Version | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|
1.0 | 2023-12-11 | Initial release as CC:2022 PP-Module |
Assurance | Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC]. |
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP) | Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration. |
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) | A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes. |
Common Criteria (CC) | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408). |
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation. |
Extended Package (EP) | A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages. |
Functional Package (FP) | A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. |
Operational Environment (OE) | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy. |
Protection Profile (PP) | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products. |
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module. |
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs. |
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR) | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE. |
Security Functional Requirement (SFR) | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE. |
Security Target (ST) | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product. |
Target of Evaluation (TOE) | The product under evaluation. |
TOE Security Functionality (TSF) | The security functionality of the product under evaluation. |
TOE Summary Specification (TSS) | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST. |
ActiveSync | Microsoft protocol for synchronizing messaging and calendar data between mobile clients and email servers. |
Add-on | Capability or functionality added to an application including plug-ins, extensions or other controls. |
Email Client | Application used to send, receive, access and manage email provided by an email server. The terms email client and TOE are interchangeable in this document. |
Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) | Protocol for an email client to retrieve email from an email server over TCP/IP; IMAP4 defined in RFC 3501. |
Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI) | Open specification used by email clients such as Microsoft Outlook and Thunderbird; defined in [MS-OXCMAPIHTTP]. |
Post Office Protocol (POP) | Protocol for an email client to retrieve email from an email server over TCP/IP; POP3 defined in RFC 1939. |
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) | Protocol used by Microsoft Exchange to send/receive MAPI commands; defined in [MS-OXCRPC]. |
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) | Used to sign or encrypt messages at the request of the user upon sending email and to verify digital signature on a signed message upon receipt. |
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) | Protocol for an email client to send email to an email server over TCP/IP; SMTP defined in RFC 5321. |
An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.
This document does not define any additional OSPs.Threat, Assumption, or OSP | Security Objectives | Rationale |
T.FLAWED_ADDON | O.ADDON_INTEGRITY | The ability to prevent the installation of untrusted add-ons (or to prevent the use of add-ons entirely) reduces the likelihood that an add-on that is installed on top of the TOE is flawed or malicious. |
O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT | The ability to manage the TOE allows for only authorized users to install add-ons, to enable or disable the ability to install add-ons, or to not have any support for add-ons at all. | |
T.NETWORK_ATTACK (from App PP) | O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for protection of transmitted data related to email client network activity. |
O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the email client to defend against network attack. | |
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP (from App PP) | O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for protection of transmitted data related to email client network activity. |
O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the email client to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data. | |
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS (from App PP) | O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE | The objective O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE as a method to bypass the TSF to access sensitive data. |
# | Management Function | Administrator | User |
1 | Enable or disable downloading embedded objects globally and by [selection: domain, sender, no other method ] | OOptional | OOptional |
2 | Enable or disable plaintext-only mode globally and by [selection: domain, sender, no other method ] | OOptional | OOptional |
3 | Enable or disable rendering and execution of attachments globally and by [selection: domain, sender, no other method ] | OOptional | OOptional |
4 | Enable or disable email notifications | OOptional | OOptional |
5 | Configure a certificate repository for encryption | OOptional | OOptional |
6 | Configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if the email client cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate | OOptional | OOptional |
7 | Configure message sending and receiving to only use cryptographic algorithms defined in FCS_SMIME_EXT.1 | OOptional | OOptional |
8 | Configure CRL retrieval frequency | OOptional | OOptional |
9 | Enable or disable support for add-ons | OOptional | OOptional |
10 | Change password or passphrase authentication credential | OOptional | OOptional |
11 | Disable key recovery functionality | OOptional | OOptional |
12 | Configure cryptographic functionality | OOptional | OOptional |
13 | [assignment: Other management functions] | OOptional | OOptional |
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE,
showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:
Objective | Addressed by | Rationale |
---|---|---|
O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT | FDP_NOT_EXT.1 | FDP_NOT_EXT.1 supports the objective by defining a mechanism for users to determine whether a given email has been signed or encrypted. |
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 supports the objective by defining the technology-specific management functions that may exist for email client applications. | |
FDP_NOT_EXT.2 (optional) | FDP_NOT_EXT.2 supports the objective by optionally requiring the TSF to enumerate the uniform resource identifier (URI) of embedded links in emails so that a user can determine the source of the link. | |
FDP_REN_EXT.1 (optional) | FDP_REN_EXT.1 supports the objective by optionally defining a plaintext-only operational mode that does not allow a user to interact with embedded content in an email message. | |
O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE | FCS_CKM_EXT.3 | FCS_CKM_EXT.3 supports the objective by defining the mechanism by which the TSF protects stored key data from unauthorized disclosure. |
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 | FCS_CKM_EXT.4 supports the objective by defining the mechanism by which the TSF securely destroys stored key data. | |
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 | FCS_KYC_EXT.1 supports the objective by defining any key chain that the TSF implements to protect a root encryption key. | |
FCS_IVG_EXT.1 (optional) | FCS_IVG_EXT.1 supports the objective by optionally specifying the initialization vectors used for various cryptographic modes if the TOE supports any of these modes. | |
FCS_NOG_EXT.1 (optional) | FCS_NOG_EXT.1 supports the objective by optionally defining the minimum nonce size if the TSF uses any cryptographic algorithms that require the use of nonces. | |
FCS_SAG_EXT.1 (optional) | FCS_SAG_EXT.1 supports the objective by optionally defining the supported methods for salt generation if the TSF uses any cryptographic algorithms that require the use of salts. | |
FDP_PST_EXT.1 (optional) | FDP_PST_EXT.1 supports the objective by optionally defining the ability of the TOE to operate without persistently storing certain types of data at all. | |
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 (selection-based) | FCS_CKM_EXT.5 supports the objective by optionally defining the mechanism by which the TSF can derive key material using a user-supplied password credential. | |
FCS_COP_EXT.2 (selection-based) | FCS_COP_EXT.2 supports the objective by defining the supported key wrap mechanisms if the TSF uses key wrapping as part of maintaining a key chain. | |
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 (selection-based) | FCS_SMC_EXT.1 supports the objective by defining the supported key combination mechanisms if the TSF uses key combining as part of maintaining a key chain. | |
O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS | FCS_CKM_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP) | FCS_CKM_EXT.1 supports the objective by requiring that the TSF provide or invoke a cryptographic function for asymmetric key generation. |
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP) | FCS_RBG_EXT.1 supports the objective by requiring that the TSF provide or invoke a DRBG for secure key generation. | |
FIA_X509_EXT.1 (from Base-PP) | FIA_X509_EXT.1 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement or invoke an X.509 certificate validation service. | |
FIA_X509_EXT.2 (from Base-PP) | FIA_X509_EXT.2 supports the objective by defining the TOE's use of X.509 certificates and what behavior the TOE takes when the revocation status of a certificate cannot be determined. | |
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP) | FTP_DIT_EXT.1 supports the objective by specifying the trusted communications channels used by the TOE to protect data in transit. | |
FCS_SMIME_EXT.1 | FCS_SMIME_EXT.1 supports the objective by defining the TOE's cryptographic implementation of S/MIME to both assert and validate the confidentiality and integrity of secure email messages. | |
FDP_SMIME_EXT.1 | FDP_SMIME_EXT.1 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to use S/MIME to protect email message data in transit. | |
FIA_X509_EXT.3 | FIA_X509_EXT.3 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to support the use of X.509 certificates for S/MIME. | |
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | FTP_ITC_EXT.1 supports the objective by specifying the trusted communications the TSF must implement that are specific to email communications. | |
FIA_SASL_EXT.1 (selection-based) | FIA_SASL_EXT.1 supports the objective by specifying how SASL is implemented in the case where the TOE claims to support it. | |
O.ADDON_INTEGRITY | FPT_AON_EXT.1 | FPT_AON_EXT.1 supports the objective by specifying whether or not the TSF has the ability to load add-ons. |
FPT_AON_EXT.2 (selection-based) | FPT_AON_EXT.2 supports the objective by defining a cryptographic method for the TSF to validate the integrity of add-ons if the TOE supports their use. |
PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP | Consistency Rationale |
---|---|
T.FLAWED_ADDON | The threat of a user installing a flawed add-on is consistent with the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat from the Base-PP. A flawed add-on, crafted deliberately or unintentionally, could cause the product to operate in a manner where it or its platform can be compromised. |
Listed below are the security objectives defined in this PP-Module with rationale for their consistency with the App PP. The PP-Module
extends the Base-PP security objectives because the PP-Module defines a specific type of software application
with security functionality that is common to the application type.
Note that the PP-Module is implicitly consistent with any claimed functional packages because the applicable functional packages do not have
TOE objectives of their own; per section 2, any claimed functional package is intended to support the O.PROTECTED_COMMS objective in the
App PP.
The objectives for the TOE are consistent with the App PP based on the following rationale:
PP-Module TOE Objective | Consistency Rationale |
---|---|
O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT | This objective is an enhancement to the O.MANAGEMENT objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the secure administration of functions that are particular to email client applications. |
O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE | This objective is an enhancement to the O.PROTECTED_STORAGE objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the data-at-rest protection that applies to email client applications. |
O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS | This objective is an enhancement to the O.PROTECTED_COMMS objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the data-in-transit protection that applies to email client applications. |
O.ADDON_INTEGRITY | This objective is an enhancement to the O.INTEGRITY objective defined in the Base-PP. Where O.INTEGRITY is concerned with the integrity of the TOE application, O.ADDON_INTEGRITY is concerned with the integrity of third-party add-ons that can be loaded into the TOE. |
This PP-Module does not define any objectives for the TOE's operational environment.
PP-Module Requirement | Consistency Rationale |
---|---|
Modified SFRs | |
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 | This SFR is changed from its definition in the Base-PP to remove one of the available selection options because it will never apply in the case where the TOE conforms to this PP-Module. |
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 | This SFR is changed from its definition in the Base-PP to remove one of the available selection options because it will never apply in the case where the TOE conforms to this PP-Module. |
FIA_X509_EXT.1 | This SFR is unchanged from its definition in the Base-PP; the SFR is recategorized from selection-based to mandatory when the TOE conforms to this PP-Module. |
FIA_X509_EXT.2 | This SFR is unchanged from its definition in the Base-PP; the SFR is recategorized from selection-based to mandatory when the TOE conforms to this PP-Module. |
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 | This SFR is changed from its definition in the Base-PP to modify the selection options such that some options are mandated if another selection is chosen and some are removed entirely, due to the specific cryptographic needs of email client applications. |
Additional SFRs | |
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the App PP is the base. | |
Mandatory SFRs | |
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 | This SFR defines how keys and key material are saved by the email client. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 | This SFR defines how email messages are formatted when sent and received by the client. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how email clients maintain key chains. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FCS_SMIME_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how email messages are formatted when sent and received by the client. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FDP_NOT_EXT.1 | This SFR defines the behavior an email client exhibits when a message is received. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FDP_SMIME_EXT.1 | This SFR defines the format an email client shall use as output for cryptographic operations. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FIA_X509_EXT.3 | This SFR defines the format an email client shall use for certificates to perform encryption and authentication. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 | This SFR defines a specific set of management functions for an email client. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FPT_AON_EXT.1 | This SFR defines what types of add-ons an email client may use. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | This SFR defines which channels for an email client must be considered trusted. It does not impact the Base-PP functionality. |
Optional SFRs | |
FCS_IVG_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how clients generate IVs for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FCS_NOG_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how clients generate nonces for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FCS_SAG_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how clients generate salts for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FDP_NOT_EXT.2 | This SFR defines how clients display URIs in embedded links. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FDP_PST_EXT.1 | This SFR defines the persistent information that must be stored for email client functionality to work as intended. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FDP_REN_EXT.1 | This SFR defines functionality to display message content. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
Objective SFRs | |
This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements. | |
Implementation-dependent SFRs | |
This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent requirements. | |
Selection-based SFRs | |
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 | This SFR defines restrictions on password composition and key derivation mechanisms. It defines functionality similar to FCS_PBKDF_EXT.1 in the Base-PP but has additional details specific to the composition of the actual password authentication factor, rather than just defining a method for key derivation. |
FCS_COP_EXT.2 | This SFR defines how clients wrap keys. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 | This SFR defines how clients combine keys. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FIA_SASL_EXT.1 | This SFR defines an alternate method of transmitting messages. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
FPT_AON_EXT.2 | This SFR defines how email clients verify add-ons. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP. |
This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.
This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent SFRs.
Functional Class | Functional Components |
---|---|
Cryptographic Support (FCS) | FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management FCS_COP_EXT Cryptographic Operation FCS_IVG_EXT Initialization Vector Generation FCS_KYC_EXT Cryptographic Key Chaining FCS_NOG_EXT Cryptographic Nonce Generation FCS_SAG_EXT Cryptographic Salt Generation FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining FCS_SMIME_EXT Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) |
Identification and Authentication (FIA) | FIA_SASL_EXT Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) FIA_X509_EXT X.509 Certificate Services |
Protection of the TSF (FPT) | FPT_AON_EXT Add-Ons |
Security Management (FMT) | FMT_MOF_EXT Management of Functions Behavior |
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) | FTP_ITC_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel |
User Data Protection (FDP) | FDP_NOT_EXT Notifications FDP_PST_EXT Storage of Persistent Information FDP_REN_EXT Rendering of Message Content FDP_SMIME_EXT Use of Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) |
FCS_CKM_EXT.3, Protection of Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to prevent the plaintext storage of secret key data.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4, Cryptographic Key Destruction, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to destroy key data.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5, Cryptographic Key Derivation (password or passphrase Conditioning), requires the TSF to support password or passphrase credentials with certain strength of secret characteristics and to support the use of such credentials as an input to a password-based key derivation function.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation |
FCS_KYC_EXT.1, Key Chaining, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to prevent the plaintext storage of secret key data.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
FCS_SMIME_EXT.1, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), requires the TSF to implement S/MIME in accordance with appropriate RFCs and using appropriate cryptographic functionality.
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation |
FCS_IVG_EXT.1, Initialization Vector Generation, requires the TSF to generate initialization vectors in a specified manner.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation |
FCS_NOG_EXT.1, Cryptographic Nonce Generation, requires the TSF to generate nonces in a specified manner.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation |
FCS_SAG_EXT.1, Cryptographic Salt Generation, requires the TSF to generate salts in a specified manner.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services |
FCS_COP_EXT.2, Key Wrapping, requires the TSF to implement key wrapping in a specified manner.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation |
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, Key Combining, requires the TSF to implement submask combining in a specified manner.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation |
FIA_X509_EXT.3, X.509 Authentication and Encryption, requires the TSF to use X.509 certificates for various functions.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: |
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps |
FIA_SASL_EXT.1, Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), requires the TSF to implement SASL in a manner that conforms to applicable standards.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
FPT_AON_EXT.1, Support for Only Trusted Add-ons, requires the TSF to either support no add-ons or to only support trusted add-ons.
FPT_AON_EXT.2, Trusted Installation and Update for Add-ons, requires the TSF to implement a method to verify the integrity of add-ons and ensure that untrusted or unknown add-ons are not loaded for use.
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation FPT_AON_EXT.1 Support for Only Trusted Add-Ons |
FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Management of Functions Behavior, requires the TSF to implement management functions specified in the SFR.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
FTP_ITC_EXT.1, Inter-TSF Trusted Channel, requires the TSF to identify the trusted channels it uses for communications with external entities.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_NOT_EXT.1, Notification of S/MIME Status, requires the TSF to present the S/MIME status of received email messages.
FDP_NOT_EXT.2, Notification of URI, requires the TSF to display the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of any embedded links.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | FCS_SMIME_EXT.1 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) |
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_SMIME_EXT.1, S/MIME, requires the TSF to support S/MIME.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_PST_EXT.1, Storage of Persistent Information, requires the TSF to identify the minimum set of data it can store on the TOE platform while maintaining functionality.
No specific management functions are identified.
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_REN_EXT.1, Rendering of Message Content, requires the TSF to implement a plaintext-only mode that prevents non-text content from being rendered.
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to: | No other components. |
Dependencies to: | No dependencies. |
This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.3 Dependencies between components.
This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.
Requirement | Rationale for Satisfaction |
---|---|
FCS_COP.1 - Cryptographic Operation | Several SFRs in this PP-Module (e.g., FPT_AON_EXT.2) have a dependency on FCS_COP.1 because they require the existence of other cryptographic functionality to be satisfied. The Base-PP permits either the TOE or its platform to implement cryptographic functions. If the TOE platform implements these functions, FCS_COP.1 is not claimed but all SFRs that depend on it are implicitly satisfied through the TOE platform's ability to provide the required functionality. |
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable Time Stamps | FIA_X509_EXT.3 has a dependency on FPT_STM.1 because reliable time is needed to validate whether or not an X.509 certificate is expired. This requirement is implicitly satisfied through the Base-PP assumption that the TOE platform can be assumed to be a reliable time source. |
Acronym | Meaning |
---|---|
AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
Base-PP | Base Protection Profile |
CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
CC | Common Criteria |
CEM | Common Evaluation Methodology |
CMS | Cryptographic Message Syntax |
cPP | Collaborative Protection Profile |
CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
CSP | Critical Security Parameter |
EP | Extended Package |
FP | Functional Package |
GCM | Galois-Counter Mode |
IMAP | Internet Message Access Protocol |
MAPI | Messaging Application Programming Interface |
MTA | Mail Transfer Agent |
OE | Operational Environment |
PBKDF | Password-Based Key Derivation Function |
Portable Document Format | |
POP | Post Office Protocol |
PP | Protection Profile |
PP-Configuration | Protection Profile Configuration |
PP-Module | Protection Profile Module |
PRF | Pseudorandom Function |
RPC | Remote Procedure Call |
S/MIME | Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions |
SAR | Security Assurance Requirement |
SASL | Simple Authentication and Security Layer |
SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
ST | Security Target |
TOE | Target of Evaluation |
TSF | TOE Security Functionality |
TSFI | TSF Interface |
TSS | TOE Summary Specification |
URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
Identifier | Title |
---|---|
[CC] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
|
[CEM] | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
|
[App PP] | Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0, TBD |
[MS-OXCMAPIHTTP] | Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI) Extensions for HTTP |
[MS-OXCRPC] | Wire Format Protocol |