MDM system. The TOE provides the capability for the administrator to apply remediation actions via the MDM system through policy, which is applied through O.APPLY_POLICY.

The TOE must provide logging facilities, which record management actions undertaken by its administrators. FAU_ALT_EXT.2 The PP-Module includes FAU_ALT_EXT.2 to support this objective by requiring the TSF to generate alerts back to an MDM Server when security-relevant events occur. FAU_GEN.1/AGENT The PP-Module includes FAU_GEN.1/AGENT to support this objective by defining the security-relevant events for which the TSF must generate audit records. FAU_SEL.1/AGENT The PP-Module includes FAU_SEL.1/AGENT to support this objective by defining how the set of audited events can be configured. FAU_STG_EXT.3 (objective) The PP-Module includes FAU_STG_EXT.3 to support this objective by optionally requiring the TSF to use platform-provided storage for the security-relevant audit data it generates. The TOE must facilitate configuration and enforcement of enterprise security policies on mobile devices via interaction with the mobile OS and the MDM Server. This will include the initial enrollment of the device into management, through its entire lifecycle, including policy updates and its possible unenrollment from management services. FIA_ENR_EXT.2 The PP-Module includes FIA_ENR_EXT.2 to support this objective by requiring the TSF to identify the MDM Server so that the authenticity of policy updates can be determined. FMT_POL_EXT.2 The PP-Module includes FMT_POL_EXT.2 to support this objective by requiring the TSF to only accept policy data that can prove its authenticity with a digital certificate. FMT_SMF_EXT.4 The PP-Module includes FMT_SMF_EXT.4 to support this objective by defining the management functions the TSF must implement to support its own configuration. FMT_UNR_EXT.1 The PP-Module includes FMT_UNR_EXT.1 to support this objective by preventing a user-directed unenrollment operation that would allow for MDM policies to be ignored. FPT_NET_EXT.1 (objective) The PP-Module includes FPT_NET_EXT.1 to support this objective by optionally requiring the TSF to detect when a sustained communications outage with the MDM Server has occurred to indicate that the TSF may be deprived of updated policy data. Data exchanged between the MDM Server and the MDM Agent must be protected from being monitored, accessed, or altered. FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because DTLS is one of the protocols the PP-Module allows to protect data in transit. FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because DTLS is one of the protocols the PP-Module allows to protect data in transit. FCS_TLS_EXT.1 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_TLS_EXT.1 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because it is mandatory to claim when the TLS Package applies so that the TSF’s usage of TLS is clearly defined. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because TLS is one of the protocols the PP-Module allows to protect data in transit. FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because it requires TLS to be mutually-authenticated if claimed. FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because TLS is one of the protocols the PP-Module allows to protect data in transit. FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 (from TLS Package) The PP-Module includes FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 from the TLS package by reference to support this objective because it requires TLS to be mutually-authenticated if claimed. FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL (if MDF is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL to support this objective because when the TOE is a mobile device, it must have a way to ensure that MDM Server communications are protected. FTP_TRP.1/MDFENROLL (if MDF is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL to support this objective because when the TOE is a mobile device, it must have a way to ensure that MDM Server enrollment communications are protected. FPT_ITT.1(2) (if MDM is Base-PP) This SFR is selection-based in the MDM PP but is required when the TOE includes this PP-Module because it is triggered by the MDM Agent being part of the TOE. This SFR supports the objective by defining the trusted channel the TSF must use to secure connectivity between the MDM Server and MDM Agent components of the distributed TOE. FTP_ITC_EXT.1/OSCHANNEL (if GPOS is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FTP_ITC_EXT.1/OSCHANNEL to support this objective because when the TOE runs on a general-purpose operating system, the operating system must have a way to ensure that MDM Server communications are protected. FTP_TRP.1/OSENROLL (if GPOS is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL to support this objective because when the TOE is a mobile device, it must have a way to ensure that MDM Server enrollment communications are protected. FPT_NET_EXT.1 (objective) The PP-Module includes FPT_NET_EXT.1 to support this objective by optionally requiring the TSF to detect when a sustained communications outage with the MDM Server has occurred as a possible indicator of communications issues. To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of a device (T.PHYSICAL), conformant TOEs will use platform-provided key storage. The TOE is expected to protect its persistent secrets and private keys. FCS_STG_EXT.1/MDMKEYS (if MDM is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FCS_STG_EXT.4 to support this objective because when the TOE is a mobile device, ensures that MDM Agent key data is stored securely. FCS_STG_EXT.4 (if MDF is Base-PP) The PP-Module includes FCS_STG_EXT.1/MDMKEYS to support this objective because when the TOE is a MDM Server with MDM Agent capability, ensures that MDM Agent key data is stored securely. FCS_STO_EXT.1 (if GPOS is Base-PP) The GPOS PP defines the FCS_STO_EXT.1 requirement for protection of sensitive data, which can include user data or keys used to protect user data.

TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner. Users of the mobile device are trained to securely use the mobile device and apply all guidance in a trusted manner. The Enterprise IT infrastructure provides security for a network that is available to the TOE and mobile devices that prevents unauthorized access. The MDM Agent relies upon the trustworthy mobile platform and hardware to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic services and data protection. The mobile platform provides trusted updates and software integrity verification of the MDM Agent. A wireless network will be available to the mobile devices.

https://github.com/commoncriteria/mobile-device release-3.3 https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=468&id=468 This family is defined in both the MDF and the MDM Base-PPs. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FCS_STG_EXT.4. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDF or MDM PP for all other definitions for this family. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to use functionality defined by the Base-PP in FCS_CKM_EXT.1. requires the TSF to define a specific location for its key storage. There are no management functions foreseen. There are no auditable events foreseen. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation This requirement ensures that persistent secrets (credentials, secret keys, authentication tokens) and private keys are stored securely when not in use by the mobile platform. The evaluator will verify that the TSS lists each persistent secret (credential, secret keys, authentication tokens) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and, for each platform listed as supported in the ST, how it is stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store persistent secrets and private keys. The Base-PP defines FTP_ITC_EXT.1 to define the secure protocols used for trusted channel communications. This PP-Module iterates the SFR to specify a subset of these protocols that may be used for MDM Agent communications in particular. The intent of this requirement is to protect the communications channel between MDM Server and Agent, post enrollment. FTP_TRP.1/MDFENROLL is to protect the communications channel between MDM Server and Agent during enrollment. This requirement is to ensure that the transmission of any audit logs, mobile device information data (software version, hardware model, and application versions), and configuration data collected by the MDM Agent and sent from the MDM Agent to the MDM Server, when commanded, or at configurable intervals, is properly protected. This trusted channel also protects any commands and policies sent by the MDM Server to the MDM Agent. Either the MDM Agent or the MDM Server is able to initiate the connection. This requirement is iterated from the MDF PP to indicate the protocols that the MDM Agent can use for a trusted channel. The mobile device is required to perform the mandated cryptographic protocols as in the Base-PP for communication channels mandated in the MDF PP. The ST author must select one of TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS in order to establish and maintain a trusted channel between the MDM Agent and the MDM Server. Only TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS are acceptable for this trusted channel. Since this requirement is only for the case when the PP-Module builds on MDF PP and in this case it is expected that the MDM Agent will be a native part of the mobile operating system, it is expected that the MDM Agent will utilize the mobile device's implementation of the selected protocols. HTTPS (FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1) and TLS (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) are already mandatory for a MDF ST. If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the following selections from the TLS Functional Package must be made: FCS_TLS_EXT.1: either TLS or DTLS is selected depending on the selection made in client must be selected FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1: The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1 from the MDF PP. mutual authentication must be selected Protocol, RBG, Certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform provided services. For all other use cases, the mobile device initiates the communication; however, for MDM Agents, the MDM Server may also initiate communication. This element is iterated from the MDF PP; it is expected that the mobile device will initiate the trusted channel between the MDM Agent and the MDM Server for administrative communication and may initiate other trusted channels to other trusted IT entities for other uses. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of Agent-Server communication are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of remote TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST. The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the communication channel between the MDM Agent and the MDM Server and conditionally, the MAS Server for each supported method. For each supported identifier type (excluding DNs), the evaluator shall repeat the following tests: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) Agent-Server communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful. The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of Agent-Server communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext. The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with the MDM Server, that a protocol analyzer identifies the traffic as the protocol under testing. Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols. This SFR uses the trusted channel protocols defined by the Base-PP in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 to facilitate a trusted path that the MDM Agent can use to enroll the mobile device it runs on into management. Even though the Base-PP does not define FTP_TRP.1, the requirement was given an iteration label for consistency with the MDM Server requirement of the same name. This requirement ensures that authorized MD users initiate all communication with the TOE via a trusted path, and that all communications with the TOE by MD users is performed over this path. The purpose of this connection is for enrollment by the MD user. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the TOE. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined by the protocol selected. Since this requirement is only for the case when the PP-Module builds on MDF PP and in this case it is expected that the MDM Agent will be a native part of the mobile operating system, it is expected that the MDM Agent will utilize the mobile device's implementation of the selected protocols. HTTPS (FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1) and TLS (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) are already mandatory for a MDF ST. If "TLS" or "DTLS" is selected the following selections from the TLS Functional Package must be made: FCS_TLS_EXT.1: TLS must be selected client must be selected FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1: The cipher suites selected must correspond with the algorithms and hash functions allowed in FCS_COP.1 from the MDF PP. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote enrollment are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of enrollment are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST. The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the enrollment sessions for each supported method. For each MDM Agent/platform listed as supported in the ST: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) enrollment method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful. For each method of enrollment supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish enrollment sessions without invoking the trusted path. The evaluator shall ensure, for each method enrollment, the channel data is not sent in plaintext. Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols. When this PP-Module is used to extend the MDF PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a mobile device. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the MDM Agent application that runs on the mobile device. This threat protects user data from unauthorized logical access. An attacker would attempt to exploit this threat by first exploiting the T.PHYSICAL, T.FLAWAPP, or T.PERSISTENT threats defined in the Base-PP against the mobile device as a whole, and then using the device itself as an attack vector against any backup data stored on the TOE. This assumption expects that networking services will be available for the TOE to use. This is consistent with the Base-PP because the TOE is installed on a mobile device defined by the Base-PP that provides networking services through various radios. This assumption expects that the TOE’s underlying hardware platform is validated against the MDF PP. This is consistent with the Base-PP by definition because the mobile device is within the TOE boundary and evaluated against the MDF PP. This assumption expects that the TOE administrator is trusted and competent in configuring the TSF. This assumption is consistent with the A.CONFIG assumption in the Base-PP which expects the TSF to be configured correctly regardless of the subject performing the configuration. This assumption expects that the TOE user is not willfully negligent or hostile in using the TSF. This assumption is consistent with the A.CONFIG assumption in the Base-PP which expects the TSF to be configured correctly regardless of the subject performing the configuration as well as the A.NOTIFY and A.PRECAUTION assumptions which define baseline expectations for the user’s level of responsibility. The Base-PP does not define any OSPs so any OSPs defined by the PP-Module will not conflict with the Base-PP by definition. The Base-PP does not define any OSPs so any OSPs defined by the PP-Module will not conflict with the Base-PP by definition. The Base-PP does not define any OSPs so any OSPs defined by the PP-Module will not conflict with the Base-PP by definition. The Base-PP does not define any OSPs so any OSPs defined by the PP-Module will not conflict with the Base-PP by definition. The Base-PP provides an objective, O.INTEGRITY, that ensures that the integrity of the mobile device is maintained. This objective assists in the implementation of O.INTEGRITY by providing records of administrative activity, which would include actions that could cause the integrity of the mobile device to be lost. This objective supports the implementation of the O.CONFIG objective defined in the Base-PP by specifying an additional method by which the TSF may be configured. This objective extends the Base-PP’s O.COMMS objective by ensuring that the communications related to MDM Agent functionality are secured in the same manner as other sensitive data transmitted to/from the mobile device. This objective extends the Base-PP’s O.STORAGE objective by ensuring that the mobile device’s data-at-rest protection mechanisms can also be used to secure the MDM Agent and related data. This objective extends the Base-PP’s OE.CONFIG objective by expecting that TOE administrators act appropriately when installing or configuring the MDM Agent. This objective extends the Base-PP’s OE.NOTIFY and OE.PRECAUTION objectives by setting reasonable expectations for user security behavior. This objective helps mitigate the T.EAVESDROP and T.NETWORK threats defined by the Base-PP by reducing the network exposure of the mobile device. This does not conflict with the Base-PP because the Base-PP does not set specific expectations for the level of security that the enterprise provides, but all use cases from the Base-PP set expectations that the mobile device is used for some enterprise purposes so it is reasonable to expect the enterprise have security controls in place to protect these functions. This objective is suitable because the MDM Agent can reasonably expect the device it has been deployed on to be secure. This objective is suitable because while the Base-PP does not associate any availability metrics with wireless communications, the mobile device will always provide the ability to access a wireless network. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to use a trusted channel defined by FTP_ITC_EXT.1 in the Base-PP to transmit data about its own behavior to the Operational Environment. The Base-PP defines FAU_GEN.1; this PP-Module defines a second iteration to use the same audit mechanism to generate audit records for the MDM Agent’s behavior. It may alternatively allow the TSF to generate its own audit trail, which does not impede the MDF from enforcing its own security functionality. The Base-PP defines FAU_SEL.1; this PP-Module defines a second iteration to use the same audit mechanism to select the auditable events to be generated by the MDM Agent. Note that the Base-PP does not mandate this requirement so it is possible that only the MDM Agent portion of the TOE may implement it. In this case, the SFR provides a selection for the MDM Agent to implement its own mechanism to perform this function rather than a platform-provided one. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to record data that it receives from the Operational Environment. It does not need to use any functionality defined in the Base-PP to do this, and doing this does not prevent the enforcement of any security requirements from the Base-PP. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to use a digital signature algorithm to validate data that it receives from the Operational Environment. To do this, the MDM Agent will use the functionality defined by the Base-PP in FCS_COP.1/SIGN. This SFR defines the ability of the MDM Agent to interact with the mobile device to execute the management functions defined by FMT_MOF_EXT.1 in the Base-PP. The Base-PP specifically indicates in FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2 that some management functions may be performed via MDM. This SFR defines the functions performed by the MDM Agent when unenrolled from an MDM. The Base-PP defines unenrollment actions in FMT_SMF_EXT.2, and goes on to note that these actions may be performed “perhaps via an MDM agent,” so this is expected behavior. This SFR defines the ability of the MDM Agent to store generated audit data in the audit storage provided by the mobile device. The Base-PP defines the capability for audit storage in FAU_STG.1. This SFR defines the ability of the MDM Agent to maintain information about its last successful connection with the environmental MDM Server (i.e., the last successful invocation of the trusted channel for that interface, as defined in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 of the Base-PP). It does not need to use any functionality defined in the Base-PP to do this, and doing this does not prevent the enforcement of any security requirements from the Base-PP. https://github.com/commoncriteria/mdm v4.0 https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=428&id=428 The Base-PP requires the TOE to define a method of key storage. This PP-Module iterates it to specify the use of platform key storage for MDM Agents. This requirement ensures that persistent secrets (credentials, secret keys) and private keys are stored securely when not in use by the mobile platform. The evaluator will verify that the TSS lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and, for each platform listed as supported in the ST, how it is stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store persistent secrets and private keys. When this PP-Module is used to extend the MDM PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still mobile device management. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the MDM Agent(s) that reside on individual mobile devices and support the management functionality that the MDM Server component implements. This threat protects user data from unauthorized logical access. If the backup data is stored outside the MDM or the mobile device that it protects, then there is no conflict with the MDM PP since it is a different security boundary. If the backup data is stored either on the MDM or on the protected device, an attacker would attempt to exploit this threat by first exploiting any of the threats that the MDM PP defines (T.MALICIOUS_APPS, T.NETWORK_ATTACK, T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP, T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS) depending on where and how the backup data is stored, and then use successful exploitation of one of these threats to attempt to access the backup data itself. This assumption expects that networking services will be available for the TOE to use. This is consistent with the Base-PP because the portion of the TOE defined by the Base-PP runs on a general-purpose operating system or specialized network appliance. The Base-PP does not make any assumptions about the environmental functionality that this PP-Module relies on, so there is nothing in this PP-Module that would contradict it. This assumption expects that the TOE’s underlying hardware platform is validated against the MDF PP. This is consistent with the Base-PP because the portion of the TOE defined by the Base-PP runs on a general-purpose operating system or specialized network appliance. The Base-PP does not make any assumptions about the environmental functionality that this PP-Module relies on, so there is nothing in this PP-Module that would contradict it. The Base-PP defines an A.PROPER_ADMIN assumption that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The Base-PP defines an A.PROPER_USER assumption that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The Base-PP defines a P.ACCOUNTABILITY OSP that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The Base-PP defines a P.ADMIN OSP that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The Base-PP defines a P.DEVICE_ENROLL OSP that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The Base-PP defines a P.NOTIFY OSP that is identical to the one defined by the PP-Module. The PP-Module just extends it to the entire TOE boundary rather than just the MDM Server. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. This objective requires the MDM Agent to use platform key storage to protect secret and private key data. The MDM PP defines a requirement for key storage (FCS_STG_EXT.1) that allows the MDM Agent to satisfy this objective. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. The MDM PP contains this same objective with the same purpose. This SFR provides the alerts that are received by the MDM Server as per FAU_ALT_EXT.1 in the Base-PP. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to generate audit records of its behavior. The mechanism by which it does this is not relevant to the MDM Server portion of the TOE as they reside on different platforms. The Base-PP defines FAU_SEL.1 as an optional SFR to limit the audit events that are generated by the TSF. This PP-Module adds another iteration that requires the MDM Agent to include this capability by default. This SFR provides information during agent enrollment that is required by the MDM Server to meet the FIA_ENR_EXT.1 requirement defined by the Base-PP. The Base-PP defines an SFR (FMT_POL_EXT.1) that requires the MDM Server to provide digitally signed policies and policy updates to the MDM Agent. FMT_POL_EXT.2 completes this transaction by requiring the MDM Agent to accept only signed policies and policy updates. This SFR requires the MDM Agent to interact with the underlying mobile device platform to enforce management functions that are configured by the MDM Server (FMT_SMF.1(1) in the Base-PP). This SFR requires the TSF to define its behavior upon unenrollment from management. Unenrollment from management is a management function that is specified in the Base-PP. This SFR defines the ability of the MDM Agent to store generated audit data in the audit storage provided by the mobile device. This does not impact the Base-PP since it resides on a different platform from the MDM Agent. This SFR defines the ability of the MDM Agent to maintain information about its last successful connection with the environmental MDM Server (i.e., the last successful invocation of the trusted channel for that interface, as defined in FPT_ITT.1(2) of the Base-PP). It does not otherwise impact the Base-PP since it describes behavior that occurs local to the MDM Agent during a period where it is not interacting with the MDM Server. The auditable events specified in this FP are included in an ST if the incorporating PP, cPP, or PP-Module supports audit event reporting through FAU_GEN.1, and if all other criteria in the incorporating PP or PP-Module are met. : Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs This family is defined in the MDM Base-PP. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FAU_ALT_EXT.2. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDM PP for all other definitions for this family. requires the TSF to define when and how an MDM Agent generates alerts and transmits them to an MDM Server based on its activity. The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Ability to configure the specific events that result in generation of alerts. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Success/failure of sending alert. FAU_ALT_EXT.1 Server Alerts [FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection; or FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel] The trusted channel is defined in FPT_ITT.1(2) of the Base-PP if the TOE claims the MDM PP and FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL in this PP-Module if the TOE claims the MDF PP. “Alert” in this requirement could be as simple as an audit record or a notification. If any prior alerts exist in the queue, per FAU_ALT_EXT.2.2, those alerts must be sent when the trusted channel is available. This requirement is to ensure that the MDM Agent must notify the MDM Server whenever one of the events listed above occurs. Lack of receipt of a successful policy installation indicates the failure of the policy installation. The periodic reachability events ensure that either the MDM Agent responds to MDM Server polls to determine device network reachability, or the MDM Agent can be configured to regularly notify the Server that it is reachable. The ST author must select “receiving” in the first case and “generating” in the second. The corresponding requirement for the MDM Server is FAU_NET_EXT.1 in the MDM PP. The ST author must either assign further events or select the “no other events” option. Note that alerts may take time to reach the MDM Server, or not arrive, due to poor connectivity. If the trusted channel is not available, alerts must be queued. When the trusted channel becomes available, the queued alerts must be sent. The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it describes how the alerts are implemented. The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it describes how the candidate policy updates are obtained and the actions that take place for successful (policy update installed) and unsuccessful (policy update not installed) cases. The software components that are performing the processing must also be identified in the TSS and verified by the evaluator. The evaluator also ensures that the TSS describes how reachability events are implemented, and if configurable are selected in FMT_SMF_EXT.4.2. The evaluator verifies that this description clearly indicates who (MDM Agent or MDM Server) initiates reachability events. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes under what circumstances, if any, the alert may not be generated (e.g., the device is powered off or disconnected from the trusted channel), how alerts are queued, and the maximum amount of storage for queued messages. The evaluator shall perform a policy update from the test environment MDM server. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent accepts the update, makes the configured changes, and reports the success of the policy update back to the MDM Server. The evaluator shall perform each of the actions listed in FAU_ALT_EXT.2.1 and verify that the alert does in fact reach the MDM Server. The evaluator shall configure the MDM Agent to perform a network reachability test, both with and without such connectivity and ensure that results reflect each. The evaluator shall remove network connectivity from the MDM Agent and generate an alert/event as defined in FAU_ALT_EXT.2.1. The evaluator shall restore network connectivity to the MDM Agent and verify that the alert generated while the TOE was disconnected is sent by the MDM Agent upon re-establishment of the connectivity. Success or failure of sending alert. No additional information. This requirement outlines the information to be included in the MDM Agent’s audit records. The ST author can include other auditable events directly in the Auditable Events table in FAU_GEN.1.1/AGENT; they are not limited to the list presented. MDM policy update must minimally indicate that an update to policy occurred. The event record need not contain the differences between the prior policy and the new policy; optionally, the specific change(s) to policy that were included in that update may be detailed. All updates to policy should trigger this alert. Modifications commanded by the MDM Server are those commands listed in FMT_SMF.1.1. The selection for the FMT_UNR_EXT.1 auditable event in the Auditable Events table corresponds to the selection in FMT_UNR_EXT.1. If “apply remediation actions” is selected in FMT_UNR_EXT.1, then the ST author selects “attempt to unenroll” in FAU_GEN.1.1/AGENT Auditable Events table for FMT_UNR_EXT.1; otherwise, "none" is selected. All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in FAU_GEN.1.2/AGENT, but may contain more information which can be assigned. The ST author must identify in the TSS which information of the audit record that is performed by the MDM Agent and that which is performed by the MDM Agent’s platform. The evaluator shall check the TSS and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Agent; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity). The evaluator shall use the TOE to perform the auditable events defined in the Auditable Events table in FAU_GEN.1.1/AGENT and observe that accurate audit records are generated with contents and formatting consistent with those described in the TSS. Note that this testing can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. The intent of this requirement is to identify all criteria that can be selected to trigger an audit event. For the ST author, the assignment is used to list any additional criteria or “no other attributes”. This selection may be configured by the MDM Server. If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Agent; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity). The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it contains instructions on how to define the set of auditable events as well as explains the syntax for multi-value selection (if applicable). The evaluator shall also verify that the operational guidance shall identify those audit records that are always recorded, regardless of the selection criteria currently being enforced. For each attribute listed in the requirement, the evaluator shall devise a test to show that selecting the attribute causes only audit events with that attribute (or those that are always recorded, as identified in the administrative guidance) to be recorded. [conditional]: If the TSF supports specification of more complex audit pre-selection criteria (e.g., multiple attributes, logical expressions using attributes) then the evaluator shall devise tests showing that this capability is correctly implemented. The evaluator shall also, in the test plan, provide a short narrative justifying the set of tests as representative and sufficient to exercise the capability. All modifications to the audi tconfiguration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating. No additional information. This family is defined in the MDM Base-PP. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FIA_ENR_EXT.2. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDM PP for all other definitions for this family. requires the TSF to record specific information about the MDM Server (i.e. the entity that is enrolling it) during the enrollment process. There are no management functions foreseen. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Completion of enrollment process. FIA_ENR_EXT.1 Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management The reference identifier of the MDM Server may be the Distinguished Name, Domain Name, and/or the IP address of the MDM Server. This requirement allows the specification of the information to be to be used to establish a network connection and the reference identifier for authenticating the trusted channel between the MDM Server and MDM Agent, as defined in the MDM PP. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes which types of reference identifiers are acceptable and how the identifier is specified (e.g. preconfigured in the MDM Agent, by the user, by the MDM server, in a policy). The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes how to configure reference identifier of the MDM Server’s certificate and, if different than the reference identifier, the Domain Name or IP address (for connectivity) of the MDM Server. The evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to establish the reference identifier of the MDM server on the MDM Agent and in conjunction with other evaluation activities verify that the MDM Agent can connect to the MDM Server and validate the MDM Server’s certificate. Enrollment in management. Reference identifier of the MDM server. This family is defined in the MDM Base-PP. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FMT_POL_EXT.2. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDM PP for all other definitions for this family. requires the TSF to verify the validity of the source of a policy before applying it. There are no management functions foreseen. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Failure to validate policy. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation FMT_POL_EXT.1 Trusted Policy Update The intent of this requirement is to cryptographically tie the policies to the enterprise that mandated the policy, not to protect the policies in transit, as this is addressed by other SFRs (the MDM Base-PP SFR FPT_ITT.1(2) or the Additional SFR FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL or FTP_ITC_EXT.1/OSCHANNEL, depending on the claimed Base-PP). This is especially critical for users who connect to multiple enterprises. Policies must be digitally signed by the enterprise using the algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3) in the MDM PP. The signing private key is associated with a certificate or raw public key used by the agent to verify the signature on the policy. The evaluator ensures that the TSS describes how the candidate policies are obtained by the MDM Agent, the processing associated with verifying the digital signature of the policy updates, and the actions that take place for successful (signature was verified) and unsuccessful (signature could not be verified) cases. The software components that are performing the processing must also be identified in the TSS and verified by the evaluators. This evaluation activity is performed in conjunction with the evaluation activity for FIA_X509_EXT.1 and FIA_X509_EXT.2 as defined in the Base-PPs. The evaluator shall perform a policy update from an available configuration interface (such as through a test MDM Server). The evaluator shall verify the update is signed and is provided to the MDM Agent. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent accepts the digitally signed policy. The evaluator shall perform a policy update from an available configuration interface (such as through a test MDM Server). The evaluator shall provide an unsigned and an incorrectly signed policy to the MDM Agent. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent does not accept the digitally signed policy. Failure of policy validation. Reason for failure of validation. This family is defined in the MDF Base-PP. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FMT_SMF_EXT.4. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDF PP for all other definitions for this family. requires the TSF to support the execution of certain management functions that require interfacing with other TOE components. The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Execution of management functions. Configuration of management functions behavior. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Successful and failed execution of management functions. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation This requirement captures all the configuration functionality in the MDM Agent to configure the underlying mobile device with the configuration policies sent from the MDM Server to the Agent. The ST author selects the Base-PP (MDF PP or MDM PP) as the source of the management functions. The administrator-provided management functions in MDF PP are specified in Column 4 of Table 5 in MDF PP and in FPT_TUD_EXT.1 (for version queries). The administrator-provided device management functions in MDM PP are specified in FMT_SMF.1.1(1); the functions in the selection of FMT_SMF.1.1(1) in the MDM PP are required to correspond to the functions available on the platforms supported by the MDM Agent. The ST author can add more commands and configuration policies by completing the assignment statement; the mobile device must support these additional commands or configuration policies. The agent must configure the platform based on the commands and configuration policies received from the MDM Server. The ST author must not claim any functionality not provided by the supported mobile device(s). All selections and assignments performed by the ST author in this requirement should match the selections and assignments of the validated mobile device ST. This requirement captures all of the configuration in the MDM Agent for configuration of itself. If the MDM Agent is a part of the mobile device, enrollment is a single function both of the Agent and of the mobile device (FMT_SMF_EXT.4.1). If the MDM Agent is an application developed separately from the mobile device, the MDM Agent performs the function “enroll the mobile device in management” (per FMT_SMF_EXT.4.1) by registering itself to the mobile device as a device administrator. The Agent itself is enrolled in management by configuring the MDM Server to which the Agent answers. If the MDM Agent does not support unenrollment prevention, remediation actions should be applied upon unenrollment (per FMT_UNR_EXT.1). If the Agent generates periodic reachability events in FAU_ALT_EXT.2.1 and the periodicity of these events is configurable, “configure periodicity of reachability events” must be selected. This assurance activity may be performed in conjunction with other assurance activities in the Base-PP. The evaluator shall verify that the any assigned functions are described in the TSS and that these functions are documented as supported by the platform. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that any differences between management functions and policies for each supported mobile device are listed. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the methods in which the MDM Agent can be enrolled. The TSS description shall make clear if the MDM Agent supports multiple interfaces for enrollment and configuration (for example, both remote configuration and local configuration). The evaluator shall verify the AGD guidance includes detailed instructions for configuring each function in this requirement. If the MDM Agent is a component of the MDM system (i.e. MDM Server is the Base-PP), the evaluator shall verify, by consulting documentation for the claimed mobile device platforms, that the configurable functions listed for this Agent are supported by the platforms. If the MDM Agent supports multiple interfaces for configuration (for example, both remote configuration and local configuration), the AGD guidance makes clear whether some functions are restricted to certain interfaces. In conjunction with the evaluation activities in the Base-PP, the evaluator shall attempt to configure each administrator-provided management function and shall verify that the mobile device executes the commands and enforces the policies. [conditional: if "import the certificates to be used for authentication of MDM Agent communications" is selected in FMT_SMF_EXT.4.1, then] The evaluator shall configure the MDM Agent authentication certificate in accordance with the configuration guidance. The evaluator shall verify that the MDM Agent uses this certificate in performing the tests for the MDM PP SFR FPT_ITT.1(2) (if the MDM PP is the Base-PP), the Additional SFR FTP_ITC_EXT.1/MDFCHANNEL (if the MDF PP is the Base-PP), or the Additional SFR FTP_ITC_EXT.1/OSCHANNEL (if the GPOS PP is the Base-PP). In conjunction with other evaluation activities, the evaluator shall attempt to enroll the MDM Agent in management with each interface identified in the TSS, and verify that the MDM Agent can manage the device and communicate with the MDM Server. [conditional] In conjunction with the evaluation activity for FAU_ALT_EXT.2.1, the evaluator shall configure the periodicity for reachability events for several configured time periods and shall verify that the MDM Server receives alerts on that schedule. [conditional] The evaluator shall design and perform tests to demonstrate that the assigned function may be configured and that the intended behavior of the function is enacted by the mobile device. Outcome (success or failure) of function. No additional information. Components in this family define requirements for TSF behavior when a user attempts to unenroll the TOE from mobile device management. requires the TSF either to prevent unenrollment entirely or to take some corrective action in the event that an unenrollment is initiated. There are no management functions foreseen. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Unenrollment from MDM. [FIA_ENR_EXT.1 Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management; or FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Functions Behavior] Unenrolling is the action of transitioning from the enrolled state to the unenrolled state. If preventing the user from unenrolling is configurable, administrators configure whether users are allowed to unenroll through the MDM Server. For those configurations where unenrollment is allowed, for example a BYOD usage, the MDF PP describes remediation actions performed upon unenrollment, such as wiping enterprise data, in FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1; however, the MDM Agent is limited to those actions supported by the mobile device on which the Agent is operating. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the mechanism used to prevent users from unenrolling or the remediation actions applied when unenrolled. The evaluator shall ensure that the administrative guidance instructs administrators in configuring the unenrollment prevention in each available configuration interface. If any configuration allows users to unenroll, the guidance also describes the actions that unenroll the Agent. If ‘prevent the unenrollment from occurring’ is selected: The evaluator shall configure the Agent according to the administrative guidance for each available configuration interface, shall attempt to unenroll the device, and shall verify that the attempt fails. If ‘apply remediation actions’ is selected: If any configuration allows the user to unenroll, the evaluator shall configure the Agent to allow user unenrollment, attempt to unenroll, and verify that the remediation actions are applied. Attempt to unenroll. No additional information This family is defined in the MDM Base-PP. This PP-Module augments the extended family by adding one additional component, FAU_STG_EXT.3. This new component and its impact on the extended family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the MDM PP for all other definitions for this family. requires the TSF to identify a location for audit record storage and the events that are stored at this location. There are no management functions foreseen. There are no auditable events foreseen. FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAU_STG_EXT.3 should only be included in the ST for MDM Agent platforms (i.e., mobile devices) that conform to MDF PP version 3 or later. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS description of the audit records indicates how the records are stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store audit records. Components in this family define requirements for tracking the availability of network components. requires the TSF to keep track of failed attempts to communicate with a remote entity. The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Configuration of unreachability threshold. The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: Minimal: Reaching/exceeding unreachability threshold. FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps This requirement is to enable the Agent to determine if it has been out of connectivity with the Server for too long. The configuration of the number of allowed missed reachability events or time limit since last successful connection with the server is handled in Server configuration policy of the Agent (the first selection of function 56 in FMT_SMF.1.1(1) within the MDM PP). If the first selection of FMT_SMF.1.1(1) function 56 is included in the ST, then FPT_NET_EXT.1.1 must be included in the ST. If the Agent has been out of connectivity with the server for too long than the remediation actions specified in the second selection of function 56 must occur. For example if the Agent has not synced with the server in the allowed amount of time that the Agent must wipe the device without requiring a command from the Server. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of how the Agent determines how long it has been since the last successful connection with the Server (i.e., total number of missed reachability events or time). If total number of missed reachability events is selected, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of how often the reachability events are sent. The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator, if needed, how to configure the TOE to detect when the time since last successful connection with the server has been reached. The evaluator shall configure the Server configuration policy of the Agent per FMT_SMF.1.1(1) function 56 within the Mobile Device Managment PP. The device shall be placed in airplane mode to prevent connectivity with the Server. The evaluator shall verify that after the configured time, the remediation actions selected in function 56 occur. MDM server connection reaching or exceeding unavailability threshold. No additional information. Requirement Rationale for Satisfaction FMT_MTD.1 - Management of TSF Data FAU_SEL.1 has a dependency on FMT_MTD.1 because the configuration settings that determine what events are audited is considered to be TSF data. While FAU_SEL.1 determines the extent to which the TOE’s audit function is configured, it relies on FMT_MTD.1 to determine the administrative roles that are permitted to manipulate this data. This is not applicable to the PP-Module because there is no management interface for a TOE user to interact with; instead, all management functions are initiated by an MDM Server and performed by the MDM Agent which has sufficient privileges on the underlying device to do this. In this case, FIA_ENR_EXT.2 and FMT_POL_EXT.1 are sufficient to validate that the source of the policy data is identified and authenticated before the policy change is accepted. It is not necessary to define a management role associated with this function because the MDM Server does not need to assume a ‘role’ on the TOE to communicate policy data; it is sufficient for the TSF to determine the policy is genuine. FPT_STM.1 - Reliable Time Stamps No matter what Base-PP is claimed for the TOE, the MDM Agent itself will be installed on a device. If the underlying device is part of the TOE, the dependency is satisfied by FPT_STM.1 if the MDF PP is the Base-PP, FPT_STM.1 is implicitly satisifed per Appendix D of the GPOS PP if that is the Base-PP. If the device is not part of the TOE (i.e. because the Base-PP is the MDM PP), a reliable time source can still be assumed because all mobile devices must include some method to update time data from a cellular carrier network, and can also reasonably be assumed to include a method to update network time if it is instead connected to a network via WLAN radio (such as when in airplane mode) and general-purpose operating systems are also assumed to have network time interfaces.