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PP-Module for LiFi Access Systems

Version: 0.1
2025-02-28
National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
0.1	2025-02-28	Initial XML conversion

1Introduction 1.1Overview 1.2Terms 1.2.1Common Criteria Terms 1.2.2Technical Terms 1.3Compliant Targets of Evaluation 1.3.1TOE Boundary 1.4Use-Cases 1.5Implementation-Based Features 1.5.1802.11bb Support 1.5.2G.vlc Support 2Conformance Claims 3Security Problem Definition 3.1Threats 3.2Assumptions 3.3Organizational Security Policies 4Security Objectives 4.1Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 4.2Security Objectives Rationale 5Security Requirements 5.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction 5.1.1 Modified SFRs 5.1.1.1Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.2TOE Security Functional Requirements 5.2.1Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs 5.2.2Security Audit (FAU)5.2.3Cryptographic Support (FCS)5.2.4Identification and Authentication (FIA)5.2.5Security Management (FMT)5.2.6Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.2.7TOE Access (FTA)5.2.8Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)5.3TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale 6Consistency Rationale 6.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition 6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements Appendix A - Optional SFRs A.1Strictly Optional Requirements A.2Objective Requirements A.3Implementation-dependent Requirements A.3.1Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs A.3.2SFRs for 802.11bb Implementations A.3.3SFRs for G.vlc Implementations Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements B.1Auditable Events for Selection-based SFRs B.2Cryptographic Support (FCS)Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions C.1Extended Components Table C.2Extended Component Definitions C.2.1Cryptographic Support (FCS)C.2.1.1FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec C.2.2Identification and Authentication (FIA)C.2.2.1FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication C.2.3Protection of the TSF (FPT)C.2.3.1FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization C.2.4Security Management (FMT)C.2.4.1FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions Appendix D - Acronyms Appendix E - Bibliography

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The scope of the LiFi Access System PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of a LiFi access system product in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 4.0

A conformant TOE will claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the Base-PP identified above, this PP-Module, and any of the PP-Modules or packages identified in Section 2.

This Base-PP is valid because a LiFi Access System is a specific function for a purpose-built network device.

Tech terms section below is placeholder/template, will need to be updated later for terms specific to this module

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

1.2.2 Technical Terms

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)	An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.
Administrator	An individual, user, or group that is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
Application (app)	Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
Application Programming Interface (API)	A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Credential	Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)	Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
DAR Protection	Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)	An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer	An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System	A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall	A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
Operating System (OS)	Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual.
Sensitive Data	Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
User	An entity operating the TOE that is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
peer	An IT entity that is external to the TOE that interfaces with the TOE via an over-the-air connection for the purpose of accessing the network on which the TOE exists as a boundary device.

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

This PP-Module specifically addresses LiFi (IEEE 802.11bb, ITU G.9991) access systems (AS). A compliant LiFi AS is a system composed of hardware and software that is connected to a network and has an infrastructure role in the overall enterprise network. In particular, a LiFi AS establishes a secure wireless (IEEE 802.11, IEEE802.1x, IEEE 802.1AE) link that provides an authenticated and encrypted path to an enterprise network and thereby decreases the risk of exposure of information transiting “over-the-air”.

Since this PP-Module extends the NDcPP, conformant TOEs are obligated to implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in response to the threat environment discussed subsequently herein.

The TOE encompasses the OS kernel drivers, shared software libraries, and some application software included with the OS. The applications considered within the TOE are those that provide essential LiFi services that make up the LiFi link and security. Examples are management services that implement configuration functions specified in this PP-Module, host services that manage client authentication to the access point, and the libraries and modules that provide security implementation of the LiFi link. This applies to each separate TOE component that are being used to meet the security requirements proposed.

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The physical boundary for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module is one or more physical network appliances (in a standalone or distributed configuration) that provides generalized network device functionality such as auditing, identification and authentication, and cryptographic services for network communications, as well as specialized functionality for facilitating remote network access via LiFi communications. The TOE's logical boundary includes all functionality required by the claimed Base-PP, this PP-Module, and any other PP-Modules which may be claimed by the ST author as a part of a PP-Configuration that includes this PP-Module. Product functionality for which no PP-Module exists, or for which no SFR within a relevant PP-Module exists to capture, are considered to be non-interfering with respect to the TSF. In other words, they may be present or enabled in the evaluated configuration of the TOE but their presence must not degrade or interrupt the enforcement of functions within the TOE's logical boundary.

Note that while the Base-PP permits the TOE either to be a physical or virtual network appliance, LiFi devices require the use of specialized hardware that will not be present on commodity servers, and it is therefore expected that any TOE that conforms to this PP-Module will be one or more dedicated physical devices.

Figure 1: High Level TOE Implementation

1.4 Use-Cases

[USE CASE 1] Standalone Device: The TOE is a standalone network device that serves as a single network endpoint that provides connectivity to LiFi clients.
[USE CASE 2] Distributed System: The TOE is a distributed system consisting of multiple network devices that collectively serve as the LiFi network endpoint. In addition to claiming the relevant "Distributed TOE" requirement in the NDcPP, this use case also requires the TOE to claim the optional SFR FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB to describe the key distribution method between distributed TOE components.

1.5 Implementation-Based Features

A conformant TOE may implement either 802.11bb or G.vlc. Depending on which is supported, different requirements will apply to the TOE as they each implement different methods of protection of data in transit.

1.5.1 802.11bb Support

The TOE implements LiFi using IEEE 802.11bb. Data in transit is protected using either IPsec or RadSec (RADIUS over TLS).

If this feature is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be claimed in the ST:

FCS_CKM.1/WPA
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
FTP_ITC.1/Client

1.5.2 G.vlc Support

The TSF implements LiFi using ITU-T G.9991 (aka G.vlc). Data in transit is protected using MACsec. When the TOE implements this feature, it must also claim conformance to the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption.

If this feature is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be claimed in the ST:

FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.

CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.

PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 4.0
PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, version 2.0

Package Claim

This PP-Module is Functional Package for Transport Layer Security Version 2.1 conformant.
This PP-Module is Functional Package for X.509 Version 1.0 conformant.
This PP-Module does not conform to any assurance packages.

The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SFRs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSF and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made.

3 Security Problem Definition

This PP-Module is written to address the situation where a distributed network device facilitates end user access to a network via LiFi. The threats are similar to those that are typical of network devices as a whole, but may be exploited differently because of the mechanisms that are unique to this particular type of product.

3.1 Threats

T.DATA_INTEGRITY: Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to modify the data without authorization. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE: Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to conduct unauthorized activities. If malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network, or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices (e.g., as a result of nonexistent or insufficient data encryption that exposes the data in transit to rogue elements), then those internal devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS: Devices located outside the protected network may seek to exercise services located on the protected network that are intended to be only accessed from inside the protected network or only accessed by entities using an authenticated pat into the protected network.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK: An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the TOE with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.
T.REPLAY_ATTACK: If an unauthorized individual successfully gains access to the system, the adversary may have the opportunity to conduct a "replay" attack. This method of attack allows the individual to capture packets trans versing throughout the wireless network and send the packets later, possibly unknown by the intended receiver.

3.2 Assumptions

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (OE) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an OE that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.

A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS: The product implements some security-relevant functionality that does not require evaluation (e.g., network time synchronization, process scheduling, and virtual memory management including process separation).
A.MANAGED_CONFIG: Depending on configuration and capability, the product may or may not be configuration-managed by the enterprise or bound to directory services to support multi-user login.
A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE: The product runs application software developed by a third party. The applications are not intentionally developed to be malicious, but can contain inadvertent coding errors. These errors introduce risk that control of an application may be seized by a malicious entity. The product shall confine these applications within the originally designated operating environment.
A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY: The platform is connected to a network. For purposes of sending/receiving data, to include software updates, the platform is connected to other entities. Other entities on the network are not inherently trustable.
A.PROPER_USER: Users are not malicious in nature, though they may inadvertently or intentionally engage in risky behavior.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The OE of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). The security objectives for the OE consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the OE should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment.

OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS: The product has functionality outside of its logical security boundary to satisfy organizational requirements that are unrelated to what this PP-Module defines.
OE.MANAGED_CONFIG: The product is compatible with enterprise architecture that allows for managed configuration, subject authorization via directory services, or both.
OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE: The operational environment permits the use of third-party software on organization-owned hardware to enforce necessary functions.
OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY: The operational environment facilitates the use of network connectivity by authorized subjects.
OE.PROPER_USER: Users of the system are adequately vetted to ensure that they are non-malicious.

4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions and organizational security policies map to operational environment security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale
Assumption or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS	OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS	The operational environment objective OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS is realized through A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS .
A.MANAGED_CONFIG	OE.MANAGED_CONFIG	The operational environment objective OE.MANAGED_CONFIG is realized through A.MANAGED_CONFIG .
A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE	OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE	The operational environment objective OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE is realized through A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE .
A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY	OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY	The operational environment objective OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY is realized through A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY .
A.PROPER_USER	OE.PROPER_USER	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER .

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

Refinement operation (denoted by bold text or ~~strikethrough text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
Selection (denoted by italicized text): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
Assignment operation (denoted by italicized text): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
Iteration operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

5.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the network device as a whole and evaluated against the Base-PP. In this case, the following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the Base-PP in addition to what is mandated by section 5.2.

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the NDcPP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

5.1.1.1 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

NOTE: for CC:2022 Part 2 conformance this SFR may be replaced in the next NDcPP release with FPT_TST.1. If so, then corresponding changes will need to be made here as well. This SFR is functionally identical to what is defined in the NDcPP except that the specific self-test of verifying the integrity of TSF executable code has been mandated as a minimum baseline for the requirement. Other self-tests may still be claimed at the ST author's discretion.

The text of the requirement is replaced with:

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) and [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur], in no other circumstances] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: integrity verification of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen, [selection: [assignment: list of additional self-tests run by the TSF], no other self-tests].

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

Table 2: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements
Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1/LiFI
FAU_GEN.1/LiFI
No events specified	N/A
FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption
FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption
No events specified	N/A
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
None	Provided client identity (e.g., MAC address).
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6
None	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address)
FMT_SMF.1/LiFi
FMT_SMF.1/LiFi
No events specified	N/A
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
No events specified	N/A
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
Unauthorized attempts to perform operations against protected data	No additional information
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
No events specified	N/A
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
No events specified	N/A
FTA_TSE.1
FTA_TSE.1
Denial of a session establishment due to the session establishment mechanism	Reason for denial Origin of establishment attempt
FTP_ITC.1/8021X

	Failed attempts to establish a trusted channel (including IEEE 802.11)	Identification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel data	Identification of the initiator and target of channel

5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1/LiFI Audit Data Generation (LiFi)

FAU_GEN.1.1/LiFI

For the sake of simplicity this has been defined as one single iteration rather than being split as in the proposed SFRs because of the amount of overlap between them. I think it is reasonable to say "whatever gets claimed gets audited" in one requirement.
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
[[auditable events defined in Table 2, auditable events defined in Table 7, auditable events defined in Table 8].
Failure of wireless sensor communication]

Application Note:

A TOE that conforms to a Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) containing this PP-Module either can be a standalone or distributed TOE as defined in the NDcPP. For distributed TOEs, the expectation for this PP-Module is that a LiFi AS is composed of a single controller and one or more access points (APs). If the TOE is a distributed system across multiple components then they must be capable of sending audit data to the controller. If the TOE is a standalone system, audit data should be stored on the component that generates it.

The auditable events defined in Table 2, Table 7, and Table 8are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module and are intended to extend FAU_GEN.1 in the Base-PP. The events in the Auditable Events table should be combined with those of the NDcPP in the context of a conforming Security Target. This table includes rows for all SFRs in the PP-Module. For any SFRs the ST claims, the corresponding audit events must also be claimed in the table. If the ST does not claim a particular SFR, then there is likewise no expectation that the auditable events for that SFR are required.

Per FAU_STG_EXT.1 in the Base-PP, the TOE must support transfer of the audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel.

FAU_GEN.1.2/LiFI

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [additional information defined in table for each auditable event, where applicable].

5.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (Data Encryption and Decryption for LiFi

FCS_COP.1.1/LiFiDataEncryption

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-GCMP and [[selection: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), CCMP, Counter (encryption mode) (CTR), Galois-Counter Mode (GCM), no other]] modes and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772, GCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38D and IEEE 802.11ax-2021 [selection: CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2020, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, no other standards].

Application Note: Application Note: This requirement is iterated from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating the selection of CBC mode and 256 bit key sizes while also defining additional AES mode and key size selections not present in the original definition. This requirement mandates AES-GCMP (which uses AES in Galois-Counter Mode (GCM) to comply with IEEE 802.11-2020. For the first selection of FCS_COP.1.1/LiFiDataEncryption, the ST author should choose the additional mode or modes in which AES operates. For the second selection, the ST author should choose the key sizes that are supported by this functionality. 256-bit GCMP is required in order to comply with FCS_CKM.1/WPA . AES-CCMP, if claimed, is required to use 256-bit keys for IEEE 802.11ax-2021 connections. CTR mode is not used for LiFi AS capabilities but remains selectable since it may be required by another part of the TSF.

5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Authentication

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865, 2866, and 3579.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.

Application Note:

This requirement covers the TOE's role as the authenticator in an 802.1X authentication exchange. If the exchange is completed successfully, the TOE will obtain the PMK from the RADIUS server and perform the four-way handshake with the wireless client (supplicant) to begin 802.11 communications. As indicated previously, there are at least three communication paths present during the exchange; two with the TOE as an endpoint and one with the TOE acting as a transfer point only. The TOE establishes an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over Local Area Network (EAPOL) connection with the wireless client as specified in 802.1X-2007. The TOE also establishes (or has established) a RADIUS protocol connection protected either by IPsec or RadSec (TLS) with the RADIUS server. The wireless client and RADIUS server establish an EAP-TLS session (RFC 5216); in this transaction the TOE merely takes the EAP-TLS packets from its EAPOL/RADIUS endpoint and transfers them to the other endpoint. Because the specific authentication method (TLS in this case) is opaque to the TOE, there are no requirements with respect to RFC 5126 in this PP-Module. However, the base RADIUS protocol (2865) has an update (3579) that will need to be addressed in the implementation and evaluation activities. RADIUS accounting is implemented via conformance to RFC 2866.

Additionally, RFC 5080 contains implementation issues that will need to be addressed by developers but which levy no new requirements. The point of performing 802.1X authentication is to provide access to the network (assuming the authentication was successful and that all 802.11 negotiations are performed successfully); in the terminology of 802.1X, this means the wireless client has access to the "controlled port" maintained by the TOE.

Evaluation Activities

FIA_8021X_EXT.1

TSS

In order to show that the TSF implements the 802.1X-2010 standard correctly, the evaluator will ensure that the TSS contains the following information:

The sections (clauses) of the standard that the TOE implements
For each identified section, any options selected in the implementation allowed by the standards are specified
For each identified section, any non-conformance is identified and described, including a justification for the non-conformance

Because the connection to the RADIUS server will be contained in an IPsec or RadSec (TLS) tunnel, the security mechanisms detailed in the RFCs identified in the requirement are not relied on to provide protection for these communications. Consequently, no extensive analysis of the RFCs is required. However, the evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes the measures (documentation, testing) that are taken by the product developer to ensure that the TOE conforms to the RFCs listed in this requirement.

Guidance

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

Test FIA_8021X_EXT.1:1: The evaluator will demonstrate that a wireless client has no access to the test network. After successfully authenticating with a RADIUS server through the TOE, the evaluator will demonstrate that the wireless client does have access to the test network.
Test FIA_8021X_EXT.1:2: The evaluator will demonstrate that a wireless client has no access to the test network. The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using an invalid client certificate, such that the EAP-TLS negotiation fails. This should result in the wireless client still being unable to access the test network.
Test FIA_8021X_EXT.1:3: The evaluator will demonstrate that a wireless client has no access to the test network. The evaluator will attempt to authenticate using an invalid RADIUS certificate, such that the EAP-TLS negotiation fails. This should result in the wireless client still being unable to access the test network.

Note: Tests 2 and 3 above are not tests that "EAP-TLS works," although that is a by-product of the test. The test is actually that a failed authentication (under two failure modes) results in denial of access to the network, which demonstrates the enforcement of FIA_8021X_EXT.1.3 .

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [when the user changes their password, [selection: following TSF-initiated session locking, [assignment: other conditions], no other conditions]].

5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/LiFi Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1/LiFi

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [configuration of the security policy for each wireless network, including:

Security type

Client credentials to be used for authentication

[selection: authentication protocol, Service Set Identifier (SSID) if the SSID is broadcasted, no other security policy elements]

].

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

FMT_SMR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls

FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from modifying:

Kernel and its drivers/modules
Security audit logs
Shared libraries
System executables
System configuration files
[assignment: other objects]

FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from reading:

Security audit logs
System-wide credential repositories
[assignment: list of other objects]

Application Note: "Credential repositories" refer, in this case, to structures containing cryptographic keys or passwords.

Evaluation Activities

FPT_ACF_EXT.1

TSS

The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS specifies the locations of kernel drivers/modules, security audit logs, shared libraries, system executables, and system configuration files. Every file does not need to be individually identified, but the system's conventions for storing and protecting such files must be specified.

Guidance

TBD

Tests

The evaluator shall create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator shall ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):

Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall attempt to modify all kernel drivers and modules.
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall attempt to modify all security audit logs generated by the logging subsystem.
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall attempt to modify all shared libraries that are used throughout the system.
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:4: The evaluator shall attempt to modify all system executables.
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:5: The evaluator shall attempt to modify all system configuration files.
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:6: The evaluator shall attempt to modify any additional components selected.

Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:7: The evaluator shall attempt to read security audit logs generated by the auditing subsystem
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:8: The evaluator shall attempt to read system-wide credential repositories
Test FPT_ACF_EXT.1:9: The evaluator shall attempt to read any other object specified in the assignment

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall always randomize process address space memory locations with [selection: 8, [assignment: number greater than 8]] bits of entropy except for [assignment: list of explicit exceptions].

FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection

FPT_SBOP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [selection: employ stack-based buffer overflow protections, not store parameters or variables in the same data structures as control flow values].

Application Note: Many OSes store control flow values (i.e. return addresses) in stack data structures that also contain parameters and variables. For these OSes, it is expected that most of the OS, to include the kernel, libraries, and application software from the OS vendor be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled. OSes that store parameters and variables separately from control flow values do not need additional stack protections.

5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)

FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment

FTA_TSE.1.1

The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment of a wireless client session based on [TOE interface, time, day, [selection: [assignment: other attributes], no other attributes]].

Application Note:

The “TOE interface” can be specified in terms of the device in the TOE that the LiFi client is connecting to (e.g. specific LiFi APs). “Time” and “day” refer to time-of-day and day-of-week, respectively.

The assignment is to be used by the ST author to specify additional attributes on which denial of session establishment can be based.

5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1/8021X Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (802.1X)

FTP_ITC.1.1/8021X

For now this is added as a separate iteration of FTP_ITC.1 just for 802.1X rather than reaching back to the NDcPP as a modified SFR. This will disambiguate the protocols that apply to individual external interfaces but can be moved up to Modified SFRs instead if desired.

The TSF shall provide a communication channel using IEEE 802.1X and [selection: IPsec, RADIUS over TLS] between itself and an 802.1X authentication server that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate the communications protocols and environmental components that a LiFI AS must use for 802.1X. IPsec or RADIUS over TLS (commonly known as "RadSec") is required at least for communications with the 802.1X authentication server. The requirement implies that not only are communications protected when they are initially established, but also on resumption after an outage.

The IT entity of "802.1X authentication server" is distinct from "authentication server" as specified in FTP_ITC.1 in the NDcPP because the latter may be used for administrator authentication rather than authorization of WLAN clients.

If IPsec is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 from the NDcPP must be claimed. If RADIUS over TLS is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed, as well as FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the Functional Package for TLS.

FTP_ITC.1.2/8021X

The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/8021X

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [802.1X authentication].

Evaluation Activities

FTP_ITC.1/8021X

The evaluator will perform the following activities in addition to those required by the NDcPP:

TSS

The evaluator will examine the TSS to determine that, for all communications with authorized IT entities identified in the requirement, each communications mechanism is identified in terms of the allowed protocols for that IT entity. The evaluator will also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS are specified and included in the requirements in the ST.

Guidance

The evaluator will confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the allowed protocols with each authorized IT entity and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be unintentionally broken.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

Test FTP_ITC.1/8021X:1: The evaluator will ensure that communications using each protocol with each authorized IT entity is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful.
Test FTP_ITC.1/8021X:2: For each protocol that the TOE can initiate as defined in the requirement, the evaluator will follow the guidance documentation to ensure that the communication channel can be initiated from the TOE.
Test FTP_ITC.1/8021X:3: The evaluator will ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
Test FTP_ITC.1/8021X:4: The evaluator will, for each protocol associated with each authorized IT entity tested during test 1, physically interrupt an established connection. The evaluator will ensure that when physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected.

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:
Table 3: SFR Rationale
Threat Addressed by Rationale
T.DATA_INTEGRITY
TBD TBD

T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
TBD TBD

T.NETWORK_ACCESS
TBD TBD

T.NETWORK_ATTACK
FPT_ACF_EXT.1

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by enforcing memory protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.

FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by enforcing stack overflow protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.

FPT_W^X_EXT.1 A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by memory write protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.

T.REPLAY_ATTACK
TBD TBD

Table 3: SFR Rationale
Threat	Addressed by	Rationale
T.DATA_INTEGRITY	TBD	TBD
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE	TBD	TBD
T.NETWORK_ACCESS	TBD	TBD
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	FPT_ACF_EXT.1
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1	A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by enforcing memory protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1	A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by enforcing stack overflow protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1	A conformant TOE mitigates the threat of network attack by memory write protections that guard against remote code execution exploits.
T.REPLAY_ATTACK	TBD	TBD

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 4: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (NDcPP base)
PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.DATA_INTEGRITY
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.REPLAY_ATTACK
A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
A.MANAGED_CONFIG
A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
A.PROPER_USER

6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

Table 5: Consistency of OE Objectives (NDcPP base)
PP-Module OE Objective Consistency Rationale
OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
OE.MANAGED_CONFIG
OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
OE.PROPER_USER

Table 5: Consistency of OE Objectives (NDcPP base)
PP-Module OE Objective	Consistency Rationale
OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
OE.MANAGED_CONFIG
OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
OE.PROPER_USER

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the NDcPP that are needed to support LiFi Access System functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the NDcPP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the NDcPP are as follows:

Table 6: Consistency of Requirements (NDcPP base)
PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs
FPT_TST_EXT.1	This PP-Module modifies the Base-PP's definition of the SFR by defining a minimum baseline for what self-tests must be run. Additional self-tests may still be specified by the ST author.
Additional SFRs
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the NDcPP is the base.
Mandatory SFRs
FAU_GEN.1/LiFI
FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
FIA_UAU.6
FMT_SMF.1/LiFi
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
FTA_TSE.1
FTP_ITC.1/8021X
Optional SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Optional requirements.
Objective SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.
Implementation-dependent SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
FTP_ITC.1/Client
FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc
Selection-based SFRs
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

Appendix A - Optional SFRs

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Strictly Optional SFRs or SARs.

A.2 Objective Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

A.3.1 Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs

Table 7: Auditable Events for Implementation-dependent Requirements
Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
No events specified	N/A
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
No events specified	N/A
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
No events specified	N/A
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
No events specified	N/A
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
No events specified	N/A
FTP_ITC.1/Client

	Failed attempts to establish a trusted channel (including IEEE 802.11)	Identification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel data	Identification of the initiator and target of channel
FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc

	Failed attempts to establish a trusted channel	Identification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel data	Identification of the initiator and target of channel

A.3.2 SFRs for 802.11bb Implementations

FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

802.11bb Support

FCS_CKM.1.1/WPA

The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF-384 and [selection: PRF-512, PRF-704, no other algorithm]] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits and [selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, no other key sizes]] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1 that meet the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020 and [selection: IEEE 802.11ax-2021, no other standards]].

Application Note:

The cryptographic key derivation algorithm required by IEEE 802.11-2020 (Section 12.7.1.2) and verified in WPA2 certification is PRF-384, which uses the HMAC-SHA-1 function and outputs 384 bits. The use of GCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11ax-2021 (Section 12.5.5) and requires a Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on HMAC-SHA-256 (for 128-bit symmetric keys) or HMAC-SHA-384 (for 256-bit symmetric keys). This KDF outputs 704 bits.

This requirement applies only to the keys that are generated or derived for the communications between the AP and the client once the client has been authenticated. It refers to the derivation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK), through the Random Bit Generator (RBG) specified in this PP-Module, as well as the derivation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) from the Pairwise Master Key (PMK), which is done using a random value generated by the RBG specified in this PP-Module, the HMAC function as specified in this PP-Module, as well as other information. This is specified in IEEE 802.11-2020, primarily in chapter 12. FCS_RBG.1 is defined in the NDcPP.

Evaluation Activities

FCS_CKM.1/WPA

TSS

The cryptographic primitives will be verified through evaluation activities specified elsewhere in this PP-Module. The evaluator will verify that the TSS describes how the primitives defined and implemented by this PP-Module are used by the TOE in establishing and maintaining secure connectivity to the wireless clients. This description will include how the GTK and PTK are generated or derived. The TSS will also provide a description of the developer’s methods of assuring that their implementation conforms to the cryptographic standards; this includes not only testing done by the developing organization, but also proof of third-party testing that is performed (e.g. WPA2 certification). The evaluator will ensure that the description of the testing methodology is of sufficient detail to determine the extent to which the details of the protocol specifics are tested.

Guidance

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following test using a packet sniffing tool to collect frames between the TOE and a wireless client:

Step 1: The evaluator will configure the AP to an unused channel and configure the packet sniffer to sniff only on that channel (i.e., lock the sniffer on the selected channel). The sniffer should also be configured to filter on the MAC address of the TOE and client.

Step 2: The evaluator will configure the TOE to communicate with a LiFi client using IEEE 802.11-2020 and a 256-bit (64 hex values 0-f) pre-shared key, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance. The pre-shared key is only used for testing.

Step 3: The evaluator will start the sniffing tool, initiate a connection between the TOE and LiFi client, and allow the TOE to authenticate, associate, and successfully complete the four-way handshake with the client.

Step 4: The evaluator will set a timer for one minute, at the end of which the evaluator will disconnect the client from the TOE and stop the sniffer.

Step 5: The evaluator will identify the four-way handshake frames (denoted EAPOL-key in Wireshark captures) and derive the PTK from the four-way handshake frames and pre-shared key as specified in IEEE 802.11-2020.

Step 6: The evaluator will select the first data frame from the captured packets that was sent between the client and TOE after the four-way handshake successfully completed and without the frame control value 0x4208 (the first two bytes are 08 42). The evaluator will use the PTK to decrypt the data portion of the packet as specified in IEEE 802.11-2020 and verify that the decrypted data contains ASCII-readable text.

Step 7: The evaluator will repeat Step 6 for the next two data frames between the TOE and client, and without frame control value 0x4208.

Additionally, the evaluator will test the PRF function using the test vectors from:

Section 2.4 “The PRF Function – PRF (key, prefix, data, length)” of the IEEE 802.11-02/362r6 document "Proposed Test vectors for IEEE 802.11 TGi" dated September 10, 2002
Annex J.3 “PRF reference implementation and test vectors” of IEEE 802.11-2020

FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB Cryptographic Key Distribution (802.11 Keys)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

802.11bb Support

FCS_CKM.2.1/DISTRIB

This is listed as optional in the WLAN AS module but not flagged as such in the LiFi requirements. If it should still be optional, this should be moved.

The TSF shall distribute the IEEE 802.11 keys in accordance with a specified key distribution method: [trusted channel protocol specified in FPT_ITT.1(Base-PP) ] that meets the following: [standards specified in the various iterations of FCS_COP.1] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.

Application Note:

This requirement applies to any key necessary for successful IEEE 802.11 connections not covered by FCS_CKM.2/GTK . In cases where a key must be distributed to other APs, this communication must be performed via a mechanism of commensurate cryptographic strength. Because communications with any component of a distributed TOE are required to be performed over a trusted connection, the transfer of these keys will be protected.

FCS_COP.1 and FPT_ITT.1 are defined in the NDcPP.

FCS_CKM.2/GTK Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

802.11bb Support

FCS_CKM.2.1/GTK

The TSF shall distribute Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [selection: AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame, AES Key Wrap with Padding in an EAPOL-Key frame] that meets the following: [NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE 802.11-2020 for the packet format and timing considerations] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.

Application Note: This requirement applies to the Group Temporal Key (GTK) that is generated by the TOE for use in broadcast and multicast messages to clients to which it is connected. 802.11-2020 specifies the format for the transfer as well as the fact that it must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.

Evaluation Activities

FCS_CKM.2/GTK

TSS

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the GTK is wrapped prior to being distributed using the AES implementation specified in this PP-Module, and also how the GTKs are distributed when multiple clients connect to the TOE.

Guidance

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following test using a packet sniffing tool to collect frames between a wireless client and the TOE (which may be performed in conjunction with the evaluation activity for FCS_CKM.1/PMK.

To fully test the broadcast and multicast functionality, these steps will be performed as the evaluator connects multiple clients to the TOE. The evaluator will ensure that GTKs established are sent to the appropriate participating clients.

Step 1: The evaluator will configure the AP to an unused channel and configure the WLAN sniffer to sniff only on that channel (i.e., lock the sniffer on the selected channel). The sniffer should also be configured to filter on the MAC address of the TOE and client.

Step 2: The evaluator will configure the TOE to communicate with the client using IEEE 802.11-2020 and a 256-bit (64 hex values 0-f) pre-shared key, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance. The pre-shared key is only used for testing.

Step 3: The evaluator will start the sniffing tool, initiate a connection between the TOE and client, and allow the client to authenticate, associate and successfully complete the four-way handshake with the TOE.

Step 4: The evaluator will set a timer for one minute, at the end of which the evaluator will disconnect the TOE from the client and stop the sniffer.

Step 5: The evaluator will identify the four-way handshake frames (denoted EAPOL-key in Wireshark captures) and derive the PTK and GTK from the four-way handshake frames and pre-shared key as specified in IEEE 802.11-2020.

Step 6: The evaluator will select the first data frame from the captured packets that was sent between the TOE and client after the four-way handshake successfully completed, and with the frame control value 0x4208 (the first two bytes are 08 42). The evaluator will use the GTK to decrypt the data portion of the selected packet as specified in IEEE 802.11-2020 and verify that the decrypted data contains ASCII-readable text.

Step 7: The evaluator will repeat Step 6 for the next two data frames with frame control value 0x4208.

The evaluator will also perform the following testing based on the supported GTK distribution methods:

AES Key Wrap (AES-KW Tests)

Test FCS_CKM.2/GTK:1: The evaluator will test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:
- 128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)
- Three plaintext lengths:
  1. One of the plaintext lengths will be two semi-blocks (128 bits).
  2. One of the plaintext lengths will be three semi-blocks (192 bits).
  3. The third data unit length will be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).
For each combination, generate a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the same key and plaintext values and encrypt them using a known good implementation of AES-KW authenticated-encryption, and ensure that the resulting respective ciphertext values are identical.
Test FCS_CKM.2/GTK:2: The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption. Additionally, the evaluator will modify one byte of the ciphertext, attempt to decrypt the modified ciphertext, and ensure that a failure is returned rather than plaintext.

AES Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP Tests)

Test FCS_CKM.2/GTK:3:
The evaluator will test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)

Three plaintext lengths. One plaintext length will be one octet. One plaintext length will be 20 octets (160 bits). One plaintext length will be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096 bits).

using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KWP authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the AES-KWP authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.
Test FCS_CKM.2/GTK:4: The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption. Additionally, the evaluator will modify one byte of the ciphertext, attempt to decrypt the modified ciphertext, and ensure that a failure is returned rather than plaintext.

FCS_CKM.2/PMK Cryptographic Key Distribution (PMK)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

802.11bb Support

FCS_CKM.2.1/PMK

The TSF shall receive the 802.11 Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [from 802.1X Authorization Server] that meets the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.

Application Note: This requirement applies to the Pairwise Master Key that is received from the RADIUS server by the TOE. The intent of this requirement is to ensure conformant TOEs implement 802.1X authentication prior to establishing secure communications with the client. The intent is that any LiFi AS product evaluated against this PP-Module will support both WPA2-Enterprise and WPA3-Enterprise at a minimum and certificate-based authentication mechanisms and therefore disallows implementations that support only pre-shared keys. Because communications with the RADIUS server are required to be performed over a protected connection, the transfer of the PMK will be protected.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

This component must be included in the ST if any of the following SFRs are included:

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for [selection: RADIUS over TLS (RadSec), IPsec, WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, IEEE 802.11 WPA2-PSK, [assignment: other protocols that use pre-shared keys]].

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:

are 22 characters and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
are composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

Application Note:

This requirement must be included if IPsec or another protocol that uses pre-shared keys is claimed, and pre-shared key authentication is selected (e.g., "Pre-shared Keys" is selected in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 or "pre-shared keys" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2). The intent of this requirement is that all protocols will support both text-based and bit-based pre-shared keys.

For the length of the text-based pre-shared keys, a common length (22 characters) is required to help promote interoperability. If other lengths are supported, they should be listed in the assignment; this assignment can also specify a range of values (e.g., "lengths from 5 to 55 characters") as well.

For FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3, the ST author specifies whether the TSF merely accepts bit-based pre-shared keys or is capable of generating them. If it generates them, the requirement specifies that they must be generated using the RBG provided by the TOE.

Evaluation Activities

FIA_PSK_EXT.1

TSS

The evaluator will verify that the TSS describes

the protocols that can use pre-shared keys and that these are consistent with the selections made in FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 .
the allowable values for pre-shared keys and that they are consistent with the selections made in FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 .
the way bit-based pre-shared keys are procured and that it is consistent with the selections made in FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 .

Guidance

The evaluator will examine the operational guidance to determine that it provides guidance to administrators on the composition of strong text-based pre-shared keys, and (if the selection indicates keys of various lengths can be entered) that it provides information on the range of lengths supported. The guidance must specify the allowable characters for pre-shared keys, and that list must be a superset of the list contained in FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 .

The evaluator will confirm the operational guidance contains instructions for either entering bit-based pre-shared keys for each protocol identified in the requirement or for generating a bit-based pre-shared key (or both).

Tests

The evaluator will also perform the following tests for each protocol (or instantiation of a protocol, if performed by a different implementation on the TOE). Note that one or more of these tests can be performed with a single test case.

Test FIA_PSK_EXT.1:1: The evaluator will compose a pre-shared key of 22 characters that contains a combination of the allowed characters in accordance with the operational guidance and demonstrates that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.
Test FIA_PSK_EXT.1:2: [conditional]: If the TOE supports pre-shared keys of multiple lengths, the evaluator will repeat Test 1 using the minimum length; the maximum length; a length inside the allowable range; and invalid lengths beyond the supported range (both higher and lower). The minimum, maximum, and included length tests should be successful, and the invalid lengths must be rejected by the TOE.
Test FIA_PSK_EXT.1:3: [conditional]: If the TOE does not generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator will obtain a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and enter it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator will then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.
Test FIA_PSK_EXT.1:4: [conditional]: If the TOE does generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator will generate a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and use it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator will then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

FTP_ITC.1/Client Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (LiFi 802.11 Client Access)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

802.11bb Support

FTP_ITC.1.1/Client

Do we need something similar for G.vlc? There was no equivalent to this in the Word doc requirements. Just checking as to whether anything is missing.

The TSF shall provide a communication channel using WPA3-Enterprise, WPA2-Enterprise, and [selection: WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, WPA2-PSK, no other mode] as defined by IEEE 802.11-2020 to provide a trusted channel between itself and LiFi clients that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate support for 802.11 specifically for LiFi client access.

FTP_ITC.1.2/Client

The TSF shall permit [LiFi clients] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/Client

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [no services].

A.3.3 SFRs for G.vlc Implementations

FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:

G.vlc Support

FTP_ITC.1.1/Gvlc

The TSF shall provide a communication channel for G.vlc using MACsec to provide a trusted channel between itself and a MACsec peer that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate support for MACsec.

FTP_ITC.1.2/Gvlc

The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, a MACsec peer] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/Gvlc

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [communications with MACsec peers that require the use of MACsec].

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-based SFRs

Table 8: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements
Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
No events specified	N/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
No events specified	N/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3
No events specified	N/A

B.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FTP_ITC.1.1/8021X .

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [selection: X.509v3 certificates, pre-shared keys].

Application Note:

This SFR is applicable if "RADIUS over TLS" is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1.

If X.509v3 certificates is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the Functional Package for TLS must be claimed and "mutual authentication" must be selected. If pre-shared keys is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 and FIA_PSK_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2 .

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1

Updated to remove 128-bit ciphers and TLS 1.1. Does TLS 1.3 need to be selectable here and do the ciphers need to change further?

The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 and no earlier TLS versions when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client that supports the following ciphersuites: [selection:

TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Application Note:

If any of the TLS_RSA_PSK ciphersuites are selected by the ST author, it is necessary to claim the selection-based requirement FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 .

The above ciphersuites are only for use when the TSF is acting as a RADIUS over TLS client, not for other uses of the TLS protocol. The ciphersuites to be tested in the evaluated configuration are limited by this requirement. The ST author should select the ciphersuites that are supported. If "X.509v3 certificates" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, the ciphersuites selected in (and tested by) FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 in the Functional Package for TLS are also supported for RADIUS over TLS client use.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

Evaluation Activities

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

TSS

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites supported are specified. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites specified are identical to those listed for this component. The evaluator will also verify that the TSS contains a description of the denial of old SSL and TLS versions.

The evaluator will examine the TSS to ensure it describes the process by which the bit-based pre-shared keys are generated (if the TOE supports this functionality) and confirm that this process uses the RBG specified in FCS_RBG.1.

Guidance

The evaluator will verify that any configuration necessary to meet the requirement must be contained in the guidance.

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that RADIUS over TLS conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of ciphersuites advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

The evaluator will confirm the operational guidance contains instructions for either entering bit-based pre-shared keys or generating a bit-based pre-shared key (or both).

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:1: The evaluator will establish a RADIUS over TLS connection using each of the ciphersuites selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1 . It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of a cipher suite to satisfy the intent of the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic in an attempt to discern the cipher suite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128-bit AES and not 256-bit AES).
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:2: The evaluator will set the pre-shared key to a value that does not match the server's pre-shared key and demonstrate that the TOE cannot successfully complete a protocol negotiation using this key.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:3: The evaluator will configure the server to select the TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL cipher suite and verify that the client denies the connection.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:4: The evaluator will perform the following modifications to the traffic:
- Change the TLS version selected by the server in the Server Hello to a non-supported TLS version (for example, 1.3, represented by the two bytes 03 04) and verify that the client rejects the connection.
- Modify at least one byte in the server’s nonce in the Server Hello handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the Server Key Exchange handshake message (if using a DHE cipher suite) or that the server denies the client’s Finished handshake message.
- Modify the server’s selected cipher suite in the Server Hello handshake message to be a cipher suite not presented in the Client Hello handshake message. The evaluator will verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Hello.
- Modify a byte in the Server Finished handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the connection and does not send any application data.
- Send a garbled message from the server after the server has issued the ChangeCipherSpec message and verify that the client denies the connection.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:5: [conditional] If the TOE does not generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator will obtain a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and enter it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator will then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2:6: [conditional] If the TOE does generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator will generate a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and use it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator will then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1 .

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.1

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.

Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1 .

The rules for verification of identity are described in Section 6 of RFC 6125. The reference identifier is typically established by configuration (e.g. configuring the name of the authentication server). Based on a singular reference identifier’s source domain and application service type (e.g. HTTP, SIP, LDAP), the client establishes all reference identifiers which are acceptable, such as a Common Name for the Subject Name field of the certificate and a (case-insensitive) DNS name for the Subject Alternative Name field. The client then compares this list of all acceptable reference identifiers to the presented identifiers in the TLS server’s certificate.

The preferred method for verification is the Subject Alternative Name using DNS names, URI names, or Service Names. Verification using the Common Name is required for the purposes of backwards compatibility. Additionally, support for use of IP addresses in the Subject Name or Subject Alternative name is discouraged as against best practices but may be implemented. Finally, support for wildcards is discouraged but may be implemented. If the client supports wildcards, the client must follow the best practices regarding matching; these best practices are captured in the evaluation activity.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.2

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall [selection: not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]] if the presented server certificate is deemed invalid.

Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1 .

Validity is determined by the identifier verification, certificate path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280. Certificate validity is tested in accordance with testing performed for FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev in the NDcPP.

Evaluation Activities

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

TSS

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes the client’s method of establishing all reference identifiers from the administrator and application-configured reference identifier, including which types of reference identifiers are supported (e.g., Common Name, DNS Name, URI Name, Service Name, or other application-specific Subject Alternative Names) and whether IP addresses and wildcards are supported. The evaluator will ensure that this description identifies whether and the manner in which certificate pinning is supported or used by the TOE.

Guidance

The evaluator will verify that the operational guidance includes instructions for setting the reference identifier to be used for the purposes of certificate validation in TLS.

Tests

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:1: The evaluator will attempt to establish the connection using a server with a server certificate that contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and verify that a connection is established. The evaluator will then verify that the client rejects an otherwise valid server certificate that lacks the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and a connection is not established. Ideally, the two certificates should be identical except for the extendedKeyUsage field.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:2: The evaluator will present a server certificate that does not contain an identifier in either the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or Common Name (CN) that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator will verify that the connection fails.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:3: The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier, contains the SAN extension, but does not contain an identifier in the SAN that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator will verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will repeat this test for each supported SAN type.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:4: The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that does not match the reference identifier but does contain an identifier in the SAN that matches. The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:5: [conditional] If the TOE does not mandate the presence of the SAN extension, the evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds. If the TOE does mandate the presence of the SAN extension, this test will be omitted.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:6: [conditional] If wildcards are supported by the TOE, the evaluator will perform the following tests:
- The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard that is not in the left-most label of the presented identifier (e.g. foo.*.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.
- The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label but not preceding the public suffix (e.g. *.example.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.example.com). The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier without a left-most label as in the certificate (e.g. example.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.
- The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label immediately preceding the public suffix (e.g. *.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.com) and verify that the connection fails.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:7: [conditional] If wildcards are not supported by the TOE, the evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard and verify that the connection fails.
Test FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3:8: [conditional] If URI or Service name reference identifiers are supported, the evaluator will configure the DNS name and the service identifier. The evaluator will present a server certificate containing the correct DNS name and service identifier in the URIName or SRVName fields of the SAN and verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will repeat this test with the wrong service identifier (but correct DNS name) and verify that the connection fails.

Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

**Table 9: Extended Component Definitions**
Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

C.2 Extended Component Definitions

C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.1.1 FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of the RadSec (RADIUS over TLS) protocol.

Component Leveling

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1, RadSec, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using a specified peer authentication method.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using pre-shared key authentication in a manner that conforms to relevant TLS specifications.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA, requires the TSF to validate the external entity used for trusted communications.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [assignment: some authentication method].

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall implement [assignment: list of allowed TLS versions] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation shall support the following ciphersuites for use when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client: [assignment: list of supported ciphersuites].

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.1

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.2

C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.2.1 FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of 802.1X port-based network access control.

Component Leveling

FIA_8021X_EXT.1, 802.1X Authentication, requires the TSF to securely implement IEEE 802.1X as an authenticator.

Management: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the ST:

Attempts to access the 802.1X controlled port prior to successful completion of the authentication exchange

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	No dependencies

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865, 2866, and 3579.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.

C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.3.1 FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization

Family Behavior

This family defines the ability of the TOE to implement address space layout randomization (ASLR). This is a new family defined for the FPT class.

Component Leveling

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1, Address Space Layout Randomization, defines the ability of the TOE to use ASLR as well as the objects that ASLR is applied to.

Management: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1

There are no management functions foreseen.

Audit: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	No dependencies.

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1

C.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.4.1 FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe architectural restrictions on security administration that are not defined in CC Part 2.

Component Leveling

FMT_SMR_EXT.1, No Administration from Client, requires the TSF to reject remote administration from a wireless client by default.

Management: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies to:	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

Appendix D - Acronyms

Table 10: Acronyms
Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
API	Application Programming Interface
app	Application
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CESG	Communications-Electronics Security Group
CMC	Certificate Management over CMS
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
CN	Common Names
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSA	Computer Security Act
CSP	Critical Security Parameters
DAR	Data At Rest
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS	Domain Name System
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DT	Date/Time Vector
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EP	Extended Package
EST	Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FP	Functional Package
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE	Operational Environment
OID	Object Identifier
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RFC	Request for Comment
RNG	Random Number Generator
RNGVS	Random Number Generator Validation System
S/MIME	Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
ST	Security Target
SWID	Software Identification
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus
XCCDF	eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XOR	Exclusive Or

Appendix E - Bibliography

Table 11: Bibliography
Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2022-11-001, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022. Part 2: Security functional requirements, CCMB-2022-11-002, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022. Part 3: Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2022-11-003, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022. Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, CCMB-2022-11-004, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022. Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements, CCMB-2022-11-005, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation methodology, CCMB-2022-11-006, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.

PP-Module for LiFi Access Systems

Revision History

Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

1.2 Terms

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

1.2.2 Technical Terms

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

1.4 Use-Cases

1.5 Implementation-Based Features

1.5.1 802.11bb Support

1.5.2 G.vlc Support

2 Conformance Claims

3 Security Problem Definition

3.1 Threats

3.2 Assumptions

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

5 Security Requirements

5.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

5.1.1.1 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1/LiFI Audit Data Generation (LiFi)

5.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (Data Encryption and Decryption for LiFi

5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Authentication

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/LiFi Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection

5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)

FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment

5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1/8021X Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (802.1X)

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

Appendix A - Optional SFRs

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

A.2 Objective Requirements

A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

A.3.1 Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs

A.3.2 SFRs for 802.11bb Implementations

FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)

FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB Cryptographic Key Distribution (802.11 Keys)

FCS_CKM.2/GTK Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK)

FCS_CKM.2/PMK Cryptographic Key Distribution (PMK)

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

FTP_ITC.1/Client Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (LiFi 802.11 Client Access)

A.3.3 SFRs for G.vlc Implementations

FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec)

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-based SFRs

B.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

C.1 Extended Components Table

C.2 Extended Component Definitions

C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

C.2.1.1 FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec

Family Behavior