The purpose of the first set of Collaborative Protection Profiles (cPPs) for Full Drive
Encryption (FDE): Authorization Acquisition (AA) and Encryption Engine (EE) is to provide
requirements for Data-at-Rest protection for a lost device that contains storage. These cPPs
allow FDE solutions based in software and/or hardware to meet the requirements. The form
factor for a storage device may vary, but could include: system hard drives/solid state
drives in servers, workstations, laptops, mobile devices, tablets, and external media. A
hardware solution could be a Self-Encrypting Drive or other hardware-based solutions; the
interface (USB, SATA, etc.) used to connect the storage device to the host machine is outside
the scope of this cPP.
Full Drive Encryption encrypts all data (with certain exceptions) on the storage device and
permits access to the data only after successful authorization to the FDE solution. The
exceptions include the necessity to leave a portion of the storage device (the size may vary
based on implementation) unencrypted for such things as the Master Boot Record (MBR) or other
AA/EE pre-authentication software. These FDEcPPs interpret the term “full drive encryption”
to allow FDE solutions to leave a portion of the storage device unencrypted so long as it
contains plaintext user or plaintext authorization data.
Since the FDEcPPs support a variety of solutions, two cPPs describe the requirements for the
FDE components shown in Figure 1. Need to update figure for FDEEE (this is for FDEAA)
The FDEcPP - Authorization Acquisition describes the requirements for the Authorization Acquisition
piece and details the necessary security requirements and assurance activities necessary to interact with a user
and result in the availability of a Border Encryption Value (BEV).
The FDEcPP - Encryption Engine describes the requirements for the Encryption Engine piece and details
the necessary security requirements and assurance activities for the actual encryption and
decryption of the data by the DEK. Each cPP will also have a set of core requirements for management
functions, proper handling of cryptographic keys, updates performed in a trusted manner, audit and self-tests.
This TOE description defines the scope and functionality of the Encryption Engine, and
the Security Problem Definition describes the assumptions made about the operating
environment and the threats to the EE that the cPP requirements address.
1.2 Terms
The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.
1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms
Assurance
Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)
Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)
A Protection Profile developed by
international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Direct Rationale
A type of Protection Profile, PP-Module, or Security Target in which the security
problem definition (SPD) elements are mapped directly to the SFRs and possibly to the
security objectives for the operational environment. There are no security objectives
for the TOE.
Extended Package (EP)
A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology,
or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)
A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology,
or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)
Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
1.2.2 Technical Terms
Assurance
Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC1].
Authorization Factor
A value that a user knows, has, or is (e.g. password, token, etc.)
submitted to the TOE to establish that the user is in the community
authorized to use the hard disk. This value is used in the derivation or
decryption of the BEV and eventual decryption of the DEK. Note
that these values may or may not be used to establish the particular
identity of the user.
Border Encryption Valu (BEV)
A value passed from the FDE Authorization
Acquisition (AA) to the FDE Encryption Engine (EE) intended to link the key chains
of the two components.
Refers to partitions of logical blocks of user accessible data as
managed by the host system that indexes and partitions and an
operating system that maps authorization to read or write data to blocks
in these partitions. For the sake of this Security Program Definition
(SPD) and cPP, FDE performs encryption and authorization on one
partition, so defined and supported by the OS and file system jointly,
under consideration. FDE products encrypt all data (with certain
exceptions) on the partition of the storage device and permits access to
the data only after successful authorization to the FDE solution. The
exceptions include the necessity to leave a portion of the storage device
(the size may vary based on implementation) unencrypted for such
things as the Master Boot Record (MBR) or other AA/EE preauthentication software. These FDE cPPs interpret the term “full drive
encryption” to allow FDE solutions to leave a portion of the storage
device unencrypted so long as it contains no protected data.
Host Platform
The local hardware and software the TOE is running on, and does not
include any peripheral devices (e.g. USB devices) that may be
connected to the local hardware and software.
Intermediate Key
A key used in a point between the initial user authorization and the
DEK.
Key Chaining
The method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to protect data. A top layer key encrypts a lower layer key which encrypts the data;
this method can have any number of layers.
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
A key used to encrypt other keys, such as DEKs or storage that
contains keys.
Key Material
Key material is commonly known as critical security parameter (CSP)
data, and also includes authorization data, nonces, and metadata.
Key Release Key (KRK)
A key used to release another key from storage, it is not used for the
direct derivation or decryption of another key.
Key Sanitization
A method of sanitizing encrypted data by securely overwriting the key
that was encrypting the data.
Non-Volatile Memory
A type of computer memory that will retain information without
power.
Operating System (OS)
Software which runs at the highest privilege level and can directly
control hardware resources.
This refers to all data on the storage device with the exception of a
small portion required for the TOE to function correctly. It is all space
on the disk a user could write data to and includes the operating
system, applications, and user data. Protected data does not include the
Master Boot Record or Pre-authentication area of the drive – areas of
the drive that are necessarily unencrypted.
Submask
A submask is a bit string that can be generated and stored in a number
of ways.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by
guidance. [CC1]
1.3 Implementation
Full Drive Encryption solutions vary with implementation and vendor combinations.
Therefore, vendors will evaluate products that provide both components of the Full Disk
Encryption Solution (AA and EE) against both cPPs – could be done in a single evaluation
with one ST. A vendor that provides a single component of an FDE solution would only evaluate
against the applicable cPP. The FDEcPP is divided into two documents to allow labs to
independently evaluate solutions tailored to one cPP or the other. When a customer acquires
an FDE solution, they will either obtain a single vendor product that meets the AA + EEcPPs
or two products, one of which meets the AA and the other of which meets the EEcPPs.
The table below illustrates a few examples for certification
A single vendor’s combination of hardware (e.g., hardware encryption engine,
cryptographic co-processor) and software
1.4 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this cPP is either the Encryption Engine or a combined
evaluation of the set of cPPs for FDE (Authorization Acquisition or Encryption Engine).
The following sections provide an overview of the functionality of the FDEEE as well as the security capabilities.
1.4.1 Encryption Engine Introduction
The Encryption Engine objectives focus on data encryption, policy enforcement, and key
management. The EE is responsible for the generation, update, archival, recovery, protection,
and destruction of the DEK and other intermediate keys under its control. The EE receives a
BEV from the AA. The EE uses that BEV for the decryption of the DEK although other
intermediate keys may exist in between those two points. Key encryption keys (KEKs) wrap
other keys, notably the DEK or other intermediary keys which chain to the DEK. Key releasing
keys (KRKs) authorize the EE to release either the DEK or other intermediary keys which chain
to the DEK. These keys only differ in the functional use.
The EE determines whether to allow or deny a requested action based on the KEK or KRK
provided by the AA. Possible requested actions include but are not limited to changing of
encryption keys, decryption of data, and key sanitization of encryption keys (including the
DEK). The EE may offer additional policy enforcement 1 to prevent access to ciphertext or the
unencrypted portion of the storage device. Additionally the EE may provide encryption support
for multiple users on an individual basis.
Figure 2 illustrates the components within EE and its relationship with AA. Need to update figure for FDEEE (this is for FDEAA)
Figure 2:
Authorization Acquisition Details
1.4.2 Encryption Engine Security Capabilities
The Encryption Engine is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the data is encrypted using a
prescribed set of algorithms. The EE manages the decryption of the data on the storage device
through decryption of the DEK based on the validity of the BEV provided by the AA. It also
manages administrative functions, such as changing the DEK, managing the BEVs required for
decrypting or releasing the DEK, managing the intermediate wrapping keys under its control,
and performing a key sanitization.
The EE may provide key archiving and recovery functionality. The EE may manage the
archiving and recovery itself, or interface with the AA to perform this function. It may also
offer configurable features, which restricts the movement of keying material and disables
recovery functionality.
The foremost security objective of encrypting storage devices is to force an adversary to
perform an exhaustive search against a prohibitively large key space in order to recover the
DEK or other intermediate keys. The EE uses approved cryptography to generate, handle, and
protect keys to force an adversary who obtains an unpowered lost or stolen platform without
the authorization factors or intermediate keys to exhaust the encryption key space of
intermediate keys or DEK to obtain the data. The EE randomly generates DEKs and – in some
cases - intermediate keys. The EE uses DEKs in a symmetric encryption algorithm in an
appropriate mode along with appropriate initialization vectors for that mode to encrypt storage
units (e.g. sectors or blocks) on the storage device. The EE either encrypts the DEK with a
KEK or an intermediate key.
This version of the cPP includes additional security 1 features, included advanced power saving
requirements and firmware signing requirements.
1.4.3 The TOE and the Operational and Pre-Boot Environments
The environment in which the EE functions may differ depending on the boot stage of the
platform in which it operates; see Figure 3. Aspects of initialization, and perhaps authorization
may be performed in the Pre-Boot environment, while provisioning, encryption, decryption
and management functionality are likely performed in the Operating System environment. Some of these aspects may occur in both environments.
The Operating System environment may make a full range of services available to the
Encryption Engine, including hardware drivers, cryptographic libraries, and perhaps other
services external to the TOE.
The Pre-Boot environment is much more constrained with limited capabilities. This
environment turns on the minimum number of peripherals and loads only those drivers
necessary to bring the platform from a cold start to executing a fully functional operating
system with running applications.
The EETOE may include or leverage features and functions within the operational
environment. Add Figure here (from published version)
1.5 Functionality Deferred Until the Next cPP
1.5.1 TOE Boundary
NIAP: Does this still need to be incorporated?
The environment in which the AA functions may differ depending on the boot stage of the platform in which it operates, see Figure 3. Depending on the solution’s architecture, aspects of provisioning, initialization, and authorization may be performed in the Pre-Boot environment, while encryption, decryption and management functionality are likely performed in the Operating System environment. In non-software solutions, encryption/decryption starts in Pre30 OS environment and continues into OS present environment.
In the Operating System environment, the Authorization Acquisition has the full range of services available from the operating system (OS), including hardware drivers, cryptographic libraries, and perhaps other services external to the TOE.
The Pre-Boot environment is much more constrained with limited capabilities. This environment turns on the minimum number of peripherals and loads only those drivers necessary to bring the platform from a cold start to executing a fully functional operating system with running applications.
The AATOE may include or leverage features and functions within the operational environment.
Figure 3:
Operational Environment
1.6 Use Cases
The use case for a product conforming to the FDEcPPs is to protect data-at-rest on a device that is
lost or stolen while powered off without any prior access by an adversary. The use case where an
adversary obtains a device that is in a powered state and is able to make modifications to the
environment or the TOE itself (e.g., evil maid attacks) is not addressed by these cPPs (i.e., FDE-AA and FDE- EE).
The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits
defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs
and SARs have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance
documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing
ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation
Activities that are used in this same manner.
CC Conformance Claims
This PP is conformant to
Part 2 (extended)
and Part 3 (conformant)
of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.
PP Claim
This PP does not claim conformance to
any Protection Profile.
The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a
PP-Configuration with this PP:
PP-Module for File Encryption Enterprise Management Version 1.0
Package Claim
This PP is not conformant to any
Functional or Assurance Packages.
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threats
This section provides a narrative that describes how the requirements mitigate the mapped
threats. A requirement may mitigate aspects of multiple threats. A requirement may only
mitigate a threat in a limited way. Some requirements are optional, either because the TSF
fully mitigates the threat without the additional requirements being claimed or because the
TSF relies on its Operational Environment to provide the functionality that is described by
the optional requirements.
A threat consists of a threat agent, an asset and an adverse action of that threat agent on
that asset. The threat agents are the entities that put the assets at risk if an adversary
obtains a lost or stolen storage device. Threats drive the functional requirements for the
target of evaluation (TOE). For instance, one threat below is T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS.
The threat agent is the possessor (unauthorized user) of a lost or stolen storage device. The asset is the data on the storage device, while the adverse action is to attempt to
obtain those data from the storage device. This threat drives the functional requirements
for the storage device encryption (TOE) to authorize who can use the TOE to access the hard
disk and encrypt/decrypt the data. Since possession of the KEK, DEK, intermediate keys,
authorization factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values that contribute
to the creation of keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to
defeat the encryption, this SPD considers key material equivalent to the data in importance
and they appear among the other assets addressed below.
It is important to reemphasize at this point that this collaborative Protection Profile
does not expect the product (TOE) to defend against the possessor of the lost or stolen
hard disk who can introduce malicious code or exploitable hardware components into the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) or the Operational Environment. It assumes that the user
physically protects the TOE and that the Operational Environment provides sufficient
protection against logical attacks. One specific area where a conformant TOE offers
some protection is in providing updates to the TOE; other than this area, though,
this cPP mandates no other countermeasures. Similarly, these requirements do not
address the “lost and found” hard disk problem, where an adversary may have taken
the hard disk, compromised the unencrypted portions of the boot device (e.g., MBR,
boot partition), and then made it available to be recovered by the original user so
that they would execute the compromised code.
T.AUTHORIZATION_GUESSING
Threat agents may exercise host software to repeatedly guess authorization factors, such as passwords and PINs. Successful guessing of the authorization factors may cause the TOE to release DEKs or otherwise put it in a state
in which it discloses protected data to unauthorized users.
T.CHOSEN_PLAINTEXT
Threat agents may trick authorized users into storing chosen
plaintext on the encrypted storage device in the form of an image, document, or some other
file. A poor choice of encryption algorithms, encryption modes, and initialization vectors along
with the chosen plaintext could allow attackers to recover the effective DEK, thus providing
unauthorized access to the previously unknown plaintext on the storage device.
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE
Possession of any of the keys, authorization factors, submasks, and random
numbers or any other values that contribute to the creation of keys or authorization factors
could allow an unauthorized user to defeat the encryption. The cPP considers possession of
key material of equal importance to the data itself. Threat agents may look for keying material
in unencrypted sectors of the storage device and on other peripherals in the operating environment
(OE), (e.g., BIOS configuration, SPI flash, or TPMs).
T.KEYSPACE_EXHAUST
Threat agents may perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen
encryption algorithms and parameters allow attackers to exhaust the key space through brute force
and give them unauthorized access to the data.
T.KNOWN_PLAINTEXT
Threat agents know plaintext in regions of storage devices,
especially in uninitialized regions (all zeroes) as well as regions that contain well known
software such as operating systems. A poor choice of encryption algorithms, encryption modes,
and initialization vectors along with known plaintext could allow an attacker to recover the
effective DEK, thus providing unauthorized access to the previously unknown plaintext on the
storage device.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS
The cPP addresses the primary threat of unauthorized disclosure of protected data stored on a
storage device. If an adversary obtains a lost or stolen storage device (e.g., a storage device
contained in a laptop or a portable external storage device), they may attempt to connect a
targeted storage device to a host of which they have complete control and have raw access to
the storage device (e.g., to specified disk sectors, to specified blocks).
T.UNAUTHORIZED_FIRMWARE_MODIFY
An attacker attempts to modify the firmware in the SED via a command from the AA or from the
host platform that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_FIRMWARE_UPDATE
An attacker attempts to replace the firmware
on the SED via a command from the AA or from the host platform with a malicious firmware
update that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE
Threat agents may attempt to perform an update of the product which compromises the security
features of the TOE. Poorly chosen update protocols, signature generation and verification
algorithms, and parameters may allow attackers to install software that bypasses the intended
security features and provides them unauthorized access to data.
3.2 Assumptions
A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE
Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned storage device free of protected data in
areas not targeted for encryption. It is also assumed that data intended for protection should not
be on the targeted storage media until after provisioning. The cPP does not intend to include
requirements to find all the areas on storage devices that potentially contain protected data. In some cases, it may not be possible - for example, data contained in “bad” sectors. While
inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad sectors or un-partitioned space is unlikely,
one may use forensics tools to recover data from such areas of the storage device. Consequently,
the cPP assumes bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that must contain unencrypted code
(e.g., MBR and AA/EE pre-authentication software) contain no protected data.
A.PHYSICAL
The platform is assumed to be physically protected in its Operational Environment and not subject
to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the platform’s correct operation.
A.PLATFORM_STATE
The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected)
is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
A.POWER_DOWN
The user does not leave the platform or storage device unattended
until the device is in a compliant power saving state or has fully powered off. This properly
clears memories and locks down the device. Authorized users do not leave the platform or
storage device in a mode where sensitive information persists in non-volatile storage (e.g., lock
screen or sleep state). Users power the platform or storage device down or place it into a
power managed state, such as a “hibernation mode”.
A.STRONG_CRYPTO
All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and used by the product
meets the requirements listed in the cPP. This includes generation of external token authorization
factors by an RBG.
A.TRAINED_USER
Users follow the provided guidance for securing the TOE and
authorization factors. This includes conformance with authorization factor strength, using
external token authentication factors for no other purpose and ensuring external token
authorization factors are securely stored separately from the storage device or platform. The user should also be trained on how to power off their system.
A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL
Communication among and between product components (e.g., AA and EE) is
sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure. In cases in which a single
product fulfils both cPPs, then the communication between the components does not
extend beyond the boundary of the TOE (e.g., communication path is within the TOE
boundary). In cases in which independent products satisfy the requirements of the
AA and EE, the physically close proximity of the two products during their operation
means that the threat agent has very little opportunity to interpose itself in the
channel between the two without the user noticing and taking appropriate actions.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
This document does not define any additional OSPs.
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist
the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. This part wise solution forms the
security objectives for the Operational Environment and consists of a set of statements describing
the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve.
OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE
The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of protected data in
areas not targeted for encryption.
Rationale: Since the cPP requires all protected data to encrypted, A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE assumes
that the initial state of the device targeted for FDE is free of protected data in those areas of
the drive where encryption will not be invoked (e.g., MBR and AA and EE pre-authentication software). Given this known start state, the product (once installed and operational) ensures partitions of
logical blocks of user accessible data is protected.
OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH
An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring that the passphrase authorization factor
conforms to guidance from the Enterprise using the TOE.
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to create authorization factors that conform to
administrative guidance.
OE.PHYSICAL
The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing space such than an adversary
is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the TOE itself.
Rationale: As stated in section 1.6, the use case for this cPP is to protect data-at-rest on a
device where the adversary receives it in a powered off state and has no prior access.
OE.PLATFORM_STATE
The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is
free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
Rationale: A platform free of malware [A.PLATFORM_STATE] prevents an attack vector that could
potentially interfere with the correct operation of the product.
OE.POWER_DOWN
Volatile memory is cleared after entering a compliant power-saving state or turned off so
memory remnant attacks are infeasible.
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to not leave the storage device unattended
until it is in a compliant power-saving state or fully turned off.
OE.SINGLE_USE_ET
External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for no other purpose than
to store the external token authorization factor.
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to use external token authorization factors as
intended and for no other purpose.
OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO
The Operating Environment will provide a cryptographic function capability that is commensurate with the
requirements and capabilities of the TOE and Appendix A.
Rationale: All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and used by the product meets the
requirements listed in this cPP [A.STRONG_CRYPTO].
OE.TRAINED_USERS
Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the TOE and authorization factors.
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to create authorization factors that conform to guidance,
not store external token authorization factors with the device, and power down the TOE when required (OE.PLATFORM_STATE)
The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is free of malware that
could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
A platform free of malware [A.PLATFORM_STATE] prevents an attack vector that could potentially interfere with the correct
operation of the product.
OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL
Communication among and between product components (i.e., AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure.
Rationale: In situations where there is an opportunity for an adversary to interpose
themselves in the channel between the AA and the EE, a trusted channel should be
established to prevent exploitation. [A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL] assumes the existence
of a trusted channel between the AA and EE, except for when the boundary is within
and does not breach the TOE or is in such close proximity that a breach is not possible
without detection.
4.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section describes how the assumptions and organizational
security policies map to operational environment security objectives.
This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of
[CC].
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
Refinement operation (denoted by bold text or strikethrough
text): Is used to add details to a requirement or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant
through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
Selection (denoted by italicized text): Is used to select one or more options
provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
Assignment operation (denoted by italicized text): Is used to assign a
specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the
value in square brackets indicates assignment.
Iteration operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier
suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."
5.1 Security Functional Requirements
The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithmmethod [selection: generate a DEK using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG.1, accept a DEK that is generated by the RBG provided by the host platform, accept a DEK that is wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1KeyWrap]
and specified cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment:
list of
standards].
Application
Note:
This SFR is iterated because additional iterations are defined as optional requirements in Appendix A. This iteration was chosen specifically to ensure consistency between the FDEcPPs.
The purpose of this requirement is to explain DEK generation during provisioning.
If the TOE can be configured to obtain a DEK through more than one method, the ST author
chooses the applicable options within the selection. For example, the TOE may generate
random numbers with an approved RBG to create a DEK, as well as provide an interface to
accept a DEK from the environment.
If the ST author chooses the first or third option, or both in the selection, the corresponding
requirement is pulled from Appendix A and included in the body of the ST.
FCS_CKM.6 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing/Method)
The TSF shall destroy [all keys and key material] when [no longer
needed].
Application
Note:
Keys, including intermediate keys and key material that are no longer needed are destroyed by
using an approved method, FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
Examples of keys are intermediate keys, submasks, and BEV. There may be instances where keys or key material that are
contained in persistent storage are no longer needed and require destruction. Based on their implementation, vendors
will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. There are multiple situations in which key material is no longer
necessary, for example, a wrapped key may need to be destroyed when a password is changed. However, there are
instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key. If a PIN was used for
a smart card, the TSF should ensure that the PIN was properly destroyed.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by
FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
[assignment:
some value that does not contain any CSP]
]
removal of power to the memory,
destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection
]
For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [selection:
logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection: single, [assignment:
ST author defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [selection:
The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction visible. For instance, in a given implementation the application may have access to the file system details and may be able to logically address specific memory locations. In another implementation the application may simply have a handle to a resource and can only ask the platform to delete the resource. The level of detail to which the TOE has access will be reflected in the TSS section of the ST.
Several selections allow assignment of a ‘value that does not contain any CSP’. This means that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS_RBG.1 requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase ‘does not contain any CSP’ is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general ‘pool’ that might contain current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.
FCS_CKM.6/Power Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
The TSF shall [selection: instruct the operational environment to clear, erase] [cryptographic keys and key material from volatile
memory] when [transitioning to a compliant power saving state as
defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1] that meets the following: [a key
destruction method specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6].
Application
Note:
In some cases, erasure of keys from volatile memory is
only supported by the operational environment, in which case the operational
environment must expose a well-documented mechanism or interface to invoke the memory clearing operation.
Self-encrypting drives do not store keys in the Operational Environment and cannot instruct
the Operational Environment to perform functionality so they are not expected to select
“instruct the Operational Environment to clear”.
The TSF shall destroy [all key material, BEV, and authentication factors
stored in plaintext] when [transitioning to a compliant power saving
state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1].
Application
Note:
The TOE may end up in a non-compliant power saving
state indistinguishable from a compliant power state (e.g. as result of sudden or
unexpected power loss). For those scenarios, the TOE or the operational
environment guidance documentation must provide procedures to support destruction of key material (e.g., automated reboot with memory clearing in early stages of the system’s power-on sequence).
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004]
Application
Note:
The selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for FCS_COP.1/SigVer and quantum resistant recommendations. For example,
SHA-256 should be chosen for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 should be chosen for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 should
be chosen for ECC with P-521. The selection of the standard is made based on the algorithms selected.
This SFR is required for the use of verifying digital signatures for trusted updates (FPT_TUD_EXT.1). It may also be used when the TSF performs validation
of a submask, intermediate key, or BEV by using a hash operation (FCS_VAL_EXT.1).
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services
(verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [selection:
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size (modulus) of [selection: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit]
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of [256 bits or greater]
]
that meet the following: [selection:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, for RSA schemes
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521] ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA schemes
Application
Note:
The selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for FCS_COP.1/SigVer and quantum resistant recommendations. For example,
SHA-256 should be chosen for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 should be chosen for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 should
be chosen for ECC with P9 521. The selection of the standard is made based on the algorithms selected.
This SFR is mandatory for its use in verification of digital signatures for TOE updates. It may also be used when the TSF performs validation of a submask,
intermediate key, or BEV by using a digital signature operation (FCS_VAL_EXT.1).
] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] for asymmetric keys.
Application
Note:
Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to
ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the drive. The number of intermediate keys
will vary – from two (e.g., using the BEV as an intermediary key to wrap the DEK) to many. This applies to all keys that contribute to the ultimate wrapping or derivation of the DEK;
including those in areas of protected storage (e.g. TPM stored keys, comparison values).
The BEV is considered to be equivalent to keying material and therefore additional checksums
or similar values are not the BEV, even if they are sent with the BEV.
Once the ST author has selected a method to create the chain (either by deriving keys or
unwrapping them), they pull the appropriate requirement out of Appendix B. It is allowable for
an implementation to use both methods.
The method the TOE uses to chain keys and manage/protect them is described in the Key
Management Description; see Appendix E for more information.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
Application
Note:
This requirement covers several important factors – the salt must be random, but the nonces only have to be unique. FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 specifies how the IV should
be handled for each encryption mode. CBC, XTS, and GCM are allowed for AES encryption of the data. AES-CCM is an allowed mode for Key Wrapping.
If the TSF uses salts in support of cryptographic operations, and these salts are generated by the TSF, then FCS_CKM.1/SKG and FCS_RBG.1 must be claimed.
The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Application
Note:
The intent of this requirement is to specify that encryption of any protected
data will not depend on a user electing to protect that data. The drive encryption specified in
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 occurs transparently to the user and the decision to protect the data is
outside the discretion of the user, which is a characteristic that distinguishes it from file
encryption. The definition of protected data can be found in the glossary.
The cryptographic functions that perform the encryption/decryption of the data may be
provided by the Operational Environment. Note that if this is the case, it is assumed that the
environmental implementation of AES is consistent with the behavior described in
FCS_COP.1/SKC. If the TOE provides the cryptographic functions to encrypt/decrypt the data,
the ST author includes FCS_COP.1/SKC as defined in Appendix B in the main body of the ST.
[selection: no other functions, configure a password for firmware update, import a wrapped DEK, configure cryptographic functionality, disable key recovery functionality, securely update the public key needed for trusted update, configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue 1 in the event of an excessive number of
failed validation attempts, [assignment:
other management functions provided by the TSF]]]
Application
Note:
The intent of this requirement is to express the management capabilities that the TOE possesses.
This means that the TOE must be able to perform the listed functions. Item (d) is used to specify
functionality that may be included in the TOE, but is not required to conform to the cPP. “Configure
cryptographic functionality” could include key management functions; for example, the BEV will be
wrapped or encrypted, and the EE will need to unwrap or decrypt the BEV. In item (d), if no other
management functions are provided (or claimed), then “no other functions” should be
selected. Default Authorization factors are the initial values that are used to
manipulate the drive.
For the purposes of this document, key sanitization means to destroy the DEK, using one of the
approved destruction methods. This applies to instances of the protected key that
exist in non-volatile storage.
only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap, or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc or FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap
only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria [selection:
the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.2
the plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning
the plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, and the other half of the key split is [selection:
wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap
encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc or FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap
derived and not stored in non-volatile memory
]
the non-volatile memory the key is stored on is located in an external storage device for use as an authorization factor
the plaintext key is [selection:
used to wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap
used to encrypt a key as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc or FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap
]
that is [selection:
already wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap,
already encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc or FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap,
Application
Note:
The plaintext key storage in non-volatile memory is allowed for several reasons. If the keys exist within protected memory that is not user accessible on the TOE
or OE, the only methods that allow it to play a security relevant role for protecting the BEV or the DEK are if it is a key split or providing additional layers
of wrapping or encryption on keys that have already been protected.
If the TSF implements key wrapping, key encryption, or key encapsulation to maintain protected cryptographic key storage, then FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap, FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc,
or FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap must be claimed. Additionally, if key wrapping or key encryption is used, then FCS_CKM.1/SKG, FCS_RBG.1, and FCS_COP.1/SKC must be claimed to
support generation, encryption, and decryption of symmetric keys used in support of these operations. If the TSF implements submask combining to maintain protected
cryptographic key storage, then FCS_SMC_EXT.1 must be claimed.
The TSF shall define the following compliant power saving states: [selection, choose one of: S3, S4, G2(S5), G3, D0, D1, D2, D3, [assignment:
other power saving states]].
Application
Note:
Power saving states S3, S4, G2(S5), G3, D0, D1, D2, and D3 are defined
by the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) standard.
For each compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter
the compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur: user-initiated request, [selection: shutdown, user inactivity, request initiated by remote management system, [assignment:
other conditions], no other conditions].
Application
Note:
If volatile memory is not cleared as part of an unexpected power shutdown sequence then guidance documentation must define mitigation activities (e.g. how long users should wait after an unexpected power-down before volatile memory can be considered cleared).
The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE [selection: software, firmware] using a [selection: digital signature as specified in FCS_COP.1/SigVer, authenticated firmware update mechanism as described in FPT_FUA_EXT.1] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
Application
Note:
While this component requires the TOE to implement the update functionality itself, it is acceptable to perform the cryptographic checks using functionality available in the Operational Environment.
5.1.5 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE,
showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:
Mitigates this threat by requiring
several options for enforcing validation, such as key sanitization of the DEK or when a
configurable number of failed validation attempts is reached within a 24 hour period. This
mitigates brute force attacks against authorization factors such as passwords and PINs.
Mitigates this threat by ensuring the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important aspects of the TOE including requests to change and erase the DEK.
Mitigates this threat by defining conditions in which the TOE will enter a compliant power state. These requirements ensure the device is secure if lost in a compliant power state.
Mitigates this threat by defining the cryptographic functions that can be used to validate the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates as defined by FPT_FUA_EXT.1.
Mitigates this threat by defining the cryptographic functions that can be used to validate the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates as defined by FPT_FUA_EXT.1.
Mitigates this threat by ensuring the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important aspects of the TOE including requests to change and erase the DEK.
Mitigates this threat by providing additional security by only allowing an update to be initiated if the initiator can provide information that would only be known to a trusted administrator.
Mitigates this threat by protecting against a malicious or inadvertent downgrade of the firmware to an earlier version that may have security flaws not present in the more recent version.
Mitigates this threat by ensuring the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important behavior of the TOE which includes the initiation of system firmware/software updates.
Mitigates this threat by providing authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE software/firmware, initiate updates, and verify updates prior to installation using a manufacturer digital signature.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
This cPP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which
the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs
independent testing. Individual evaluation activities to be performed are specified within
each SFR.
Note to ST authors: There is a selection in the ASE_TSS that must be completed. One cannot simply reference the SARs in this cPP.
The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this cPP is as follows: after the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the TOE, supporting environmental IT (if required), and the administrative/user guides for the TOE. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Evaluation Activities contained within the SD, which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the TOE. The Evaluation Activities that are captured in the SD also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the cPP.
The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be Evaluation Activities specified within the SD that call for necessary descriptions to be included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.
The SFRs in this cPP allow for conformant implementations to incorporate a wide range of acceptable key management approaches as long as basic principles are satisfied. Given the criticality of the key management scheme, this cPP requires the developer to provide a detailed description of their key management implementation. This information can be submitted as an appendix to the ST and marked proprietary, as this level of detailed information is not expected to be made publicly available. See Appendix E for details on the expectation of the developer’s Key Management Description
In addition, if the TOE includes a random bit generator Appendix D provides a description of the information expected to be provided regarding the quality of the entropy.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR, including a proprietary Key Management Description (Appendix E), and [selection: Entropy Essay, list of all of 3rd 9 party software libraries (including version numbers), 3rd 10 party hardware components (including model/version numbers), no other cPP specified proprietary documentation].
5.2.2 ADV: Development
The design information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST, and any additional information required by this cPP that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Essay).
The functional specification describes the TOE Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because TOEs conforming to this cPP may have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invoked by TOE users, there is little point
specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this cPP, the evaluation activities
for this family focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the evaluation activities specified.
The evaluation activities are associated with the applicable SFRs. Since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly
already done and no additional documentation is necessary.
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the
SFRs.
Application
Note:
As indicated in the introduction to this section, the
functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and
AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application
developers and the evaluator. The evaluation activities in the functional requirements
point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS
section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element
ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is
necessary.
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.3 AGD: Guidance Documentation
The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that
the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style
and readable by the IT personnel.
Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance
includes:
Instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment
Instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.
Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in
the evaluation activities
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators, and
integrators can be spread among documents or web pages.
The developer should review the evaluation activities to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be
checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Application
Note:
The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a
single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be
spread among documents or web pages. Where appropriate, the guidance documentation is
expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to
support security automation. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should
review the evaluation activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the
guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary
information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
Application
Note:
User and administrator are to be considered in the definition
of user role.
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of
the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each
type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the
control of the TSF.
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of
the TOE (including operation following failure or operational
error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
Application
Note:
As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to
the evaluation activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative
procedures.
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's
delivery procedures.
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE
can be prepared securely for operation.
5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this cPP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor’s development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer’s practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC_CMC.1.
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests
Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA_VAN family. For this cPP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.
Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the operational guidance (includes “evaluated configuration” instructions). The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met. The Evaluation Activities in the SD identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations that are claiming conformance to this cPP.
Application
Note:
The developer must provide at least one product instance of the TOE for complete testing on at least one
platform regardless of equivalency. See the Equivalency Appendix for more details.
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm
that the TSF operates as specified.
Application
Note:
The evaluator should test the application on the most current
fully patched version of the platform.
5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
For the current generation of this cPP, the iTC is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been
discovered in these types of products and provide that content into the AVA_VAN discussion. In most cases, these vulnerabilities
will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. This information will be used in the development of future Protection
Profiles.
If the TOE is a Network Attached Storage (NAS) device, the evaluator shall verify as part of the vulnerability assessment that
remote management services are either not present or can be fully disabled.
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Vulnerability Analysis
Sources of Vulnerability Information
CEM Work Unit AVA_VAN.1-3 is supplemented here to provide a better-defined set of flaws to
investigate and procedures to follow based on this particular technology. Terminology used is based on the flaw hypothesis
methodology, where the evaluation team hypothesizes flaws and then either proves or disproves those flaws (a flaw is equivalent
to a “potential vulnerability” as used in the CEM). Flaws are categorized into four “types” depending on how they are
formulated:
A list of flaw hypotheses applicable to the technology described by the cPP derived from public sources as documented in
the Type 1 Hypotheses section—this fixed set has been agreed to by the iTC. Additionally, this will be supplemented with entries for a set
of public sources (as indicated below) that are directly applicable to the TOE or its identified components (as defined by
the process in the Type 1 Hypotheses section below); this is to ensure that the evaluators include in their assessment applicable entries
that have been discovered since the cPP was published;
A list of flaw hypotheses contained in this document that are derived from lessons learned specific to that technology and
other iTC input (that might be derived from other open sources and vulnerability databases, for example) as documented in
the Type 2 Hypotheses section;
A list of flaw hypotheses derived from information available to the evaluators; this includes the baseline evidence
provided by the vendor described in this document (documentation associated with EAs, documentation described in
the Vulnerability Survey section), as well as other information (public and/or based on evaluator experience) as documented in the Type 3 Hypotheses
section; and
A list of flaw hypotheses that are generated through the use of iTC-defined tools (e.g., nmap, protocol testers) and their
application is specified in the Type 4 Hypotheses section.
Type 1 Hypotheses-Public-Vulnerability-Based
The following list of public sources of vulnerability information was selected by the iTC:
Search Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: http://cve.mitre.org/cve/
Search the National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/
In order to successfully complete this activity, the evaluator will use the developer provided list of all of third party library
information that is used as part of their product, along with the version and any other identifying information (this is required
in the cPP as part of the ASE_TSS.1.1C requirement). This applies to hardware (including chipsets, etc.) that a vendor utilizes
as part of their TOE. This TOE-unique information will be used in the search terms the evaluator uses in addition to those listed
above.
The evaluator will also consider the requirements that are chosen and the appropriate guidance that is tied to each requirement.
In order to supplement this list, the evaluators shall also perform a search on the sources listed above to determine a list of
potential flaw hypotheses that are more recent that the publication date of the cPP, and those that are specific to the TOE and
its components as specified by the additional documentation mentioned above. Any duplicates – either in a specific entry, or in
the flaw hypothesis that is generated from an entry from the same or a different source – can be noted and removed from
consideration by the evaluation team.
As part of type 1 flaw hypothesis generation for the specific components of the TOE, the evaluator shall also search the
component manufacturer’s websites to determine if flaw hypotheses can be generated on this basis (for instance, if security
patches have been released for the version of the component being evaluated, the subject of those patches may form the basis
for a flaw hypothesis).
The iTC has leveraged the expertise of the developers and the evaluation labs to diligently develop the appropriate search
terms and vulnerability databases. They have also thoughtfully considered the iTC-sourced hypotheses the evaluators should
use based upon the applicable use case and the threats to be mitigated by the SFRs. Therefore, it is the intent of the iTC,
for the evaluation to focus all effort on the Type 1 and Type 2 Hypotheses and has decided that Type 3 Hypotheses are not
necessary.
However, if the evaluators discover a Type 3 potential flaw that they believe should be considered, they should work with
their Certification Body to determine the feasibility of pursuing the hypothesis. The Certification Body may determine
whether the potential flaw hypotheses is worth submitting to the iTC for consideration as Type 2 hypotheses in future drafts
of the cPP/SD.
Type 4 Hypotheses-Evaluation-Team-Generated
The iTC has called out several tools that should be used during the Type 2 hypotheses process. Therefore, the use of any tools
is covered within the Type 2 construct and the iTC does not see any additional tools that are necessary. The use case for
Version 2 of this cPP is rather straightforward – the device is found in a powered down state and has not been subjected to
revisit/evil maid attacks. Since that is the use case, the iTC has also assumed there is a trusted channel between the AA and
EE. Since the use case is so narrow, and is not a typical model for penetration or fuzzing testing, the normal types of
testing do not apply. Therefore, the relevant types of tools are referenced in Type 2.
Process for Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis
As flaw hypotheses are generated from the activities described above, the evaluation team will disposition them; that is,
attempt to prove, disprove, or determine the non-applicability of the hypotheses. This process is as follows. The evaluator will refine each flaw hypothesis for the TOE and attempt to disprove it using the information provided by the
developer or through penetration testing. During this process, the evaluator is free to interact directly with the developer
to determine if the flaw exists, including requests to the developer for additional evidence (e.g., detailed design
information, consultation with engineering staff); however, the CB should be included in these discussions. Should the
developer object to the information being requested as being not compatible with the overall level of the evaluation
activity/cPP and cannot provide evidence otherwise that the flaw is disproved, the evaluator prepares an appropriate set of
materials as follows:
The source documents used in formulating the hypothesis, and why it represents a potential compromise against a
specific TOE function;
An argument why the flaw hypothesis could not be proven or disproved by the evidence provided so far; and
The type of information required to investigate the flaw hypothesis further.
The Certification Body (CB) will then either approve or disapprove the request for additional information. If approved, the
developer provides the requested evidence to disprove the flaw hypothesis (or, of course, acknowledge the flaw).
For each hypothesis, the evaluator will note whether the flaw hypothesis has been successfully disproved, successfully proven
to have identified a flaw, or requires further investigation. It is important to have the results documented as outlined in
the Reporting section below. If the evaluator finds a flaw, the evaluator must report these flaws to the developer. All reported flaws must be addressed
as follows:
If the developer confirms that the flaw exists and that it is exploitable at Basic Attack Potential, then a change is made by
the developer, and the resulting resolution is agreed by the evaluator and noted as part of the evaluation report.
If the developer, the evaluator, and the CB agree that the flaw is exploitable only above Basic Attack Potential and does not
require resolution for any other reason, then no change is made and the flaw is noted as a residual vulnerability in the
CB-internal report (ETR).
If the developer and evaluator agree that the flaw is exploitable only above Basic Attack Potential, but it is deemed critical
to fix because of technology-specific or cPP-specific aspects such as typical use cases or operational environments, then a
change is made by the developer, and the resulting resolution is agreed by the evaluator and noted as part of the evaluation
report.
Disagreements between evaluator and vendor regarding questions of the existence of a flaw, its attack potential, or whether
it should be deemed critical to fix are resolved by the CB.
Any testing performed by the evaluator shall be documented in the test report as outlined
in the Reporting section below.
As indicated in the Reporting section, the public statement with respect to vulnerability analysis that is performed on TOEs
conformant to the cPP is constrained to coverage of flaws associated with Types 1 and 2 (defined in the Sources of
Vulnerability Information section) flaw hypotheses only. The fact that the iTC generates these candidate hypotheses indicates
these must be addressed.
Reporting
The evaluators shall produce two reports on the testing effort; one that is public-facing (that is, included in the
non-proprietary evaluation report, which is a subset of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)), and the complete ETR that is
delivered to the overseeing CB.
The public-facing report contains:
The flaw identifiers returned when the procedures for searching public sources were followed according to instructions in
the Type 1 Hypotheses section;
A statement that the evaluators have examined the Type 1 flaw hypotheses specified
in this document in the
Type 1 Hypotheses section (i.e. the flaws listed in the previous bullet) and the Type 2 flaw hypotheses specified in the
the Type 2 Hypotheses section
No other information is provided in the public-facing report.
The internal CB report contains, in addition to the information in the public-facing report:
a list of all of the flaw hypotheses generated (cf. AVA_VAN.1-4);
the evaluator penetration testing effort, outlining the testing approach, configuration, depth and results (cf. AVA_VAN.1-9);
all documentation used to generate the flaw hypotheses (in identifying the documentation used in coming up with the
flaw hypotheses, the evaluation team must characterize the documentation so that a reader can determine whether it is
strictly required in this document, and the nature of the documentation (design information, developer
engineering notebooks, etc.));
the evaluator shall report all exploitable vulnerabilities and residual vulnerabilities, detailing for each:
its source (e.g. CEM activity being undertaken when it was conceived, known to the evaluator, read in a publication)
whether it is exploitable in its operational environment or not (i.e. exploitable or residual).
the amount of time, level of expertise, level of knowledge of the TOE, level of opportunity and the equipment
required to perform the identified vulnerabilities (cf. AVA_VAN.1-11);
how each flaw hypothesis was resolved (this includes whether the original flaw hypothesis was confirmed or
disproved, and any analysis relating to whether a residual vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker with Basic
Attack Potential) (cf. AVA_VAN1-10); and
in the case that actual testing was performed in the investigation (either as part of flaw hypothesis generation
using tools specified by the iTC in the Type 4 Hypotheses section, or in proving or disproving a particular flaw) the steps followed in
setting up the TOE (and any required test equipment); executing the test; post-test procedures; and the actual results
(to a level of detail that allow repetition of the test, including the following:
identification of the potential vulnerability the TOE is being tested for;
instructions to connect and setup all required test equipment as required to conduct the penetration test;
instructions to establish all penetration test prerequisite initial conditions;
Application
Note:
Suitability for testing means not being obfuscated or
packaged in such a way as to disrupt either static or dynamic analysis by the
evaluator.
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
Application
Note:
Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly known vulnerabilities. Public domain
sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to
attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
Appendix A - Optional Requirements
As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be
performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this PP. This appendix contains three other types of optional requirements:
The first type, defined in Appendix A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements, are strictly optional requirements. If the TOE meets any of these requirements the vendor is encouraged to claim the associated SFRs
in the ST, but doing so is not required in order to conform to this PP.
The second type, defined in Appendix A.2 Objective Requirements, are objective requirements. These describe security functionality that is not yet
widely available in commercial technology.
Objective requirements are not currently mandated by this PP, but will be mandated in
the future. Adoption by vendors is encouraged, but claiming these SFRs is not required in order to conform to this
PP.
The third type, defined in Appendix A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements, are Implementation-dependent requirements. If the TOE implements the product features associated with the listed SFRs, either the SFRs must be claimed
or the product features must be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements
A.1.1 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR.1)
This SAR is optional and may be claimed at the ST-Author's discretion.
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect
of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to
provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each
security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw
information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives
from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported
flaws are remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any
corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each
security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw
information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives from
TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
The flaw remediation procedures shall include a procedure requiring timely response and
the automatic distribution of security flaw reports and the associated corrections to
registered users who might be affected by the security flaw.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are
remediated and the remediation procedures issued to TOE users.
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any
corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users may register
with the developer, to be eligible to receive security flaw reports and corrections.
Reminder - Update all crypto SFRs with the crypto catalog versions when available.
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [selection:
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [selection: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3
ECC schemes using “NIST curves” of [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4
FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of
[selection: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1
]and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment:
cryptographic key sizes]
that meet the following:
[assignment:
list of standards].
Application
Note:
Asymmetric keys may be used to “wrap” a key or submask. This SFR should be included by the ST author when making the appropriate selection in FCS_COP.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [by using the appropriate method to destroy
all encryption keys encrypting the key intended for destruction] that meets the following:
[no standard].
Application
Note:
A key can be considered destroyed by destroying the key that protects the
key. If a key is wrapped or encrypted it is not necessary to “overwrite” that key, overwriting
the key that is used to wrap or encrypt the key used to encrypt/decrypt data, using the
appropriate method for the memory type involved, will suffice. For example, if a product uses
a Key Encryption Key (KEK) to encrypt a Data Encryption Key (DEK), destroying the KEK
using one of the methods in FCS_CKM.EXT.6.1 is sufficient, since the DEK would no longer
be usable (of course, presumes the DEK is still encrypted.
The TSF shall require [selection: a password, a known unique value printed on the device, a privileged user action] before the firmware update proceeds.
Application
Note:
Before an update takes place, the drive owner will authorize the update by providing either a known unique
value (for example, a serial number) that is printed on the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
Encryption - Encryption Engine drive, a password (which should be administratively configurable as defined
in FMT_SMF.1) or perform the operation as a privileged user. It is assumed that physical presence to the drive
is limited to authorized personnel. If the correct value is not provided, the update will not take place. The
values are intended to be unique per drive so they cannot be easily exhausted.
The same requirements for cleaning up a password still apply.
The TSF shall verify that the new firmware package is not downgrading to a lower
security version number by [assignment:
method of verifying the security version number
is the same as or higher than the currently installed version].
The TSF shall generate and return an error code if the attempted firmware
update package is detected to be an invalid version.
Application
Note:
This requirement prevents an unauthorized rollback of the firmware to an
earlier authentic version. This mitigates against unknowing installation of an earlier authentic
firmware version that may have a security weakness. It is expected that vendors will increase
security version numbers with each new update package.
For FPT_RBP_EXT.1.1 the purpose is to verify that the new package has a security version
number equal to or larger than the security version number of currently installed firmware
package.
The administrator guidance would include instructions for the administrator to configure the
rollback prevention mechanism, if appropriate.
A.2 Objective Requirements
This PP does not define any
Objective requirements.
A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements
This PP does not define any
Implementation-dependent requirements.
Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements
As indicated in the introduction to this PP,
the baseline requirements
(those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform)
are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of
the PP:
if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below must be included.
The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1 and specified cryptographic key
sizes [selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the following: [no standard].
Application
Note:
Symmetric keys may be used to generate keys along the key chain. Any instance in where the TSFDRBG is referenced for key generation (as in FCS_AFA_EXT.1,
FCS_SNI_EXT.1, and FCS_KDF_EXT.1), or where the TSF generates or re-generates key encryption or key wrapping keys as part of deriving a key or validating
an authorization factor (as in FCS_KYC_EXT.1, FPT_KYP_EXT.1, and FCS_VAL_EXT.1)
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified in FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
Application
Note:
This SFR must be included in the ST if selected in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
This SFR should be
In the first selection, the ST Author is presented options for destroying disused cryptographic
keys based on whether they are in volatile memory or non-volatile storage within the TOE. The
selection of block erase for non-volatile storage applies only to flash memory. A block erase
does not require a read-verify, since the reference to the memory location is erased as well
as the data itself.
Within the selections is the option to overwrite the memory location with a new value of a key. The intent is that a new value of a key (as specified in another SFR within the PP) can be used
to “replace” an existing key.
Several selections allow assignment of a ‘value that does not contain any CSP’. This means
that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS_RBG
requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The
point of the phrase ‘does not contain any CSP’ is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully
selected, and not taken from a general ‘pool’ that might contain current or residual data that
itself requires confidentiality protection.
Key destruction does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs.
FCS_CKM.6/SW Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
This component must be included in the ST if any of the following SFRs are included:
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified in FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
[assignment:
some value that does not contain any CSP]
]
removal of power to the memory,
destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection
]
For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided
by the underlying platform that [selection:
logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection: single, [assignment:
ST author defined multi-pass]]
overwrite consisting of [selection:
Application
Note:
This SFR must be included in the ST if selected in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the
most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be
various levels of abstraction visible. For instance, in a given implementation the application
may have access to the file system details and may be able to logically address specific memory
locations. In another implementation the application may simply have a handle to a resource
and can only ask the platform to delete the resource. The level of detail to which the TOE has
access will be reflected in the TSS section of the ST.
Several selections allow assignment of a ‘value that does not contain any CSP’. This means
that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS_RBG
requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The
point of the phrase ‘does not contain any CSP’ is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully
selected, and not taken from a general ‘pool’ that might contain current or residual data that
itself requires confidentiality protection.
Key destruction does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified in FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
[assignment:
some value that does not contain any CSP]
]
removal of power to the memory,
destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection
]
For non-volatile [selection:
that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be
executed by a [selection: single overwrite consisting of zeroes, single overwrite consisting of ones, overwrite with a new value of a key of the same size, single overwrite consisting of [assignment:
some value that does not
29 contain any CSP], block erase]
that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction
shall be executed by a [selection:
[selection: single, [assignment:
ST author defined multi-pass] overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-verify]
[selection: single, [assignment:
ST author defined multi-pass] overwrite
consisting of ones followed by a read-verify]
[selection: single, [assignment:
ST author defined multi-pass]overwrite
consisting of [assignment:
some value that does not contain any CSP] followed by a read-verify]block erase
]
]and if the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall
be repeated again up to [assignment: number of times to attempt
overwrite] times, whereupon an error is returned.
Application
Note:
This SFR must be included in the ST if selected in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
In the first selection, the ST Author is presented options for destroying a
key based on the memory or storage technology where keys are stored within the TOE.
If non-volatile memory is used to store keys, the ST Author selects whether the memory
storage algorithm uses wear-leveling or not. Storage technologies or memory types that use
wear-leveling are not required to perform a read verify. The selection for destruction
includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase
does not require a read verify, since the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory
locations are erased as well as the data itself.
Within the selections is the option to overwrite a disused key with a new value of a key. The
intent is that a new value of a key (as specified in another SFR within the PP) can be used to
“replace” an existing key.
If a selection for read verify is chosen, it should generate an audit record upon failures.
Several selections allow assignment of a ‘value that does not contain any CSP’. This means
that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting
FCS_RBG_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other
selection options. The point of the phrase ‘does not contain any CSP’ is to ensure that the
overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general ‘pool’ that might contain
current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.
Key destruction does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs.
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [selection: HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-256] and [selection: HMAC, AES] key sizes [assignment:
key size (in bits)] that meet the following: [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”, NIST SP 800-38B].
Application
Note:
The key size [k] in the assignment falls into a range between L1 and L2 (defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function for
example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 =256) where L2 ≤ k ≤ L1.
This SFR is required when the TSF performs a key derivation operation as part of maintaining and deriving a key chain (FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
FCS_KYC_EXT.1) or when the TSF performs validation of a submask, intermediate key, or BEV using a keyed hash operation (FCS_VAL_EXT.1).
The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [selection: CBC, GCM] mode] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772]].
Application
Note:
This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use AES encryption/decryption for protecting the keys as part of the key chaining
approach that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
This SFR is required when the TSF performs key encryption as part of maintaining and deriving a key chain (FCS_KDF_EXT.1, FCS_KYC_EXT.1) or when the TSF
uses key encryption as part of password conditioning.
The TSF shall perform [key transport] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [RSA in the following modes [selection: KTS-OAEP, KTS-KEM-KWS] and the cryptographic key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-56B, Revision 1].
Application
Note:
This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use key transport in the key chaining approach that is specified in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
This SFR is required when the TSF performs key encryption as part of maintaining and deriving a key chain (FCS_KDF_EXT.1, FCS_KYC_EXT.1) or
when the TSF uses key encryption as part of password conditioning.
The TSF shall perform [key wrapping] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the following modes [selection: KW, KWP, GCM, CCM] and cryptographic key size [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [selection: NIST SP 800-38F, ISO/IEC 19772, no other standards]].
Application
Note:
This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use key wrapping in the key chaining approach that is specified in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
This SFR is required when the TSF performs key wrapping as part of maintaining and deriving a key chain (FCS_KDF_EXT.1, FCS_KYC_EXT.1) or
when the TSF performs validation of a submask, intermediate key, or BEV using a key wrap operation (FCS_VAL_EXT.1).
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1, FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1.
The TSF shall perform [data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in
[selection: CBC, GCM, XTS]
mode] and cryptographic key sizes
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3,
[selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772, XTS as specified in IEEE 1619]].
Application
Note:
The intent of this requirement in the context of this cPP is to provide an SFR that expresses the appropriate symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms
suitable for use in the TOE. If the ST author incorporates the validation requirement (FCS_VAL_EXT.1) and chooses to select the option to decrypt a known
value and perform a comparison, this is the requirement used to specify the algorithm, modes, and key sizes the ST author can choose from.
When the XTS mode is selected, a cryptographic key of 256-bit or of 512-bit is allowed as specified in IEEE 1619. XTS-AES key is divided into two AES keys
of equal size - for example, AES-128 is used as the underlying algorithm, when 256-bit key and XTS mode are selected. AES-256 is used when a 512-bit key
and XTS mode are selected.
This SFR is required when the TSF performs any key wrapping, key encryption, or key derivation operation as part of maintaining and deriving a key chain
(FCS_KDF_EXT.1, FCS_KYC_EXT.1), or when the TSF performs validation of a submask, intermediate key, or BEV using a symmetric encryption operation
(FCS_VAL_EXT.1).
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2.
The TSF shall accept [selection: an RNG generated submask as specified in FCS_RBG.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection:
NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]
] using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
Application
Note:
This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to
use key derivation in the key chaining approach that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.2.
This requirement establishes acceptable methods for generating a new random key or an existing submask to create a new key along the key chain.
FCS_RBG.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
The TSF shall perform deterministic random bit generation services using
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)] in accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] after initialization with a seed.
The TSF shall use a [selection: TSF noise source [assignment:
name of noise source], multiple TSF noise sources [assignment:
names of noise sources], TSF interface for seeding]
for initialized seeding.
Application
Note:
For the
selection in this requirement, the ST author selects "TSF noise source" if
a single noise source is used as input to the DRBG. The ST author selects "multiple TSF noise sources" if a seed is formed from a combination of two or more noise sources within the TOE boundary. If the TSF implements two or more separate DRBGs that are seeded in separate manners, this SFR should be iterated for each DRBG. It multiple distinct noise sources exist such that each DRBG only uses one of them, then each iteration would select "TSF noise source"; "multiple TSF noise sources" is only selected if a single DRBG uses multiple noise sources for its seed. The ST author selects "TSF interface for seeding" if noise source data is generated outside the TOE boundary.
If "TSF noise source" is selected, FCS_RBG.3 must be claimed.
The TSF shall update the RBG state by [selection: reseeding, uninstantiating and reinstantiating] using a [selection: TSF noise source [assignment:
name of noise source], TSF interface for seeding]
in the following situations: [selection:
never
on demand
on the condition: [assignment:
condition]
after [assignment:
time]
]
in accordance with [assignment:
list of standards].
Application
Note:
This SFR is claimed when the TSF requires the use of random bit generation for submask generation (FCS_AFA_EXT.1,
FCS_KDF_EXT.1) or salt generation (FCS_SNI_EXT.1).
FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall be able to accept a minimum input of [assignment:
minimum input length greater than zero] from a TSF interface for the purpose of seeding.
Application
Note:
This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from one or more noise source that is outside the TOE
boundary. Typically the entropy produced by an environmental noise source is conditioned such that the input length has
full entropy and is therefore usable as the seed. However, if this is not the case, it should be noted what the minimum
entropy rate of the noise source is so that the TSF can collect a sufficiently large sample of noise data to be
conditioned into a seed value.
FCS_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using a [selection, choose one of: TSF software-based noise source, TSF hardware-based noise source] [assignment:
name of noise source] with a minimum of [assignment:
number of bits] bits of min-entropy.
Application
Note:
This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from a single noise source that is within the TOE boundary. Min-entropy should be expressed as a ratio of entropy bits to sampled bits so that the total amount of data needed to ensure full entropy is known, as well as the conditioning function by which that data is reduced in size to the seed.
FCS_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using [selection: [assignment:
number] TSF software-based noise sources, [assignment:
number] TSF hardware-based noise sources].
Application
Note:
This requirement is claimed when a DRBG is seeded with entropy from multiple noise sources that are within the TOE boundary. FCS_RBG.5 defines the mechanism by which these sources are combined to ensure sufficient minimum entropy.
FCS_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall [assignment:
combining operation] [selection: output from TSF noise sources, input from TSF interfaces for seeding)] to create the entropy input into the derivation function as defined in [assignment:
list of standards], resulting in a minimum of [assignment:
number of bits] bits of min-entropy.
Application
Note:
Examples of typical combining operations include, but are not limited to, XORing or hashing.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1, FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1.
The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-521] to generate an [intermediary key or BEV].
Application
Note:
This requirement specifies the way that a product may combine the various submasks by using either an XOR or an
approved SHA-hash. The approved hash functions are captured in
FCS_COP.1/Hash.
This SFR is claimed when the TSF requires the use of submask combining as part of maintaining or deriving a key chain.
FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2.
The TSF shall perform validation of the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV]
using the following methods: [selection:
key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap;
hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV]
as specified in [selection: FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash] and compare it to a stored hashed [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV];
decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] specified in FCS_COP.1/SKC and compare it against a stored known value
The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [forwarding the BEV to the EE].
Application
Note:
This SFR is claimed when the TSF validates an authentication factor as a prerequisite to unlocking the key chain as
defined in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
perform a key sanitization of the DEK upon a
[selection: configurable number, [assignment:
ST author specified number]]
of consecutive failed validation attempts
institute a delay such that only [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] can be made within a 24 hour period
block validation after [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts
require power cycle or reset the TOE after [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts
The purpose of performing secure validation is to not expose any material that might compromise the submasks. For the selections in FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1, the ST author must clarify in the KMD which specific entities are referred to in this SFR if multiple entities of a type exist.
The TOE validates the submasks (e.g., authorization factors) prior to presenting the BEV to the EE. When a password is used as an authorization factor, it is conditioned before any attempts to validate. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not forward a BEV to EE.
When the key wrap in FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap is used, the validation is performed inherently.
The delay must be enforced by the TOE, but this requirement is not intended to address attacks that bypass the product (e.g. attacker obtains hash value or “known” crypto value and mounts attacks outside of the TOE, such as a third party password crackers). The cryptographic functions (i.e., hash, decryption) performed are those specified in FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, and FCS_COP.1/SKC.
The ST author may need to iterate this requirement if multiple authentication factors are used, and either different methods are used to validate, or in some cases one or more authentication factors may be validated, and one or more are not validated.
B.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
This component must be included in the ST if any of the following SFRs are included:
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [DRBG self-test failure].
Application
Note:
The intent of this requirement is to ensure that cryptographic services requiring random bit generation cannot be performed if a failure of a self-test defined in FPT_TST.1 occurs.
The TSF shall authenticate the source of the firmware update using the
digital signature algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1/SigVer using the RTU
that contains [selection: the public key, hash value of the public key as specified in FCS_COP.1/Hash]
The TSF shall only allow modification of the existing firmware after
the successful validation of the digital signature, using a mechanism as described in
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2.
Application
Note:
The firmware portion of the TOE (e.g., RTU (key store and the signature
verification algorithm)) is expected to be stored in a write protected area on the TOE. It is
expected that the firmware only be modifiable in a post-manufacturing state using the
authenticated update mechanism described in FPT_FUA_EXT.1. The TSF is modifiable only
by using the mechanisms specified in FPT_TUD_EXT.
The TSF shall return an error code if any part of the firmware update process
fails.
Application
Note:
This SFR must be claimed if "authenticated firmware update mechanism as
described in FPT_FUA_EXT.1" is claimed in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3.
These requirements are for an SED in an operational state – not a drive in manufacturing.
The authenticated firmware update mechanism employs digital signatures to ensure the
authenticity of the firmware update image. The TSF provides a RTU that contains a signature
verification algorithm and a key store that includes the public key needed to verify the signature
on the update image. The key store in the RTU should include a public key used to verify the
signature on an update image or a hash of the public key if a copy of the public key is provided
with the update image. In the latter case, the update mechanism should hash the public key
provided with the update image, and ensure that it matches a hash which appears in the key
store before using the provided public key to verify the signature on the update image. If the
hash of the public key is selected, the ST author may iterate the FCS_COP.1/Hash requirement -
to specify the hashing functions used.
The intent of this requirement is to specify that the authenticated update mechanism should
ensure that the new image has been digitally signed; and that the digital signature can be
verified by using a public key before the update takes place. The requirement also specifies
that the authenticated update mechanism only allows installation of updates when the digital
signature has been successfully verified by the TSF.
FPT_TST.1 TSF Self-Testing
The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in
FCS_RBG.1.2.
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment:
conditions under which self-test should occur]]
to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment:
parts of TSF], TSF data]: [assignment:
list of self-tests run by the TSF].
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment:
parts of TSF], TSF].
Application
Note:
This SFR is a required dependency of FCS_RBG.1. It is intended to require that any DRBG implemented by the TOE undergo health testing to ensure that the random bit generation functionality has not been degraded. If the TSF supports multiple DRBGs, this SFR should be iterated to describe the self-test behavior for each.
Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions
This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP.
C.1 Extended Components Table
All extended components specified in the PP are listed in this table:
Table 5: Extended Component Definitions
Functional Class
Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Destruction Types FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation) FCS_VAL_EXT Validation of Cryptographic Elements
The TSF shall accept [selection: an RNG generated submask as specified in FCS_RBG.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection:
NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]
] using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1, such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
C.2.1.3 FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining
Family Behavior
This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the drive.
Component Leveling
FCS_KYC_EXT.1,
Key Chaining (Initiator),
requires the TSF to maintain a key chain for a BEV that is provided to a component external to the TOE. Note that this cPP does not include FCS_KYC_EXT.1; it is only included here to provide a complete definition of the FCS_KYC_EXT family.
FCS_KYC_EXT.2,
Key Chaining (Recipient) ,
requires the TSF to be able to accept a BEV that is then chained to a DEK used
by the TSF through some method.
]
while maintaining an effective strength of
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of
[selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] for asymmetric keys.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide at least a
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] BEV to [assignment:
one or more external entities]
[selection:
after the TSF has successfully performed the validation process as specified in FCS_VAL_EXT.1
] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] for asymmetric keys.
C.2.1.4 FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining
Family Behavior
This family specifies the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more than one submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.
Component Leveling
FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
Submask Combining ,
requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a predictable fashion.
The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-521] to generate an [assignment:
types of keys].
C.2.1.5 FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
Family Behavior
This family ensures that salts, nonces, and IVs are well formed.
Component Leveling
FCS_SNI_EXT.1,
Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation),
requires the generation of salts, nonces, and IVs to be used by the cryptographic components of the TOE to be performed in the specified manner.
The TSF shall perform validation of the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV]
using the following methods: [selection:
key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1;
hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV]
as specified in [assignment:
cryptographic operation requirement] and compare it to a stored hashed [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV];
decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] specified in FCS_COP.1 and compare it against a stored known value
perform a key sanitization of the DEK upon a
[selection: configurable number, [assignment:
ST author specified number]]
of consecutive failed validation attempts
institute a delay such that only [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] can be made within a 24 hour period
block validation after [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts
require power cycle or reset the TOE after [assignment:
ST author specified number of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts
The TSF shall require [selection: a password, a known unique value printed on the device, a privileged user action] before the firmware update proceeds.
The TSF shall authenticate the source of the firmware update using the
digital signature algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1 using the RTU
that contains [selection: the public key, hash value of the public key as specified in FCS_COP.1]
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only allow installation of update if the digital signature
has been successfully verified as specified in FCS_COP.1.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall only allow modification of the existing firmware after
the successful validation of the digital signature, using a mechanism as described in
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall return an error code if any part of the firmware update process
fails.
C.2.2.3 FPT_KYP_EXT Key and Key Material Protection
Family Behavior
This family requires that key and key material be protected if and when written to non-volatile storage.
Component Leveling
FPT_KYP_EXT.1,
Protection of Key and Key Material ,
requires the TSF to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to non-volatile storage.
This family defines secure behavior of the TSF when the TOE supports multiple power saving states. The use of compliant power saving states (i.e. power saving states that purge security relevant data upon entry) is essential for ensuring that state transitions cannot be used as attack vectors to bypass TOE self-protection mechanisms.
Component Leveling
FPT_PWR_EXT.1,
Power Saving States,
defines the compliant power saving states that are implemented by the TSF.
FPT_PWR_EXT.2,
Timing of Power Saving States,
describes the situations that cause compliant power saving states to be entered.
Management: FPT_PWR_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Enable or disable the use of individual power saving states
Specify one or more power saving state configurations
The TSF shall define the following compliant power saving states: [selection, choose one of: S3, S4, G2(S5), G3, D0, D1, D2, D3, [assignment:
other power saving states]].
For each compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter
the compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur: user-initiated request, [selection: shutdown, user inactivity, request initiated by remote management system, [assignment:
other conditions], no other conditions].
C.2.2.5 FPT_RBP_EXT Rollback Protection
Family Behavior
This family requires that the TSF protects against rollbacks or downgrades
to its firmware.
Component Leveling
FPT_RBP_EXT.1,
Rollback Protection,
requires the TSF to detect and prevent unauthorized rollback.
The TSF shall verify that the new firmware package is not downgrading to a lower
security version number by [assignment:
method of verifying the security version number
is the same as or higher than the currently installed version].
FPT_RBP_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall generate and return an error code if the attempted firmware
update package is detected to be an invalid version.
C.2.2.6 FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update
Family Behavior
Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE firmware and/or software.
Component Leveling
FPT_TUD_EXT.1,
Trusted Update,
requires the capability to be provided to update the TOE firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation.
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates
Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
The TSF shall provide [assignment:
list of subjects] the ability to
query the current version of the TOE
[selection: software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide [assignment:
list of subjects] the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[selection: software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a [selection: digital signature, published hash] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
C.2.3 User Data Protection
This PP defines the following extended components as part of the
class originally defined by CC Part 2:
C.2.3.1 FDP_DSK_EXT Protection of Data on Disk
Family Behavior
This family specifies methods for ensuring that data residing in permanent storage on disk is
not subject to unauthorized disclosure.
Component Leveling
FDP_DSK_EXT.1,
Protection of Data on Disk,
requires the TSF to validate submasks and BEVs by one or
more of the specified methods.
The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1, such that the drive contains no plaintext protected data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Appendix D - Entropy Documentation and Assessment
This is an optional appendix in the cPP, and only applies if the TOE is providing deterministic random bit generation services, e.g. the ST claims FCS_RBG.1.
This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used by the TOE.
The documentation of the entropy sources should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS in the public facing ST.
D.1 Design Description
Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.
The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.
This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.
If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.
D.2 Entropy Justification
There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses made of the RBG output (by this particular TOE). This argument will include a description of the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the TOE randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.
The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the type of entropy source included in the product.
For developer provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed, and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.
For third party provided entropy sources, in which the TOE vendor has limited access to the design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor to “assume” an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the assumption included in the ST.
Regardless of type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is initialized with the entropy stated in the ST, for example by verifying that the min-entropy rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered complete.
The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.
D.3 Operating Conditions
The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such, documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is no longer guaranteed to provide sufficient entropy. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.
D.4 Health Testing
More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at startup, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, TOE behavior upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.
Appendix E - Key Management Description
The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS - it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.
Essay:
The essay will provide the following information for all keys in the key chain:
The purpose of the key
If the key is stored in non-volatile memory
How and when the key is protected
How and when the key is derived
The strength of the key
When or if the key would be no longer needed, along with a justification.
The essay will also describe the following topics:
A description of all authorization factors that are supported by the product and how each factor is handled, including any conditioning and combining performed.
If validation is supported, the process for validation shall be described, noting what value is used for validation and the process used to perform the validation. It shall describe how this process ensures no keys in the key chain are weakened or exposed by this process.
The authorization process that leads to the ultimate release of the BEV. This section shall detail the key chain used by the product. It shall describe which keys are used in the protection of the BEV and how they meet the derivation, key wrap, or a combination of the two requirements, including the direct chain from the initial authorization to the BEV. It shall also include any values that add into that key chain or interact with the key chain and the protections that ensure those values do not weaken or expose the overall strength of the key chain.
The diagram and essay will clearly illustrate the key hierarchy to ensure that at no point the chain could be broken without a cryptographic exhaust or all of the initial authorization values and the effective strength of the BEV is maintained throughout the Key Chain.
A description of the data encryption engine, its components, and details about its implementation (e.g. for hardware: integrated within the device’s main SOC or separate co-processor, for software: initialization of the product, drivers, libraries (if applicable), logical interfaces for encryption/decryption, and areas which are not encrypted (e.g. boot loaders, portions associated with the Master Boot Record (MBRs), partition tables, etc.)). The description should also include the data flow from the device’s host interface to the device’s persistent media storing the data, information on those conditions in which the data bypasses the data encryption engine (e.g. read-write operations to an unencrypted Master Boot Record area). The description should be detailed enough to verify all platforms to ensure that when the user enables encryption, the product encrypts all hard storage devices. It should also describe the platform’s boot initialization, the encryption initialization process, and at what moment the product enables the encryption.
The process for destroying keys when they are no longer needed by describing the storage location of all keys and the protection of all keys stored in non-volatile memory.
Diagram:
The diagram will include all keys from the initial authorization factors to the BEV and any keys or values that contribute into the chain. It must list the cryptographic strength of each key and indicate how each key along the chain is protected with either Key Derivation or Key Wrapping (from the allowed options). The diagram should indicate the input used to derive or unwrap each key in the chain.
A functional (block) diagram showing the main components (such as memories and processors) and the data path between, for hardware, the device’s host interface and the device’s persistent media storing the data, or for software, the initial steps needed for the activities the TOE performs to ensure it encrypts the storage device entirely when a user or administrator first provisions the product. The hardware encryption diagram shall show the location of the data encryption engine within the data path.
The hardware encryption diagram shall show the location of the data encryption engine within the data path. The evaluator shall validate that the hardware encryption diagram contains enough detail showing the main components within the data path and that it clearly identifies the data encryption engine.
