Version | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|
Round 1 | 2015-04-23 | First draft of version 1.0 for comment |
1.0 | 2015-08-14 | Release - first version released |
Column 1 | Column 2 | |
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Row 1 | Data 1 | Data 2 |
Row 2 | Data 3 | Data 4 |
Row 2 | Data 7 | |
Row 3 | Data 5 |
This is going to show some tests:
$$x=\frac{-b\pm\sqrt{b^{2}-4ac}}{2a}$$ | (1) |
And here's a generic coutner Abc 1: Some Words
And here's the reference to it Abc 1.
Assurance | Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC]. |
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) | A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes. |
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation. |
Distributed TOE | A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole. |
Extended Package (EP) | A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages. |
Functional Package (FP) | A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. |
Operational Environment (OE) | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy. |
Protection Profile (PP) | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products. |
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module. |
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs. |
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR) | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE. |
Security Functional Requirement (SFR) | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE. |
Security Target (ST) | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product. |
Target of Evaluation (TOE) | The product under evaluation. |
TOE Security Functionality (TSF) | The security functionality of the product under evaluation. |
TOE Summary Specification (TSS) | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST. |
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) | An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process. |
Administrator | An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users. |
Application (app) | Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation. |
Application Programming Interface (API) | A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform. |
Credential | Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password. |
Critical Security Parameters (CSP) | Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module. |
DAR Protection | Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping. |
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) | An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code. |
Developer | An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same. |
General Purpose Operating System | A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices. |
Host-based Firewall | A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS. |
Operating System (OS) | Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document. |
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) | Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual. [OMB] |
Sensitive Data | Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author. |
User | A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator. |
Virtual Machine (VM) | Blah Blah Blah |
For changes to included SFRs, selections, and assignments required for this use case, see .
Threat, Assumption, or OSP | Security Objectives | Rationale |
T.NETWORK_ATTACK | O.PROTECTED_COMMS | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data. |
O.INTEGRITY | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network. | |
O.MANAGEMENT | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack. | |
O.ACCOUNTABILITY | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred. | |
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP | O.PROTECTED_COMMS | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data. |
O.MANAGEMENT | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data. | |
T.LOCAL_ATTACK | O.INTEGRITY | The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform. |
O.ACCOUNTABILITY | The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred. | |
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS | O.PROTECTED_STORAGE | The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE. |
A.PLATFORM | OE.PLATFORM | The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM. |
A.PROPER_USER | OE.PROPER_USER | The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER. |
A.PROPER_ADMIN | OE.PROPER_ADMIN | The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN. |
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE,
showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:
Objective | Addressed by | Rationale |
---|---|---|
O.ACCOUNTABILITY | FAU_GEN.1 | 'cause FAU_GEN.1 is awesome |
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | Cause FTP reasons | |
O.INTEGRITY | FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 | For reasons |
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 | ASLR For reasons | |
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 | For reasons | |
FCS_COP.1/HASH | For reasons | |
FCS_COP.1/SIGN | For reasons | |
FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC | For reasons | |
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FPT_SRP_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FIA_X509_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FPT_TST_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FIA_AFL.1 | For reasons | |
FIA_UAU.5 | For reasons | |
O.MANAGEMENT | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 | For reasons |
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 | For reasons | |
FTA_TAB.1 | For reasons | |
FTP_TRP.1 | For reasons | |
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE | FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FDP_ACF_EXT.1 | Rationale for a big chunk |
O.PROTECTED_COMMS | FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/SIGN, FCS_COP.1/HMAC, FDP_IFC_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | Rationale for a big chunk |
Functional Class | Functional Components |
---|---|
Cryptographic Support (FCS) | FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management |
Security Audit (FAU) | FAU_STG_EXT Security Store Filtering |
Requirement | Rationale for Satisfaction |
FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication | FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test. |
FIA_UID.1 - Timing of identification | FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test. |
FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements. |
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps | FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement. |
FTA_SSL.1 - TSF-initiated session locking | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement. |
FTA_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement. |
FAU_STG.1 - Protected audit trail storage | FPT_ACF_EXT.1 defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements. |
FAU_GEN.2 - User identity association | FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event. |
FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review | FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information. |
Acronym | Meaning |
---|---|
AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
API | Application Programming Interface |
API | Application Programming Interface |
app | Application |
ASLR | Address Space Layout Randomization |
CEM | Common Evaluation Methodology |
CESG | Communications-Electronics Security Group |
CMC | Certificate Management over CMS |
CMS | Cryptographic Message Syntax |
CN | Common Names |
cPP | Collaborative Protection Profile |
CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
CSA | Computer Security Act |
CSP | Critical Security Parameters |
DAR | Data At Rest |
DEP | Data Execution Prevention |
DES | Data Encryption Standard |
DHE | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral |
DNS | Domain Name System |
DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator |
DSS | Digital Signature Standard |
DSS | Digital Signature Standard |
DT | Date/Time Vector |
DTLS | Datagram Transport Layer Security |
EAP | Extensible Authentication Protocol |
ECDHE | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral |
ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
EP | Extended Package |
EST | Enrollment over Secure Transport |
FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standards |
FP | Functional Package |
HMAC | Hash-based Message Authentication Code |
HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
IP | Internet Protocol |
ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
IT | Information Technology |
ITSEF | Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility |
NIAP | National Information Assurance Partnership |
NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
OE | Operational Environment |
OID | Object Identifier |
OMB | Office of Management and Budget |
OS | Operating System |
PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
PP | Protection Profile |
PP | Protection Profile |
PP-Configuration | Protection Profile Configuration |
PP-Module | Protection Profile Module |
RBG | Random Bit Generator |
RFC | Request for Comment |
RNG | Random Number Generator |
RNGVS | Random Number Generator Validation System |
S/MIME | Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions |
SAN | Subject Alternative Name |
SAR | Security Assurance Requirement |
SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
ST | Security Target |
SWID | Software Identification |
TLS | Transport Layer Security |
TOE | Target of Evaluation |
TSF | TOE Security Functionality |
TSFI | TSF Interface |
TSS | TOE Summary Specification |
URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
USB | Universal Serial Bus |
VM | Virtual Machine |
XCCDF | eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format |
XOR | Exclusive Or |
Identifier | Title |
---|---|
[CC] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
|
[CEM] | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security - Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. |
[CESG] | CESG - End User Devices Security and Configuration Guidance |
[CSA] | Computer Security Act of 1987, H.R. 145, June 11, 1987. |
[OMB] | Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments, OMB M-06-19, July 12, 2006. |