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PP-Module for LiFi Access Systems

NIAP Logo
Version: 0.1
2025-02-28
National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

VersionDateComment
0.12025-02-28Initial XML conversion

TDs Applied

Contents

1Introduction1.1Overview1.2Terms1.2.1Common Criteria Terms1.2.2Technical Terms1.3Compliant Targets of Evaluation1.3.1TOE Boundary1.4Use-Cases1.5Implementation-Based Features1.5.1802.11bb Support1.5.2G.vlc Support2Conformance Claims3Security Problem Definition3.1Threats3.2Assumptions3.3Organizational Security Policies4Security Objectives4.1Security Objectives for the Operational Environment4.2Security Objectives Rationale5Security Requirements5.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction 5.1.1 Modified SFRs 5.1.1.1Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.2TOE Security Functional Requirements5.2.1Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs5.2.2Security Audit (FAU)5.2.3Cryptographic Support (FCS)5.2.4Identification and Authentication (FIA)5.2.5Security Management (FMT)5.2.6Protection of the TSF (FPT)5.2.7TOE Access (FTA)5.2.8Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)5.3TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale6Consistency Rationale6.1Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition 6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements Appendix A - Optional SFRsA.1Strictly Optional Requirements A.2Objective Requirements A.3Implementation-dependent Requirements A.3.1Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRsA.3.2SFRs for 802.11bb ImplementationsA.3.3SFRs for G.vlc ImplementationsAppendix B - Selection-based Requirements B.1Auditable Events for Selection-based SFRsB.2Cryptographic Support (FCS)Appendix C - Extended Component DefinitionsC.1Extended Components TableC.2Extended Component DefinitionsC.2.1Cryptographic Support (FCS)C.2.1.1FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSecC.2.2Identification and Authentication (FIA)C.2.2.1FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) AuthenticationC.2.3Protection of the TSF (FPT)C.2.3.1FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout RandomizationC.2.4Security Management (FMT)C.2.4.1FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management RestrictionsAppendix D - AcronymsAppendix E - Bibliography

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The scope of the LiFi Access System PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of a LiFi access system product in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

A conformant TOE will claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the Base-PP identified above, this PP-Module, and any of the PP-Modules or packages identified in Section 2.

This Base-PP is valid because a LiFi Access System is a specific function for a purpose-built network device.

Tech terms section below is placeholder/template, will need to be updated later for terms specific to this module

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance
Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)
Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)
A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
 Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE
A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)
A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)
A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)
Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)
A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)
An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)
A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

1.2.2 Technical Terms

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
 An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.
Administrator
 An individual, user, or group that is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
Application (app)
 Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
Application Programming Interface (API)
 A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Credential
 Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
 Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
DAR Protection
 Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
 An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer
 An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System
 A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall
 A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
Operating System (OS)
 Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
 Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual.
Sensitive Data
 Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
User
 An entity operating the TOE that is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
peer
An IT entity that is external to the TOE that interfaces with the TOE via an over-the-air connection for the purpose of accessing the network on which the TOE exists as a boundary device.

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

This PP-Module specifically addresses LiFi (IEEE 802.11bb, ITU G.9991) access systems (AS). A compliant LiFi AS is a system composed of hardware and software that is connected to a network and has an infrastructure role in the overall enterprise network. In particular, a LiFi AS establishes a secure wireless (IEEE 802.11, IEEE802.1x, IEEE 802.1AE) link that provides an authenticated and encrypted path to an enterprise network and thereby decreases the risk of exposure of information transiting “over-the-air”.

Since this PP-Module extends the NDcPP, conformant TOEs are obligated to implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in response to the threat environment discussed subsequently herein.

The TOE encompasses the OS kernel drivers, shared software libraries, and some application software included with the OS. The applications considered within the TOE are those that provide essential LiFi services that make up the LiFi link and security. Examples are management services that implement configuration functions specified in this PP-Module, host services that manage client authentication to the access point, and the libraries and modules that provide security implementation of the LiFi link. This applies to each separate TOE component that are being used to meet the security requirements proposed.

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The physical boundary for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module is one or more physical network appliances (in a standalone or distributed configuration) that provides generalized network device functionality such as auditing, identification and authentication, and cryptographic services for network communications, as well as specialized functionality for facilitating remote network access via LiFi communications. The TOE's logical boundary includes all functionality required by the claimed Base-PP, this PP-Module, and any other PP-Modules which may be claimed by the ST author as a part of a PP-Configuration that includes this PP-Module. Product functionality for which no PP-Module exists, or for which no SFR within a relevant PP-Module exists to capture, are considered to be non-interfering with respect to the TSF. In other words, they may be present or enabled in the evaluated configuration of the TOE but their presence must not degrade or interrupt the enforcement of functions within the TOE's logical boundary.

Note that while the Base-PP permits the TOE either to be a physical or virtual network appliance, LiFi devices require the use of specialized hardware that will not be present on commodity servers, and it is therefore expected that any TOE that conforms to this PP-Module will be one or more dedicated physical devices.


Figure 1: High Level TOE Implementation

1.4 Use-Cases

[USE CASE 1] Standalone Device
The TOE is a standalone network device that serves as a single network endpoint that provides connectivity to LiFi clients.
[USE CASE 2] Distributed System
The TOE is a distributed system consisting of multiple network devices that collectively serve as the LiFi network endpoint. In addition to claiming the relevant "Distributed TOE" requirement in the NDcPP, this use case also requires the TOE to claim the optional SFR FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB to describe the key distribution method between distributed TOE components.

1.5 Implementation-Based Features

A conformant TOE may implement either 802.11bb or G.vlc. Depending on which is supported, different requirements will apply to the TOE as they each implement different methods of protection of data in transit.

1.5.1 802.11bb Support

The TOE implements LiFi using IEEE 802.11bb. Data in transit is protected using either IPsec or RadSec (RADIUS over TLS).

If this feature is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be claimed in the ST:

1.5.2 G.vlc Support

The TSF implements LiFi using ITU-T G.9991 (aka G.vlc). Data in transit is protected using MACsec. When the TOE implements this feature, it must also claim conformance to the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption.

If this feature is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be claimed in the ST:

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.
CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.
PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:
Package Claim

The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SFRs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSF and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made.

3 Security Problem Definition

This PP-Module is written to address the situation where a distributed network device facilitates end user access to a network via LiFi. The threats are similar to those that are typical of network devices as a whole, but may be exploited differently because of the mechanisms that are unique to this particular type of product.

3.1 Threats

T.DATA_INTEGRITY
Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to modify the data without authorization. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to conduct unauthorized activities. If malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network, or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices (e.g., as a result of nonexistent or insufficient data encryption that exposes the data in transit to rogue elements), then those internal devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
Devices located outside the protected network may seek to exercise services located on the protected network that are intended to be only accessed from inside the protected network or only accessed by entities using an authenticated pat into the protected network.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the TOE with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.
T.REPLAY_ATTACK
If an unauthorized individual successfully gains access to the system, the adversary may have the opportunity to conduct a "replay" attack. This method of attack allows the individual to capture packets trans versing throughout the wireless network and send the packets later, possibly unknown by the intended receiver.

3.2 Assumptions

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (OE) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an OE that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.
A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
The product implements some security-relevant functionality that does not require evaluation (e.g., network time synchronization, process scheduling, and virtual memory management including process separation).
A.MANAGED_CONFIG
Depending on configuration and capability, the product may or may not be configuration-managed by the enterprise or bound to directory services to support multi-user login.
A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
The product runs application software developed by a third party. The applications are not intentionally developed to be malicious, but can contain inadvertent coding errors. These errors introduce risk that control of an application may be seized by a malicious entity. The product shall confine these applications within the originally designated operating environment.
A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
The platform is connected to a network. For purposes of sending/receiving data, to include software updates, the platform is connected to other entities. Other entities on the network are not inherently trustable.
A.PROPER_USER
Users are not malicious in nature, though they may inadvertently or intentionally engage in risky behavior.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The OE of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). The security objectives for the OE consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the OE should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment.
OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
The product has functionality outside of its logical security boundary to satisfy organizational requirements that are unrelated to what this PP-Module defines.
OE.MANAGED_CONFIG
The product is compatible with enterprise architecture that allows for managed configuration, subject authorization via directory services, or both.
OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
The operational environment permits the use of third-party software on organization-owned hardware to enforce necessary functions.
OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
The operational environment facilitates the use of network connectivity by authorized subjects.
OE.PROPER_USER
Users of the system are adequately vetted to ensure that they are non-malicious.

4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions and organizational security policies map to operational environment security objectives.
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale
Assumption or OSPSecurity ObjectivesRationale
A.NON_​SECURITY_​FUNCTIONSOE.NON_​SECURITY_​FUNCTIONSThe operational environment objective OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS is realized through A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS.
A.MANAGED_​CONFIGOE.MANAGED_​CONFIGThe operational environment objective OE.MANAGED_CONFIG is realized through A.MANAGED_CONFIG.
A.THIRD_​PARTY_​SOFTWAREOE.THIRD_​PARTY_​SOFTWAREThe operational environment objective OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE is realized through A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE.
A.NETWORK_​CONNECTIVITYOE.NETWORK_​CONNECTIVITYThe operational environment objective OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY is realized through A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY.
A.PROPER_​USEROE.PROPER_​USERThe operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

5.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the network device as a whole and evaluated against the Base-PP. In this case, the following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the Base-PP in addition to what is mandated by section 5.2.

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the NDcPP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

5.1.1.1 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

NOTE: for CC:2022 Part 2 conformance this SFR may be replaced in the next NDcPP release with FPT_TST.1. If so, then corresponding changes will need to be made here as well. This SFR is functionally identical to what is defined in the NDcPP except that the specific self-test of verifying the integrity of TSF executable code has been mandated as a minimum baseline for the requirement. Other self-tests may still be claimed at the ST author's discretion.

The text of the requirement is replaced with:

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) and [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur], in no other circumstances] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: integrity verification of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen, [selection: [assignment: list of additional self-tests run by the TSF], no other self-tests].

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

Table 2: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1/LiFI
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption
No events specifiedN/A
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
NoneProvided client identity (e.g., MAC address).
FIA_UAU.6
NoneOrigin of the attempt (e.g., IP address)
FMT_SMF.1/LiFi
No events specifiedN/A
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
Unauthorized attempts to perform operations against protected data No additional information
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FTA_TSE.1
Denial of a session establishment due to the session establishment mechanism
  • Reason for denial
  • Origin of establishment attempt
FTP_ITC.1/8021X
Failed attempts to establish a trusted channel (including IEEE 802.11)Identification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel dataIdentification of the initiator and target of channel

5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1/LiFI Audit Data Generation (LiFi)

For the sake of simplicity this has been defined as one single iteration rather than being split as in the proposed SFRs because of the amount of overlap between them. I think it is reasonable to say "whatever gets claimed gets audited" in one requirement.
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
  1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
  2. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
  3. [[auditable events defined in Table atref-mandatory, auditable events defined in Table t-audit-sel-based, auditable events defined in Table t-audit-impl-dep].
  4. Failure of wireless sensor communication]
Application Note:

A TOE that conforms to a Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) containing this PP-Module either can be a standalone or distributed TOE as defined in the NDcPP. For distributed TOEs, the expectation for this PP-Module is that a LiFi AS is composed of a single controller and one or more access points (APs). If the TOE is a distributed system across multiple components then they must be capable of sending audit data to the controller. If the TOE is a standalone system, audit data should be stored on the component that generates it.

The auditable events defined in Table t-audit-mandatory, Table t-audit-sel-based, and Table t-audit-impl-dep are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module and are intended to extend FAU_GEN.1 in the Base-PP. The events in the Auditable Events table should be combined with those of the NDcPP in the context of a conforming Security Target. This table includes rows for all SFRs in the PP-Module. For any SFRs the ST claims, the corresponding audit events must also be claimed in the table. If the ST does not claim a particular SFR, then there is likewise no expectation that the auditable events for that SFR are required.

Per FAU_STG_EXT.1 in the Base-PP, the TOE must support transfer of the audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel.

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
  1. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
  2. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [additional information defined in Table atref-mandatory table for each auditable event, where applicable].

5.2.3 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (Data Encryption and Decryption for LiFi

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-GCMP and [[selection: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), CCMP, Counter (encryption mode) (CTR), Galois-Counter Mode (GCM), no other]] modes and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772, GCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38D and IEEE 802.11ax-2021 [selection: CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CCMP as specified in NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2020, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, no other standards].
Application Note: Application Note: This requirement is iterated from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating the selection of CBC mode and 256 bit key sizes while also defining additional AES mode and key size selections not present in the original definition. This requirement mandates AES-GCMP (which uses AES in Galois-Counter Mode (GCM) to comply with IEEE 802.11-2020. For the first selection of FCS_COP.1.1/LiFiDataEncryption, the ST author should choose the additional mode or modes in which AES operates. For the second selection, the ST author should choose the key sizes that are supported by this functionality. 256-bit GCMP is required in order to comply with FCS_CKM.1/WPA. AES-CCMP, if claimed, is required to use 256-bit keys for IEEE 802.11ax-2021 connections. CTR mode is not used for LiFi AS capabilities but remains selectable since it may be required by another part of the TSF.

5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Authentication

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.
The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865 and 3579.
The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.
Application Note:

This requirement covers the TOE's role as the authenticator in an 802.1X authentication exchange. If the exchange is completed successfully, the TOE will obtain the PMK from the RADIUS server and perform the four-way handshake with the wireless client (supplicant) to begin 802.11 communications. As indicated previously, there are at least three communication paths present during the exchange; two with the TOE as an endpoint and one with the TOE acting as a transfer point only. The TOE establishes an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over Local Area Network (EAPOL) connection with the wireless client as specified in 802.1X-2007. The TOE also establishes (or has established) a RADIUS protocol connection protected either by IPsec or RadSec (TLS) with the RADIUS server. The wireless client and RADIUS server establish an EAP-TLS session (RFC 5216); in this transaction the TOE merely takes the EAP-TLS packets from its EAPOL/RADIUS endpoint and transfers them to the other endpoint. Because the specific authentication method (TLS in this case) is opaque to the TOE, there are no requirements with respect to RFC 5126 in this PP-Module. However, the base RADIUS protocol (2865) has an update (3579) that will need to be addressed in the implementation and evaluation activities.

Additionally, RFC 5080 contains implementation issues that will need to be addressed by developers but which levy no new requirements. The point of performing 802.1X authentication is to provide access to the network (assuming the authentication was successful and that all 802.11 negotiations are performed successfully); in the terminology of 802.1X, this means the wireless client has access to the "controlled port" maintained by the TOE.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [when the user changes their password, [selection: following TSF-initiated session locking, [assignment: other conditions], no other conditions]].

5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/LiFi Specification of Management Functions

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [configuration of the security policy for each wireless network, including:
  • Security type
  • Client credentials to be used for authentication
  • [selection: authentication protocol, Service Set Identifier (SSID) if the SSID is broadcasted, no other security policy elements]
].

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls

The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from modifying:
  • Kernel and its drivers/modules
  • Security audit logs
  • Shared libraries
  • System executables
  • System configuration files
  • [assignment: other objects]
.
The TSF shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from reading:
  • Security audit logs
  • System-wide credential repositories
  • [assignment: list of other objects]
.
Application Note: "Credential repositories" refer, in this case, to structures containing cryptographic keys or passwords.

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

The TSF shall always randomize process address space memory locations with [selection: 8, [assignment: number greater than 8]] bits of entropy except for [assignment: list of explicit exceptions].

FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection

The TSF shall [selection: employ stack-based buffer overflow protections, not store parameters or variables in the same data structures as control flow values].
Application Note: Many OSes store control flow values (i.e. return addresses) in stack data structures that also contain parameters and variables. For these OSes, it is expected that most of the OS, to include the kernel, libraries, and application software from the OS vendor be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled. OSes that store parameters and variables separately from control flow values do not need additional stack protections.

5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)

FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment

The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment of a wireless client session based on [TOE interface, time, day, [selection: [assignment: other attributes], no other attributes]].
Application Note:

The “TOE interface” can be specified in terms of the device in the TOE that the LiFi client is connecting to (e.g. specific LiFi APs). “Time” and “day” refer to time-of-day and day-of-week, respectively.

The assignment is to be used by the ST author to specify additional attributes on which denial of session establishment can be based.

5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1/8021X Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (802.1X)

For now this is added as a separate iteration of FTP_ITC.1 just for 802.1X rather than reaching back to the NDcPP as a modified SFR. This will disambiguate the protocols that apply to individual external interfaces but can be moved up to Modified SFRs instead if desired.

The TSF shall provide a communication channel using IEEE 802.1X and [selection: IPsec, RADIUS over TLS] between itself and an 802.1X authentication server that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate the communications protocols and environmental components that a LiFI AS must use for 802.1X. IPsec or RADIUS over TLS (commonly known as "RadSec") is required at least for communications with the 802.1X authentication server. The requirement implies that not only are communications protected when they are initially established, but also on resumption after an outage.

The IT entity of "802.1X authentication server" is distinct from "authentication server" as specified in FTP_ITC.1 in the NDcPP because the latter may be used for administrator authentication rather than authorization of WLAN clients.

If IPsec is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 from the NDcPP must be claimed. If RADIUS over TLS is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed, as well as FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the Functional Package for TLS.

The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [802.1X authentication].

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:
Table 3: SFR Rationale
ThreatAddressed byRationale
T.DATA_​INTEGRITY
TBDTBD
T.NETWORK_​DISCLOSURE
TBDTBD
T.NETWORK_​ACCESS
TBDTBD
T.NETWORK_​ATTACK
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
FPT_W^X_EXT.1
T.REPLAY_​ATTACK
TBDTBD

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 4: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (NDcPP base)
PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSPConsistency Rationale
T.DATA_INTEGRITY
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.REPLAY_ATTACK
A.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
A.MANAGED_CONFIG
A.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
A.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
A.PROPER_USER

6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

Table 5: Consistency of OE Objectives (NDcPP base)
PP-Module OE ObjectiveConsistency Rationale
OE.NON_SECURITY_FUNCTIONS
OE.MANAGED_CONFIG
OE.THIRD_PARTY_SOFTWARE
OE.NETWORK_CONNECTIVITY
OE.PROPER_USER

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the NDcPP that are needed to support LiFi Access System functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the NDcPP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the NDcPP are as follows:
Table 6: Consistency of Requirements (NDcPP base)
PP-Module RequirementConsistency Rationale
Modified SFRs
FPT_TST_EXT.1This PP-Module modifies the Base-PP's definition of the SFR by defining a minimum baseline for what self-tests must be run. Additional self-tests may still be specified by the ST author.
Additional SFRs
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the NDcPP is the base.
Mandatory SFRs
FAU_GEN.1/LiFI
FCS_COP.1/LiFiDataEncryption
FIA_8021X_EXT.1
FIA_UAU.6
FMT_SMF.1/LiFi
FMT_SMR_EXT.1
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
FTA_TSE.1
FTP_ITC.1/8021X
Optional SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Optional requirements.
Objective SFRs
This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.
Implementation-dependent SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
FTP_ITC.1/Client
FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc
Selection-based SFRs
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

Appendix A - Optional SFRs

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Strictly Optional SFRs or SARs.

A.2 Objective Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

A.3.1 Auditable Events for Implementation-Dependent SFRs

Table 7: Auditable Events for Implementation-dependent Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FCS_CKM.1/WPA
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.2/GTK
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_CKM.2/PMK
No events specifiedN/A
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FTP_ITC.1/Client
Failed attempts to establish a trusted channel (including IEEE 802.11)Identification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel dataIdentification of the initiator and target of channel
FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc
Failed attempts to establish a trusted channelIdentification of the initiator and target of channel
Detection of modification of channel dataIdentification of the initiator and target of channel

A.3.2 SFRs for 802.11bb Implementations

FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF-384 and [selection: PRF-512, PRF-704, no other algorithm]] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits and [selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, no other key sizes]] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1 that meet the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020 and [selection: IEEE 802.11ax-2021, no other standards]].
Application Note:

The cryptographic key derivation algorithm required by IEEE 802.11-2020 (Section 12.7.1.2) and verified in WPA2 certification is PRF-384, which uses the HMAC-SHA-1 function and outputs 384 bits. The use of GCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11ax-2021 (Section 12.5.5) and requires a Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on HMAC-SHA-256 (for 128-bit symmetric keys) or HMAC-SHA-384 (for 256-bit symmetric keys). This KDF outputs 704 bits.

This requirement applies only to the keys that are generated or derived for the communications between the AP and the client once the client has been authenticated. It refers to the derivation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK), through the Random Bit Generator (RBG) specified in this PP-Module, as well as the derivation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) from the Pairwise Master Key (PMK), which is done using a random value generated by the RBG specified in this PP-Module, the HMAC function as specified in this PP-Module, as well as other information. This is specified in IEEE 802.11-2020, primarily in chapter 12. FCS_RBG.1 is defined in the NDcPP.

FCS_CKM.2/DISTRIB Cryptographic Key Distribution (802.11 Keys)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
This is listed as optional in the WLAN AS module but not flagged as such in the LiFi requirements. If it should still be optional, this should be moved.

The TSF shall distribute the IEEE 802.11 keys in accordance with a specified key distribution method: [trusted channel protocol specified in FPT_ITT.1(Base-PP) ] that meets the following: [standards specified in the various iterations of FCS_COP.1] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note:

This requirement applies to any key necessary for successful IEEE 802.11 connections not covered by FCS_CKM.2/GTK. In cases where a key must be distributed to other APs, this communication must be performed via a mechanism of commensurate cryptographic strength. Because communications with any component of a distributed TOE are required to be performed over a trusted connection, the transfer of these keys will be protected.

FCS_COP.1 and FPT_ITT.1 are defined in the NDcPP.

FCS_CKM.2/GTK Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
The TSF shall distribute Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [selection: AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame, AES Key Wrap with Padding in an EAPOL-Key frame] that meets the following: [NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE 802.11-2020 for the packet format and timing considerations] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note: This requirement applies to the Group Temporal Key (GTK) that is generated by the TOE for use in broadcast and multicast messages to clients to which it is connected. 802.11-2020 specifies the format for the transfer as well as the fact that it must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.

FCS_CKM.2/PMK Cryptographic Key Distribution (PMK)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
The TSF shall receive the 802.11 Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method: [from 802.1X Authorization Server] that meets the following: [IEEE 802.11-2020] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
Application Note: This requirement applies to the Pairwise Master Key that is received from the RADIUS server by the TOE. The intent of this requirement is to ensure conformant TOEs implement 802.1X authentication prior to establishing secure communications with the client. The intent is that any LiFi AS product evaluated against this PP-Module will support both WPA2-Enterprise and WPA3-Enterprise at a minimum and certificate-based authentication mechanisms and therefore disallows implementations that support only pre-shared keys. Because communications with the RADIUS server are required to be performed over a protected connection, the transfer of the PMK will be protected.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

This component must be included in the ST if any of the following SFRs are included:
The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for [selection: RADIUS over TLS (RadSec), IPsec, WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, IEEE 802.11 WPA2-PSK, [assignment: other protocols that use pre-shared keys]].
The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
  • are 22 characters and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
  • are composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).
The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.
Application Note:

This requirement must be included if IPsec or another protocol that uses pre-shared keys is claimed, and pre-shared key authentication is selected (e.g., "Pre-shared Keys" is selected in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 or "pre-shared keys" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2). The intent of this requirement is that all protocols will support both text-based and bit-based pre-shared keys.

For the length of the text-based pre-shared keys, a common length (22 characters) is required to help promote interoperability. If other lengths are supported, they should be listed in the assignment; this assignment can also specify a range of values (e.g., "lengths from 5 to 55 characters") as well.

For FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3, the ST author specifies whether the TSF merely accepts bit-based pre-shared keys or is capable of generating them. If it generates them, the requirement specifies that they must be generated using the RBG provided by the TOE.

FTP_ITC.1/Client Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (LiFi 802.11 Client Access)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
Do we need something similar for G.vlc? There was no equivalent to this in the Word doc requirements. Just checking as to whether anything is missing.

The TSF shall provide a communication channel using WPA3-Enterprise, WPA2-Enterprise, and [selection: WPA3-SAE, WPA3-SAE-PK, WPA2-PSK, no other mode] as defined by IEEE 802.11-2020 to provide a trusted channel between itself and LiFi clients that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate support for 802.11 specifically for LiFi client access.

The TSF shall permit [LiFi clients] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [no services].

A.3.3 SFRs for G.vlc Implementations

FTP_ITC.1/Gvlc Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec)

This component must be included in the ST if the TOE implements any of the following features:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel for G.vlc using MACsec to provide a trusted channel between itself and a MACsec peer that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
Application Note:

This requirement has been iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to mandate support for MACsec.

The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, a MACsec peer] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [communications with MACsec peers that require the use of MACsec].

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

B.1 Auditable Events for Selection-based SFRs

Table 8: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements
RequirementAuditable EventsAdditional Audit Record Contents
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2
No events specifiedN/A
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3
No events specifiedN/A

B.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FTP_ITC.1.1/8021X.
The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.
The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [selection: X.509v3 certificates, pre-shared keys].
Application Note:

This SFR is applicable if "RADIUS over TLS" is selected in FTP_ITC.1.1.

If X.509v3 certificates is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the Functional Package for TLS must be claimed and "mutual authentication" must be selected. If pre-shared keys is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, then FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 and FIA_PSK_EXT.1 in this PP-Module must be claimed.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2.
Updated to remove 128-bit ciphers and TLS 1.1. Does TLS 1.3 need to be selectable here and do the ciphers need to change further?

 The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 and no earlier TLS versions when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client that supports the following ciphersuites: [selection:
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
].
Application Note:

If any of the TLS_RSA_PSK ciphersuites are selected by the ST author, it is necessary to claim the selection-based requirement FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.

The above ciphersuites are only for use when the TSF is acting as a RADIUS over TLS client, not for other uses of the TLS protocol. The ciphersuites to be tested in the evaluated configuration are limited by this requirement. The ST author should select the ciphersuites that are supported. If "X.509v3 certificates" is selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2, the ciphersuites selected in (and tested by) FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 in the Functional Package for TLS are also supported for RADIUS over TLS client use.

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.
When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.
Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.

The rules for verification of identity are described in Section 6 of RFC 6125. The reference identifier is typically established by configuration (e.g. configuring the name of the authentication server). Based on a singular reference identifier’s source domain and application service type (e.g. HTTP, SIP, LDAP), the client establishes all reference identifiers which are acceptable, such as a Common Name for the Subject Name field of the certificate and a (case-insensitive) DNS name for the Subject Alternative Name field. The client then compares this list of all acceptable reference identifiers to the presented identifiers in the TLS server’s certificate.

The preferred method for verification is the Subject Alternative Name using DNS names, URI names, or Service Names. Verification using the Common Name is required for the purposes of backwards compatibility. Additionally, support for use of IP addresses in the Subject Name or Subject Alternative name is discouraged as against best practices but may be implemented. Finally, support for wildcards is discouraged but may be implemented. If the client supports wildcards, the client must follow the best practices regarding matching; these best practices are captured in the evaluation activity.

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall [selection: not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]] if the presented server certificate is deemed invalid.
Application Note:

This requirement must be claimed if any ciphersuites beginning with 'TLS_RSA_PSK' are selected in FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1.

Validity is determined by the identifier verification, certificate path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280. Certificate validity is tested in accordance with testing performed for FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev in the NDcPP.

Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:
Table 9: Extended Component Definitions
Functional ClassFunctional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec
Identification and Authentication (FIA)FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication
Protection of the TSF (FPT)FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization
Security Management (FMT)FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

C.2 Extended Component Definitions

C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.1.1 FCS_RADSEC_EXT RadSec

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of the RadSec (RADIUS over TLS) protocol.

Component Leveling

FCS_RADSEC_EXT123

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1, RadSec, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using a specified peer authentication method.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys, requires the TSF to implement RadSec using pre-shared key authentication in a manner that conforms to relevant TLS specifications.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3, RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA, requires the TSF to validate the external entity used for trusted communications.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement RADIUS over TLS as specified in RFC 6614 to communicate securely with a RADIUS server.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall perform peer authentication using [assignment: some authentication method].

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_RADSEC_EXT.1 RadSec
FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall implement [assignment: list of allowed TLS versions] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation shall support the following ciphersuites for use when acting as a RADIUS over TLS client: [assignment: list of supported ciphersuites].

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall be able to [selection: accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

Management: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys and RSA

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to: FCS_RADSEC_EXT.2 RadSec using Pre-Shared Keys
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509v3 Certificate Validation

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.1

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.

FCS_RADSEC_EXT.3.2

When the TSF negotiates a TLS_RSA_PSK cipher suite, the TSF shall [selection: not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]] if the presented server certificate is deemed invalid.

C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.2.1 FIA_8021X_EXT 802.1X Port Access Entity (Authenticator) Authentication

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe requirements for implementation of 802.1X port-based network access control.

Component Leveling

FIA_8021X_EXT1

FIA_8021X_EXT.1, 802.1X Authentication, requires the TSF to securely implement IEEE 802.1X as an authenticator.

Management: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_8021X_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the ST:

  • Attempts to access the 802.1X controlled port prior to successful completion of the authentication exchange

FIA_8021X_EXT.1 802.1X Authentication

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:No dependencies

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Authenticator” role.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support communications to a RADIUS authentication server conforming to RFCs 2865 and 3579.

FIA_8021X_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that no access to its 802.1X controlled port is given to the wireless client prior to successful completion of this authentication exchange.

C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.3.1 FPT_ASLR_EXT Address Space Layout Randomization

Family Behavior

This family defines the ability of the TOE to implement address space layout randomization (ASLR). This is a new family defined for the FPT class.

Component Leveling

FPT_ASLR_EXT1

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1, Address Space Layout Randomization, defines the ability of the TOE to use ASLR as well as the objects that ASLR is applied to.

Management: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1

There are no management functions foreseen.

Audit: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:No dependencies.

FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall always randomize process address space memory locations with [selection: 8, [assignment: number greater than 8]] bits of entropy except for [assignment: list of explicit exceptions].

C.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.4.1 FMT_SMR_EXT Security Management Restrictions

Family Behavior

Components in this family describe architectural restrictions on security administration that are not defined in CC Part 2.

Component Leveling

FMT_SMR_EXT1

FMT_SMR_EXT.1, No Administration from Client, requires the TSF to reject remote administration from a wireless client by default.

Management: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FMT_SMR_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FMT_SMR_EXT.1 No Administration from Client

Hierarchical to:No other components.
Dependencies to:FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that the ability to administer remotely the TOE from a wireless client shall be disabled by default.

Appendix D - Acronyms

Table 10: Acronyms
AcronymMeaning
AESAdvanced Encryption Standard
APIApplication Programming Interface
APIApplication Programming Interface
appApplication
ASLRAddress Space Layout Randomization
Base-PPBase Protection Profile
CCCommon Criteria
CEMCommon Evaluation Methodology
CESGCommunications-Electronics Security Group
CMCCertificate Management over CMS
CMSCryptographic Message Syntax
CNCommon Names
cPPCollaborative Protection Profile
CRLCertificate Revocation List
CSAComputer Security Act
CSPCritical Security Parameters
DARData At Rest
DEPData Execution Prevention
DESData Encryption Standard
DHEDiffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNSDomain Name System
DRBGDeterministic Random Bit Generator
DSSDigital Signature Standard
DSSDigital Signature Standard
DTDate/Time Vector
DTLSDatagram Transport Layer Security
EAPExtensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHEElliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSAElliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EPExtended Package
ESTEnrollment over Secure Transport
FIPSFederal Information Processing Standards
FPFunctional Package
HMACHash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTPHypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPSHypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETFInternet Engineering Task Force
IPInternet Protocol
ISOInternational Organization for Standardization
ITInformation Technology
ITSEFInformation Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIAPNational Information Assurance Partnership
NISTNational Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSPOnline Certificate Status Protocol
OEOperational Environment
OIDObject Identifier
OMBOffice of Management and Budget
OSOperating System
PIIPersonally Identifiable Information
PKIPublic Key Infrastructure
PPProtection Profile
PPProtection Profile
PP-ConfigurationProtection Profile Configuration
PP-ModuleProtection Profile Module
RBGRandom Bit Generator
RFCRequest for Comment
RNGRandom Number Generator
RNGVSRandom Number Generator Validation System
S/MIMESecure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SANSubject Alternative Name
SARSecurity Assurance Requirement
SFRSecurity Functional Requirement
SHASecure Hash Algorithm
SIPSession Initiation Protocol
STSecurity Target
SWIDSoftware Identification
TLSTransport Layer Security
TOETarget of Evaluation
TSFTOE Security Functionality
TSFITSF Interface
TSSTOE Summary Specification
URIUniform Resource Identifier
URLUniform Resource Locator
USBUniversal Serial Bus
XCCDFeXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XORExclusive Or

Appendix E - Bibliography

Table 11: Bibliography
IdentifierTitle
[CC]Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
[CEM]Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation -